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INTRODUCTION 
CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS: SOME OBSERVATIONS 
F. Gilbert Chan & Ka-che Yip 
This book is not a comprehensive study of China's foreign policy; 
it offers instead a selective treatment of China's relations with the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the United States (US), 
and Taiwan. With the possible exception of June Dreyer's chapter, 
which chronicles the rivalries between the People's Republic of China 
(PRC) and the USSR along the Sinkiang border, the book concen-
trates on the developments of the 1970s. 
The contributors of this volume have come from different 
backgrounds, although all of them received their graduate training 
from major American universities. Bryon Weng, now teaching at the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong, is a Taiwanese, while Gilbert 
Chan and Ka-che Yip were brought up in the British colony of Hong 
Kong. To them, the Taiwan problem may be more than an academic 
issue, and their analyses of the subject often reflect the emotional 
dilemma of many Chinese intellectuals who have no political 
connection with either the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). The views expressed by these three 
contributors on the question of Taiwan obviously do not represent the 
opinions of either the editors of the Occasional Papers/Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies or the School of Law at the 
University of Maryland. 
From 1968 through February 1977, Robert Sutter was a Chinese 
foreign policy analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. He and 
Robert Worden are now associated with the Library of Congress. 
June Dreyer worked in the same library before she started to teach at 
the University of Miami. While their experiences in these govern-
ment agencies have brought a new dimension to their studies, their 
interpretations of China's foreign relations do not reflect the views of 
the US government. 
THE SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION 
China's decision against renewing the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, which expired in 1980, 
was not unexpected. The hostility and suspicion which marked the 
(1) 
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relations of the two Communist powers for the last twenty years had 
rendered the treaty virtually meaningless. Indeed, as Harry Schwartz 
noted in the mid-1960s, the alliance was "unnatural" because of the 
"conflicting ... national interests of these two great nations."' In 
1969, Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times openly discussed 
"the coming war between Russia and China."2 
The causes of the Sino-Soviet dispute are complicated and 
fundamental, and Franz Michael is incorrect to dismiss it as simply 
"a power struggle for the leadership of the Communist bloc."3 The 
peoples of the PRC and the USSR have been shaped by different 
histories and traditions. They are further separated by the wide gap 
in their economic and technological developments. Thanks to the 
dissimilar revolutionary realities in China and Russia, the leaders of 
the two Communist parties have pursued different national goals 
through different political strategies. Moreover, even prior to 
Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin in 1956, the USSR had not been 
overly generous toward China. The credit of 300 million dollars 
which Stalin extended to the PRC in the 1950 treaty compared poorly 
with the loan of 450 million dollars granted to Poland two years 
earlier.4 
The Sino-Soviet dispute along the Sinkiang border, as described 
by June Dreyer in the second chapter of this volume, clearly 
illustrates some of the differences which have brought about the 
1. Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars: A History of Chinese-Russian 
Relations (revised edition; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1973}, p.3. 
2. Salisbury, The Coming War Between Russia and China (London: Pan Books 
Ltd., 1969). 
3. See Michael's statement in Sino-Soviet Conflict: Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict 
and Itslmplications, submitted by the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives !Washington, D.C.: US 
Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 8. For further discussions of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute, see Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars; C. P. Fitzgerald, The 
Chinese View of Their Place in the World !London: Oxford University Press, 1969}, esp. 
pp. 44-68; G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, The 
Sino-Soviet Dispute <New York: Praeger, 196U; 0. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: 
The ~Great Game" <New York: Columbia University Press, 1971}; Klaus Mehnert, 
Peking and Moscow <New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963}; Sidney Klein, The Road 
Divides: Economic Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute CHong Kong: International 
Studies Group, 1966); David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the 
Sino-Soviet Conflict <New York: Praeger, 1963}; Harold C. Hinton, The Bear at the 
Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure (Stanford: Hoover Institution on 
War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 197U; and 0. B. Borisov and B. T. 
Koloskov, Sino-Soviet Relations !Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975L 
4. Schwartz, Tsars, Mandarins, and Commissars, p. 158. 
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confrontation between the two Communist parties. China's interests 
in the "Western Regions" can be dated back to the glorious era of the 
Han dynasty, although this vast territory did not become a Chinese 
province until 1884. Conflicts with Russia over this borderland, 
however, had started before the close of the seventeenth century. 
Negotiations between the Manchu dynasty and the czarist govern-
ment at Nerchinsk and Kiakhta, in 1689 and 1727 respectively, 
resulted in the loss of Chinese territory in these "Western Regions." 
Russian aggression intensified in the nineteenth century as the 
Manchus declined in power.5 
After the Russian Revolution of 1917, as June Dreyer suggests, 
the USSR "proved even more interested" in Sinkiang than its czarist 
predecessor. Indeed, at times, Stalin was willing to hurt the Chinese 
Communist movement in order to protect the Soviet influence in this 
province. In 1937, for example, when Governor Sheng Shih-ts'ai 
proposed to Ch'en Shao-yu and K'ang Sheng that he would become a 
CCP member, Stalin pressured the Chinese Communists to reject 
Sheng's application. Nonetheless, in the following year, the Soviet 
leader persuaded Sheng to join the Russian Communist Party, 
thereby extending Soviet control over Sinkiang.6 In view of these 
earlier developments along China's northwestern frontier, one may 
argue that the confrontation between the USSR and the PRC in the 
post-1956 years was inevitable. 
The Chinese Communist leaders disagreed with Khrushchev, 
and later with Brezhnev in the 1960s, over their different policies 
toward Washington. They denounced Khrushchev's pursuit of peace-
ful coexistence with the US as "revisionistic," while condemning 
Moscow's reluctance to support their attempt to "liberate" Taiwan in 
1958. Sino-Soviet relations were further strained when the US 
stepped up its involvement in Vietnam in early 1965. According to 
Harold Hinton, Chinese and Soviet policies toward the war were 
"competitive and almost hostile."7 As the PRC became increasingly 
concerned with the possibility of Russian invasion, its leaders 
5. Clubb, China and Russia, pp. 30-132; and Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Ili Crisis; 
A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 1878-1881 <Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). 
6. F. Gilbert Chan, "Regionalism and Central Power: Sheng Shih-ts'ai in 
Sinkiang, 1933-1944," in F. Gilbert Chan (ed.l, China at the Crossroads: Nationalists 
and Communists, 1927-1949 <Boulder: Westview Press, 1980>, pp. 139-40; and Allen S. 
Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? lEast Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 1958), pp. 53-57. 
7. Harold C. Hinton, The Sino-Soviet Confrontation: Implications for the Future 
<New York: Crane, Russak & Co., Ltd., 1976>, p. 8. 
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abandoned the strategy of struggling simultaneously against Moscow 
and Washington. Henceforth, they treated the USSR as China's 
principal enemy. In an interview on August 21-23, 1980 with Oriana 
Fallaci, a noted Italian journalist, Teng Hsiao-p'ing warned the 
Western powers about "the inevitability of the third world war."8 
In the third chapter of this volume, Robert Sutter discusses 
China's endeavors to improve its relations with the Nixon adminis-
tration. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, the main architects of this 
policy, were determined to "broaden Peking's leverage against the 
USSR," and the US "seemed to have sufficient strength to serve as an 
effective deterrent to Soviet pressure." Nevertheless, as "antihege-
monism" constituted the core of China's foreign policy in the 1970s, 
the Chinese leaders were evidently troubled by Washington's "weak-
ness," especially after the collapse of the US position in Indochina 
during the spring of 1975. In the 1980 interview, Teng Hsiao-p'ing 
bluntly told Oriana Fallaci that "America fears the Soviet Union."9 
In addition to normalizing its relations with the US, the PRC 
also tried to win the support of Japan, as well as countries in both 
Southeast Asia and Western Europe, in order to counteract the Soviet 
military threat. After long and difficult negotiations, Peking con-
cluded the Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Tokyo on August 12, 
1978. The Chinese leaders succeeded in including in this document 
the provision of "antihegemonism" which, though somewhat mod-
ified to accommodate Japanese sensitivities, was clearly directed 
against the USSR. Significantly, when Hua Kuo-feng visited Japan 
in May 1980, he stated that it would be "a matter of course" for the 
Japanese government to increase its military spending. 111 Preoccupied 
with the threat of Soviet aggression, the Chinese leadership had 
obviously overcome its earlier fear of the "revival of Japanese 
militarism." 
China's "punitive" expedition against Hanoi in early 1979 was 
indicative of its apprehension of Soviet-Vietnamese encirclement. 
Hanoi's military raids into Thailand in June 1980 reinforced Peking's 
suspicion that Vietnam's aggressive activities in Southeast Asia 
represented an extension of Soviet influence in that region. Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing therefore characterized Hanoi as "the Cuba of the East," 
charging that "the Vietnamese are following the footsteps of the 
Soviet Union." 11 
8. Washington Post, September 1, 1980, p. A10. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid., May 29, 1980, p. A17. 
11. See E'allaci's interview with Teng, in ibid., September 1, 1980, p. A10. 
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In spite of the many differences between the PRC and the USSR, 
however, it seems unlikely that polemics will, in the near future, give 
way to a war of weapons. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has 
apparently dragged the USSR into such a political quagmire that it 
may discourage this Communist power from taking military actions 
in other parts of the world. Moreover, many of the Soviet leaders, 
including Brezhnev, are advanced in years, and some are in very poor 
health. It is doubtful that they will risk a major confrontation with 
the PRC. Similarly, the post-Mao leadership in China is, at present, 
busily involved in the task of modernization, and Hua Kuo-feng and 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing simply cannot afford to waste their limited 
resources on a military adventure against the USSR. Yet, these 
encouraging factors notwithstanding, few observers have, so far, 
suggested that the two Communist rivals will soon settle their 
differences in a peaceful fashion. In fact, the roots of their dispute are 
so deeply grounded that the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapproche-
ment seems extremely remote. 
SINO-AMERICAN RAPPROCHMENT AND THE FUTURE OF 
TAIWAN 
On December 15, 1978, President Jimmy Carter announced that 
the US would establish full diplomatic relations with the PRC at the 
beginning of the following year. The Americans would henceforth 
terminate their official ties with the Republic of China <ROC), while 
maintaining their economic and cultural connections. The security 
treaty of 1954 would be abrogated a year afterward. These executive 
actions completed the process of normalization started by Richard 
Nixon's ping-pong diplomacy of 1971. 12 
Carter's "China decision" did not represent an "about face" of 
Washington's policy toward the PRC. The process of normalization 
was initiated by a Republican president, and the diplomatic goal was 
finally achieved under a Democratic administration almost seven 
years after the promulgation of the Shanghai Communique of 
February 1972. The delay was caused by the Watergate scandal and 
Gerald Ford's preoccupation with the 1976 presidential campaign 
against a conservative challenger within his own party. 
12. On President Carter's decision to establish diplomatic relations with China, 
see Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy !eds.l, The Chinese Connection and Normaliza-
tion (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 19801, esp. 107-15; and John 
Tierney, Jr. led. I, About Face: The China Decision and Its Consequences !New Rochelle, 
N.Y.: Arlington Houe Publishers, 19791. 
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In the Shanghai Communique, the American government did not 
challenge the "one China" policy pursued by both Peking and Taipei. 
According to Ralph Clough, this policy was "firmly grounded in 
historical precedent."13 Indeed, as Robert Worden points out in the 
fourth chapter of this book, the Chinese government described the 
Taiwan problem in February 1972 as "the crucial question" in 
Sino-American relations. · 
Carter's recognition of the PRC was intended to serve US 
interests. He hoped to use the "China card" to strengthen Washing-
ton's position vis-a-vis Moscow. During his visit to Peking in May 
1978, Zbigniew Brzezinski, assistant to the president on national 
security matters, assured his hosts at a banquet: 
As ·reflected in the Shanghai Communique, our commitment to 
friendship with China is based on shared concerns and is derived 
from a long-term strategic view .... We recognize- and share 
-China's resolve to resist the efforts of any nation which seeks 
to establish global or regional hegemony. 14 
He further entertained the Chinese with his anti-Soviet jokes, 
earning the nickname of "polar-bear tamer" for himself. 15 
Taiwan has not fared poorly after severing its diplomatic 
connections with Washington. Under the provisions of the Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979, the US will continue to supply the ROC with 
"arms of a defensive character." Moreover, Washington will hence-
forth "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other 
than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to 
the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave 
concern to the United States."16 As Byron Weng elaborates in the last 
chapter of this volume, Peking has likewise initia~ed a new 
conciliatory policy toward the ROC. In the summer of 1980, 
13. Clough, Island China <Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 
123. For the text of the Shanghai Communique, see GeneT. Hsiao led.), Sino-American 
Detente and Its Policy Implications <New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 298-301. 
14. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's Republic of 
China <hereinafter FBIS-CHD, May 22, 1978, p. A3. 
15. Newsweek,June 5, 1978, p. 61. 
16. The text of the Taiwan Relations Act is included in Chiu and Murphy leds.), 
The Chinese Connection and Normalization, pp. 116-23. The quotations appear in p. 
116. 
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Ambassador Leonard Woodcock observed that tensions across the 
Taiwan Strait were "at their lowest level in thirty years."17 
In spite of the shock of diplomatic isolation, Taiwan's economy 
has continued to prosper. On September 19, 1980, Premier Sun 
Yun-suan reported to the Legislative Yuan in Taipei that the island's 
foreign trade in the first eight months of the year had shown an 
increase of 31.2 percent when compared with the same period in 
1979.18 Through its "dummy corporations" in Hong Kong, Taiwan has 
also begun to trade with the Chinese Communists on the mainland. 
Yet, because of many fundamental differences between Taipei and 
Peking, the process of rapprochement is going to be slow and difficult. 
It will require, according to Ambassador Woodcock, "delicacy, 
delicacy, and more delicacy."19 
In his chapter, Byron Weng emphasizes the economic successes of 
the Chinese people on Taiwan. He suggests that the developmental 
experience of the island can be valuable to Teng Hsiao-p'ing's 
program of "Four Modernizations." This should, in his opinion, form 
the basis of peaceful negotiations .between Peking and Taipei. ~t is 
unlikely, however, that this will happen in the foreseeable future. 
Indeed, there is no easy solution for the Taiwan problem. The leaders 
of both governments must bear the awesome responsibility of 
formulating a bold and imaginative policy to meet the new challenges 
of the 1980s. 
17. Quoted in James P. Sterba, "China Opens Trade Doors to Taiwan -
Delicately," New York Times, August 31, 1980, p.E2. 
18. Free China Weekly (Taipei), September 21, 1980, p. 4. Cf. U.S. News and World 
Report, July 23, 1979, p. 37. 
19. Quoted in Sterba, "China Opens Trade Door," p. E2. 
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Chapter One 
THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN THE 
SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE 
June T. Dreyer 
THE PROTAGONISTS 
The Sino-Soviet frontier in Central Asia is an artificial boundary 
which divides several minority groups. This chapter will focus on two 
of these groups, the Kazakhs and the Uighurs, and their relations with 
their fellow Turkic Muslim peoples and with the Soviet and Chinese 
governments. 
There are approximately five million Uighurs and 700,000 
Kazakhs in China, most of them living in Sinkiang province, 1 which 
is contiguous to the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan. According to the 
1970 Soviet census, there are 173,000 Uighurs and nearly 5.3 million 
KazaK.hs in the Union of Soviet SoCialist Republics (USSR). Both 
Soviet and Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs are minority groups not 
only in relation to the populations of their own countries (China has 
an estimated 950 million people and the Soviet Union, according to 
its 1970 census, has 241,720,000), but even in the provinces in which 
they live. Sinkiang has a population of approximately eleven million 
persons and Kazakhstan, 12.13 million. The importance of the 
Uighurs and Kazakhs, however, lies not in their numbers but in their 
interactions with the other minority peoples of the area, and in the 
strategic positions of these groups with regard to the Soviet and 
Chinese leaderships. The position of these minority peoples becomes 
much more impressive if viewed in this light. The combined minority 
people of the four Soviet Central Asian republics account for 59 
percent of the total population, and those of China's Sinkiang 
province, more than 60 percent. 
The ethnic mosaic of Central Asia is complex, formed over many 
centuries of nomadic migration and the rise and fall of invading 
1. Peking Review (hereinafter PR), XIX, No. 22 (May 28, 1976), p. 28. Other 
Chinese population figures are, unless otherwise specified, drawn from John S. Aird, 
Population Estimates for the Provinces of the People's Republic of China: 1953 to 1974, 
International Population Reports, Series P-95, No. 73, United States Department of 
Commerce, 1974. The population of Sinkiang was given as eleven million in a 
broadcast by Urumchi Radio, November 1, 1976. Soviet population data are, unless 
otherwise specified, drawn from the 1974 census as reported in the Current Digest of 
the Soviet Press (hereinafter CDSPJ, XXIII, No. 16 (May 18, 1971), pp. 14-18. 
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warrior tribes. The emergent picture is one of constant reshuffiing of 
alignments and of a steppe constantly in flux. Both Uighurs and 
Kazakhs are Turkic Muslim peoples, though the modem-day Uighurs 
are predominantly sedentary agriculturalists while the Kazakhs are 
nomadic herders. The Uighurs first appeared as a clearly separate 
people in records dating from-the fourth century A.D. By the eighth 
century, they had created a large empire in what is now the 
Mongolian People's Republic (MPR), but were themselves conquered 
by another tribe, the Kirghiz, during the following century. Many of 
the defeated Uighurs dispersed throughout Central Asia; some 
intermarried and intermingled with other steppe peoples. A large 
number entered what is now Sinkiang province in 840 A.D., and soon 
established their dominance of the oasis areas characteristic of 
southern Sinkiang. 
The word Kazakh first appeared during the fifteenth century. Of 
Turkish origin, it derives from a term meaning a masterless person 
or freebooter, and comes by extension to refer to nomads as well. The 
Kazakhs are closely relateQ to other Central Asian Muslim peoples, 
particularly to the Kirghiz and Uzbeks. The traditional nobilities of 
the Kazakhs and these other groups trace their origins to Genghis 
Khan, a Mongol. While the accuracy of historical records, and 
particularly of genealogical tables, from this period is often diluted by 
fanciful embellishment, the Mongol conquests of the twelfth century 
apparently effected a fundamental redistribution of the various 
nomadic groups of the Central Asian steppes. In the following 
centuries, the culture of the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and Uzbeks was 
formed. Because of this, different ethnic groups may, indeed, have the 
same ancestor. Whether the presence of the ancestor in several 
different genealogical tables is genuine or fictitious is often less 
important than the fact that these tables are taken seriously by the 
groups involved. Normally these kinship groups were loosely orga-
nized and spread over extensive areas. Unless united under a single 
leader, such as Genghis Khan, they did not pose a large-scale threat 
to more centralized governmental systems. Nevertheless, kinship, 
real or imaginary, often manifested itself in cooperation in time of 
hostilities, and even resulted in a certain amount of crossing of ethnic 
lines.2 In addition to the potential binding force of kinship, coopera-
2. Lawrence Krader, Peoples of Central Asia (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1963), p. 193. See also Alfred E. Hudson, Kazakh Social Structure, Yale 
University Publications in Anthropology No. 20, 1938 (reprinted; New York: Human 
Relations Area Files Press, 1964). 
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tion has also been facilitated by the Muslim faith common to most of 
these groups. The Islamic admonition to join together in time of holy 
war was generally enthusiastically accepted by most members of the 
group, even when the cause might appear to outsiders as rather 
tenuously related to religious matters. The circumstance of finding 
themselves in the paths of two expanding empires was to provide the 
peoples of the steppes with many causes for uprising. 
THE COURSE OF THE CZARIST EMPIRE IN CENTRAL 
ASIA 
Imperial China had traditionally claimed jurisdiction over 
Central Asia, but rarely exercised it in fact. Chinese civilization was 
based on sedentary agriculture, and the mountainous, arid cold of 
much of Central Asia did not attract Han Chinese settlers. Save for a 
small area in which moderate climatic conditions prevailed, the 
territory referred to rather vaguely in Chinese sources as "the 
Western Regions" could not be considered part of either the Chinese 
cultural or administrative sphere. A few caravan routes traversed the 
area from earliest times, allowing trade between Han China3 and 
imperial Rome, but the hazards of the route combined with the 
anti-commercial bias of official Confucian philosophy to limit the 
effects of this contact. It would be difficult to consider Central Asia an 
integral part of the Chinese economic unit. Culturally, since the 
inhabitants of these lands did not partake of Han civilization, they 
were regarded by the Han Chinese as barbarians. The expert 
horsemanship and martial skills which characterized their life-styles 
were frequently threats to Han culture. 
These peoples could be, and several times were, conquered by 
Chinese armies, yet even garrisoning such far-flung areas was 
difficult and expensive. One solution devised to alleviate the problem 
of maintaining armed forces in distant areas was the military 
agricultural colony; soldiers were charged with raising their own food 
and were expected to form self-sufficient outposts of the empire. The 
plan, though ingenious, had several drawbacks. For example, soldiers 
tended to marry local women and eventually became assimilated to 
the very people they had been sent to subdue. In general, Chinese 
policy toward these and other border peoples aimed at control rather 
3. The Han dynasty, commonly divided into Former or Western Han C206 B.C. -
23 A.D.) and Later or Eastern Han (25- 220 A.D.>, is regarded as one of China's most 
glorious periods, giving its name to the majority (94 per cent of the present-day 
population) ethnic group of the country. 
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than absorption; the inhabitants were permitted to maintain their 
traditional life-styles and cultures so long as they did not disturb the 
order and peace of empire. 
Meanwhile, shortly after the Kazakhs began to appear as a 
separate people, the Russian empire started to expand eastward. In 
1689, China ceded 93,000 square miles of its Central Asian domains 
to the czar's government, and in 1727 the Treaty of Kiakhta gave 
Russia an additional 40,000 square miles. In the following years, the 
once-powerful Ch'ing dynasty became increasingly enfeebled and 
unable to repel the demands of foreign powers. By the Treaty of 
Aigun in 1858, the land on the left bank of the Amur River down to 
the Ussuri became Russian territory and in 1860, the Treaty of 
Peking enabled Russia to annex 133,000 square miles of land east of 
the Ussuri to the Pacific.• The Ch'ing government resented these 
cessions, which, together with other concessions to various foreign 
countries, came to be known as the "unequal treaties." Since these 
settlements were forced on an unwilling government, China today 
claims sovereign rights over large portions of Kazakhstan and other 
parts of Soviet Central Asia. 
One result of czarist expansion was the colonization of Kazakh-
stan by peasants from European Russia. The Russian government 
had originally restricted migration but, on realizing its value, began 
to offer attractive inducements to settlers. Their arrival aroused 
considerable resentment among the Kazakhs, whose numbers were 
then estimated at three million.5 The nomads had pastured their 
herds over large portions of the steppes. Russian colonization took 
land away from grazing, and denied many Kazakhs the use of their 
traditional winter camps. Many of them fled south, to land still held 
by China. 
The increasing weakness of the Ch'ing dynasty had other 
repercussions besides the cession of territory to Russia. The efficient 
and relatively honest governors and officials the Chinese government 
sent to the "Western Regions" soon after it had reconquered the area 
in 1759 were gradually replaced with less competent and greedy 
types who oppressed the peoples under their charge and aroused their 
hostility. Both this and the arrival of the Kazakhs, whom the Russian 
government could claim were subjects of the czar, played into Russian 
hands. 
4. W. A. Douglas Jackson, The Russo-Chinese Borderlands <Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1962), pp. 112-13, 116. 
5. George J. Demko, The Russian Colonization of Kazakhstan, 1896-1916 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969l, pp.121-22. 
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Accumulated grievances against the Ch'ing government flared 
into a Muslim rebellion in 1862, which eventually encompassed the 
entire Chinese northwest. In 1865 a Turkic Muslim named Yakub 
Beg took advantage of the rebellion to set up an independent state in 
Sinkiang; tacit support from Russia helped Y akub Beg to maintain 
his position.6 In the attendant chaos, however, Russia's trade was 
disrupted and its consulates burned. There was also a substantial 
exodus of refugees into Russia. Seeing a territorial opportunity in 
this as well as a way to reassert its trading position, Russia moved 
into the rich Ili Valley, in Kazakh territory, and annexed it. The 
enfeebled Ch'ing dynasty, in a costly campaign which it could ill 
afford, defeated the northwest Muslim rebellion and destroyed Y akub 
Beg's state. The subsequent Chinese demand that Russia withdraw 
from Ili led to a major diplomatic confrontation between the two 
countries. Eventually, an agreement was signed providing for Russian 
withdrawal in return for China's cession of some territory west oflli, the 
granting of special trading concessions to Russia in nearby areas, and the 
payment of a nine million ruble indemnity to cover Russia's expenses in 
"administering" Ili. 7 
Fearful of further Russian moves, the Ch'ing government decided 
to incorporate what had been the "Western Regions" into the regular 
administrative system of China. In 1884 the area was transformed 
into a province with the name Sinkiang, or "New Territory." 
In the following years, the czarist government attempted to cope 
with mounting domestic problems, a costly and ultimately humiliat-
ing war with Japan, and international intrigues on its European 
borders. But the colonization of Kazakhstan continued. Between 1896 
and 1916, more than 1.4 million new settlers poured into Kazakhstan 
and implanted a strong Russian presence there. Its economy became 
firmly tied to that of European Russia, supplying it with meat, hides, 
and dairy products.8 
Further escalation of tensions between China and Russia over 
Central Asia was limited by domestic difficulties which prevented 
them from further consolidating their hold over their Central Asian 
6. Yuan Tsing, "Yakub Beg and the Moselm Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan," 
Central Asiatic Journal, IV, No. 2 (June 19621, p. 154. 
7. Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy, 
1871-1881 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19651, pp. 186-87. 
8. Demko, Russian Colonization, p. 182. 
9. Elizabeth E. Bacon, Central Asians under Russian Rule <Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 19661, pp. 116-17; and Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet 
Union (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19641, p.83. 
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domains. In 1911, the Ch'ing dynasty fell, being replaced by a series 
of warlord governments that were preoccupied with quarrels with 
other warlords; even Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT) govern-
ment, which assumed power in 1928, was unable to exercise more 
than nominal control over Sinkiang. In Russia, a 1916 decree ordered 
Kazakhs, who were traditionally exempt from military service, to be 
drafted to help fight in World War I, and this caused a bloody 
rebellion which further weakened the faltering czarist government. 
During the ensuing disruptions on the steppe, additional numbers of 
Kazakhs fled to China.9 
THE 1917 REVOLUTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON CENTRAL 
ASIA 
The success of the Bolshevik Revolution that began in Russia in 
1917 changed the power equation in Central Asia in favor of the 
newly established Soviet Union. The new government's success did 
not come easily, and its relations with the non-Russian peoples of the 
former czarist empire were among its more difficult problems. In an 
earlier bid for the support of these peoples, called minority 
nationalities in Marxist parlance, it had promised self-determination 
to all who wanted it. Nonetheless, when the Communist party's 
struggle against the czarist government actually came to fruition, the 
party came to view self-determination as "profoundly 
counterrevolutionary" and ruthlessly suppressed such movements. 
The Kazakhs' Alash-Orda provisional government was one of the 
victims. A bitter anti-Bolshevik struggle took place, and many 
Kazakhs joined the White Army of Admiral A. V. Kolchak. 10 The 
economy of the area was badly affected. In the Kazakh province of 
Semirechie, for instance, livestock dropped by 51.67 percent between 
1917 and 1920.11 In 1920 and 1921, moreover, the Kazakh areas were 
hit by famine. The Kazakhs were more seriously affected than the 
Russian colonists; their herds had been depleted in the fighting and 
they did not receive their fair share of the emergency food supplies 
sent in by the new government. An estimated one million persons 
died of hunger and related diseases in 1921 alone, and a necessary 
preoccupation with sheer survival reduced the Kazakhs' organized 
resistance to the Bolshevik government. 12 
10. Pipes, Formation, pp. 108, 172-73. 
11. Bacon, Central Asians, p. 117. 
12. Pipes, Formation, p. 174. 
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. In contrast to the czarist government's relatively cautious 
attitude toward altering the traditional life-styles of its Central Asian 
subjects, the Soviet government promoted rapid change. Although 
Kazakhstan was designated an "autonomous" socialist republic in 
1920 and given the constitutional right to secede from the USSR, its 
non-Russian inhabitants actually had very little to say about the 
governance of their areas, and any attempts to exercise the right to 
secede would be regarded as counterrevolutionary. Measures were 
introduced to force the nomads to settle down, to destroy tribal and 
kinship ties which might facilitate resistance to the new government, 
to promote agriculture as an alternative to pastoralism, and to 
introduce the Kazakhs and other Central Asian peoples to the 
Russian language and Marxist culture. While motivated by a desire 
to improve the lives of Central Asian peopl~s as well as to facilitate 
the new government's control of the areas, the reforms were not 
perceived as improvements by many of those affected. The fictional 
nature of autonomy was patently obvious to all. The Turkic Muslim 
intelligentsia, influential despite its small numbers, was irked by the 
introduction of a new Cyrillic-based language which the government 
alleged would suit the nationality's needs better than the traditional 
Arabic script. The intelligentsia would have preferred a system 
devised by Crimean Tatar Ismail Bey Gaspirali (1851-1914), which 
would have been suitable for all Turkic peoples, and viewed the 
Soviet government's choice of a Cyrillic script as an attempt to 
separate the Kazakhs from these other peoples. 13 
In addition, there was a cultural contradiction between the 
Soviet leadership's implicit belief that agriculture was a more 
desirable way of life and the nomads' attachment to their animals 
and to a peripatetic mode of existence. A collectivization program, 
begun in 1928, was carried out without adequate planning, and it 
was far in advance of collectivization in Russian areas. Forced into 
collectives where grazing was often insufficient, thousands of 
Kazakhs watched their herds starve. Others killed their animals and 
tried to escape. Some of these fled to Afghanistan, others to China. 
The Kazakh population of the USSR fell by almost 900,000 between 
1926 and 1939, and there was a sharp drop in numbers of animals as 
well. 14 Soviet policies were administered through the local Russian-
colonist elite, with damaging effect on the Turkic Muslim peoples. As 
13. Bacon, Central Asians, p. 114. 
14. Ibid., p. ll8. 
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Richard Pipes notes, the elite "utilized the Soviet government and 
party machines to intensify the economic and political exploitation of 
the native population." The Bolshevik Revolution brought to the 
Muslim areas "not an abolition of colonialism, but colonialism in a 
new and much more oppressive form." 15 
The situation of the Kazakhs and Uighurs, like those of other 
Soviet nationalities, has been better since the death of Stalin, though 
not so much so as to eliminate discontent. Khrushchev's reforms in 
higher education allowed higher percentages of Kazakhs, Uighurs, 
and most other nationalities to attend universities and to take 
advantage of better job opportunities. Standards of living in Central 
Asia have improved markedly. Locally situated factories turn out 
desired consumer goods. The infamous Soviet housing shortage is 
significantly less serious in Central Asia than in European Russia, as 
in the supply of fresh meat, milk, and vegetables. There is a Kazakh 
member of the Pclitburo.16 
Still, the results of raised living standards and two generations of 
pressure have not made significant numbers of Turkic Muslims into 
either committed Soviet citizens or assimilated Russians. Nomadism 
has survived, albeit in a modified form. Although Soviet propaganda 
describes nomads as "roving" ( otgonnyi), rather than nomadic 
(kochevoi), herders as "specialists skilled in the care of livestock," and 
the nomadic family as a "bridgade" with each member holding an 
official title, pastoral nomads continue to move seasonally in family 
groups to find grazing for their animals. 17 
A recent study maintains that the Turkic Muslim peoples have 
been extraordinarily resistant to assimiliation. This is true even of 
persons who have been exposed to Russians for long periods of time. 
Using linguistic identification as an index of assimilation, the study 
concludes that the russification level of urbanized Kazakh communi-
ties who have had more than two centuries of extensive contact with 
Russians is only 3.2 percent; that for rural Kazakhs is even lower, 2.7 
percent.18 Interestingly, the 1970 Soviet census listed a slightly 
higher percentage of Uighurs reporting Uighur as their native 
language than in the previous census of 1959 (88.5 percent versus 85 
15. Pipes, Formation, p. 191. 
16. Ann Sheehy, "The Central Asian Republics," Conflict Studies, No. 30 
!December 1972), pp. 13-27. 
17. Bacon, Central Asians, pp. 119-20. 
18. Brian Silver, "Social Mobilzation and the Russification of Soviet Nationali-
ties," American Political Science Review, LXVIII, No. 1 (March 1974), p. 63. 
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percent). The percentage of Kazakhs remained almost exactly the 
same as in 1959.19 Similar figures are reported for other Central 
Asian minorities, tending to support the conclusion that the effect of 
exposure to Russians on the russification of Muslims is "exceedingly 
small."20 An American student in Tashkent in 1970 was told by a 
Russian that it was hard for him to believe at first that Russian rule 
had extended to Central Asia.21 
A Western social scientist, analyzing the significantly higher 
rates of population increase among Central Asian minorities than 
among Russians, describes these peoples as pursuing la vengeance des 
berceaux, getting even through the cradle, or compensation for heavy 
in-migration to their homelands and some assimilation losses 
through a high birth rate. In the Central Asian republics, the Muslim 
school-age population is much higher than the Muslim percentage in 
the total population of the province, even though children of the 
Muslim minorities, particularly female children, are more likely to 
drop out of school than Russian children. The fact that available 
labor now seems to be directed at Siberia rather than Central Asia 
makes russification still less likely.22 Nonetheless, as Russian 
dissident Andrei Sakharov points out, Soviet prisons are filled with 
ethnic dissidents.23 
ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST 
PARTIES IN SINKIANG 
While the Soviet government was extending and consolidating 
its power over the former czarist domains in Central Asia, it did not 
lose interest in those Central Asian territories still nominally under 
Chinese control. When the Bolshevik government assumed power in 
Russia, it issued a declaration abrogating the unequal treaties 
concluded during the czarist era. None of the land obtained 
thereunder, however, was returned to China, and the Soviet Union 
proved even more interested in Sinkiang than had czarist Russia. The 
warlord of Sinkiang, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, was concerned with 
maintaining his independence from the government of China, then 
19. CDSP, XXI, No. 16, p. 16. 
20. Silver, "Social Mobilization," p. 62. 
21. David C. Montgomery, "An American Student in Tashkent," Asian Affairs, 
February 1972, p. 37; quoted in Sheehy, "Central Asian Republics," p. 19. 
22. Rein Taagepera, "National Differences Within Soviet Demographic Trends," 
Soviet Studies (Glasgow), XX, No. 4 <April 1969l, pp. 478, 481, and 489. 
23. Andrei Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks <New York: Alfred Knopf, 1974), p. 43. 
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headed by Chiang Kai-shek, and the Soviet Union provided financial 
assistance which helped Sheng in this endeavor. In return, the USSR 
received a privileged position in Sinkiang. Soviet geologists explored 
the province's rich natural resources, Soviet engineers surveyed 
railways and Soviet pilots manned Sinkiang's air routes. 
The Russians also promoted propaganda activities aimed at 
forming a pro-Soviet Communist party; the atmosphere in Sinkiang 
was for the most part distinctly unfriendly to the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). In 1934, when the beleaguered CCP fled its Kiangsi 
Soviet base to escape annihilation by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, it 
wandered about for many months in search of a reasonably safe 
haven. The USSR, ostensibly its fraternal socialist ally and adviser, 
never told the CCP of its favorable position in Sinkiang. According to 
an ex-CCP leader, this was because Stalin had designs on Sinkiang 
and wished to exclude Chinese influence of any sort from the 
province. 24 
In 1938, Sheng, seemingly attempting to gain some degree of 
independence from the USSR by playing off the Soviet and Chinese 
Communist parties against one another, welcomed several CCP 
advisers into his government and even announced his intention to 
join the CCP. Nevertheless, a few years later, he accused them of 
being involved in a plot against him, and had them arrested and 
executed. Mao Tse-tung's brother, Tse-min, was one of the victims. 
In the early 1940s, owing to its involvement in World War II, the 
USSR could no longer sustain its aid to Sinkiang. In fact, it looked to 
Sheng Shih-ts'ai as if the Soviet Union might be losing the war. He 
thereupon turned toward mending fences with Chiang Kai-shek's 
KMT government. Accepting a cabinet-level position in Chungking, 
Sheng left Sinkiang in 1944, and the KMT was able to choose its first 
governor of the province. Sinkiang's non-.Han groups were not 
pleased by the reassertion of Chinese control, and the new provincial 
administration proved neither tactful nor honest. Han settlers were 
arriving and would presumably occupy minorities' lands. A Han 
army stationed there had to be provisioned and paid, and the 
province's economy was deteriorating. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had taken the offensive in World 
War II and was able to reassert its interest in Sinkiang. The previous 
government-to-province special relationship having failed, the USSR 
24. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot? <East 
Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958), p. 54. 
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began to work through Sinkiang's aggrieved non-Han groups. 
Sympathetic Soviet agents provided dissident ethnic group leaders 
with financial aid and advice. A major rebellion ensued, and a 
multi-ethnic alliance representing Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, White 
Russians and others established an independent state - the East 
Turkistan Republic (ETR) with its capital at Ining - in the 
predominantly Kazakh territory bordering Soviet Kazakhstan. Its 
leader, Akhmedjan, was a Uighur, and the ETR's mainstay was its 
Kazakh cavalry, commanded by Osman Bator. At one point the rebel 
cavalry threatened the provincial capital of Urumchi.25 They pulled 
back only when the Soviet Union, having offered its services as 
mediator, advised them to do so; this seems to indicate the 
movement's dependence on the USSR. Yet, in view of the abundant 
evidence of KMT mismanagement, the Soviet Union was clearly 
exploiting existing grievances rather than creating them. 
Chiang Kai-shek's KMT government was amenable to compro-
mise, especially since the Sinkiang rebellion was tying down troops 
and material Chiang could have put to better use in the battle with 
the CCP. Eventually a compromise was worked out, providing for 
increased minority representation in government and a greater 
degree of automony for the province. Burhan, a Tartar who had 
managed to create a certain amount of rapport with all sides, was 
made governor. As a partial guarantee that the KMT would observe 
its part of the bargain, the ETR troops would not be dispersed, while 
a KMT garrison also remained in Sinkiang. 
Meanwhile, however, Chiang Kai-shek was losing his battle with 
the CCP. The Soviet Union not only did not aid the CCP in this effort, 
but actually entered into publicly announced negotiations with the 
KMT. Although the exact bargaining terms were not revealed, the 
Soviet Union was clearly offering Chiang Kai-shek's government 
arms - which would surely be used against the CCP - in return for 
some form of USSR control over Sinkiang.26 Eventually, the CCP's 
military success foreclosed this option. By the late summer of 1949 
their armies had been victorious in most of the rest of China and 
were pressing hard on Sinkiang. At this point virtually the entire 
provincial government of Sinkiang, from Governor Burhan on down, 
and including most of those who had been leaders of the ETR, 
defected to the CCP en masse. 
25. Excellent accounts of this period may be found in Whiting and Sheng, 
Sinkiang; and Owen Lattimore, Pivot of Asia <Boston: Little, Brown, 1950>. 
26. New York Times, (hereinafter NYT), February 1, 1949, p. 1; February 2, 1949, 
p. 18; February 6, 1949, Section 4, p. 1; and March 22, 1949, p. 22. 
CHINA's FoREIGN RELATIONs: SELECTED STuDIEs 19 
Thus Sinkiang, with its large Turkic Muslim majority (estimated 
at 75 percent Uighur, 10 percent Kazakh, and less than 6 percent 
Han Chinese at this time) formally became part of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC). Exactly how the province's leadership had 
been persuaded to defect is not known. But, in addition to the 
certainty of CCP takeover regardless of their wishes, the provincial 
leaders were surely influenced by promises that Sinkiang would 
receive autonomous status (the content of this autonomy probably 
being somewhat ambiguous), that there would be concessions to the 
ethnic groups and their cultures, and that the leadership role of the 
present elite would continue. This last promise the CCP did not have 
to keep in several significant cases. The plane carrying most of the 
high-ranking ETR leaders, including Akhmedjan, crashed myster-
iously en route to a conference in Peking. The Chinese did not release 
news of the disaster until many months later, thus fanning specula-
tion that the crash might not have been accidental.27 The only 
remaining ETR leader of note was Salfudin, a young Moscow-trained 
Uighur who spoke Chinese rather poorly at this time. He had been 
engaged in fomenting anti-Han Chinese riots in Sinkiang during the 
early 1940s, had been minister of education in the ETR government, 
and was a member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU). 
Salfudin was not the only reminder of the Soviet Union's 
privileged position in Sinkiang. The new PRC began its political 
career as an international outcast, and was forced to turn to the 
USSR for help. Negotiations over a treaty dragged on for nine weeks, 
leading observers to conclude that the Soviet Union was driving a 
hard bargain. The full provisions of what would become the 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950 were not announced by either side, but are 
known to have included a special consular position for the USSR in 
Sinkiang, in addition to joint exploitation of Sinkiang's resources and 
the creation of joint stock companies to exploit those resources.28 
The Chinese did not send People's Liberation Army (PLA) work 
teams to the three predominantly Kazakh districts i'n December 
1949, when such teams were sent to the rest of Sinkiang, explaining 
that "conditions were as yet unsettled" in those areas.29 The work 
27. Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, pp. 142-43. 
28. Ibid., p. 86. 
29. K. F. Kotov, Autonomy of Local Nationalities in the Chinese People's Republic 
(Moscow: State Publishing House, 1956), trans. in United States Department of 
Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service, No. 3547, p. 56. 
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teams did not appear in the three districts until the latter half of 
1950, after the Sino-Soviet Treaty was signed. One may speculate 
that the "unsettled conditions" may have included the unsettled 
question of who should administer the three districts with the USSR 
arguing for jurisdiction over them. Though the Soviet Union did not 
get them, it retained an influential position in these areas. When the 
organs of local power in IIi, Tacheng, and Tarbagatai were "reorga-
nized" toward the end of 1950, the Administrative Control Boards 
which replaced them included many Kazakhs and Uighurs who had 
been members of, or sympathetic to, the ETR government, though a 
Han Chinese generally held the final decision-making power. In 
urban areas of the three districts, the pro-Soviet minority intel-
ligentsia remained in power and was not generally compelled to 
undergo intensive ideological remolding or reform. The local clan 
headman structure was left largely unaltered as well, save for those 
headmen who overtly resisted the new government. Osman Bator, 
whose Kazakh cavalry had been so important to the success of the 
ETR, was one such holdout. He fled south, where he was eventually 
captured and executed. As for Salfudin, while he was in Moscow 
helping to negotiate the 1950 treaty, it was announced from Peking 
that he had become a member of the CCP, having meanwhile 
resigned from the CPSU. 
In 1951, a purge was undertaken, probably in connection with 
the "three-anti" campaign then being conducted in other parts of 
China. It reportedly removed pro-Soviet figures in the minority areas, 
and a large-scale pacification and reeducation campaign was con-
ducted in 1953. As the official New China News Agency (NCNA) 
explained, "it was only after all this that the entire Kazakh people 
returned to the fold of the ancestral land."30 
In general, however, strenuous efforts were made to conceal any 
differences between the Chinese and Soviet governments over 
minority lands. The national boundary was referred to as "Friendship 
Border," and Kazakhs and Uighurs of both nations, who were 
virtually indistinguishable without reference to passports, crossed it 
frequently to trade, graze their herds, and visit kinfolk. Soviet 
technicians were lavishly praised in the Chinese press for the selfless 
way in which they were helping their socialist neighbor to develop its 
resources, and Soviet ethnographers worked with the Han Chinese 
30. NCNA, Lanchow, May 6, 1954; quoted in Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, p. 
144. 
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among Sinkiang minorities.31 Soviet aid helped build a railroad 
connecting Lanchow, capital of China's Kansu province, with Drum-
chi, the capital of Sinkiang. It was planned to continue the line 
through Ili, where it would ultimately reach the Soviet border. 
Meanwhile, the USSR would extend the terminus of its Turk-Sib 
railroad from Aktogal to the border; the two lines would connect at a 
new town, Druzhba (Friendship). 
Wishing to avoid antagonizing the minorities and risk the 
reinforcement of any pro-Soviet tendencies they might have, 
Chinese policy was cautious and followed a modified Soviet plan. 
"Land" reform was carried out under slogans such as "herdowners 
and [poorer] herders both profit" and "no struggle, no liquidation, no 
division of property." Chinese state trading organs offered relatively 
high prices for herders' products. While presented as evidence of the 
PRC's high regard for its minority nationalities and its desire to 
insure their prosperity, this was also a way for the new government 
to gain control in the herding areas by linking them with the Chinese 
market system, and to redirect trade away from the USSR as well. 
Lenient attitudes were also taken toward most religious practices, 
even toward polygamy. 
In 1954, Khrushchev visited Peking, hoping to obtain Chinese 
support in his bid to succeed Stalin. This he did, but not before the 
Chinese exacted a quid pro quo. Khrushchev agreed, among other 
things, to terminate the joint stock companies in Sinkiang. Soviet 
influence, however, remained in the form of advisers and technicians, 
and Sinkiang needed to order equipment and spare parts from the 
USSR. The Chinese also announced that Uighur, Kazakh, and other 
Turkic Muslim languages would henceforth be written with the 
Cyrillic script. This was understandable, as the intelligentsia of these 
minorities had often been educated in the Soviet Union and many in 
this group were already acquainted with Cyrillic. Yet, the use of such 
script in writing Uighur and Kazakh also created a bond between 
these Chinese minorities and their fellow Uighurs and Kazakhs in 
the USSR, while creating a linquisitic distance between the Chinese 
minorities and the Han majority in China. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, from his 
vantage point in Taiwan, later recalled his own misgivings when his 
Soviet advisers repeatedly declared that "the peoples along the 
Sino-Soviet frontier are all brethren. The racially related peoples will 
31. See, for example, Kotov's report as cited in n. 29 above; and S. I. Bruk, "Ethnic 
Composition and Distribution of the Population in the Sinkiang.Uighur Autonomous 
Region in the People's Republic of China," Sovetskaya Etnografiya, No. 2 (19561. 
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one day be united as citizens of the same nation."32 It is, therefore, 
inconceivable that the leaders of the PRC would not have seen the 
implication of allowing Cyrillic to replace Arabic in Sinkiang, and 
the fact that this decision was announced at all is indicative of the 
degree to which the Chinese government felt it necessary to placate 
the Soviet Union at this time.33 
A month after Khrushchev's visit to China, the Ili Kazakh 
Autonomous Chou was created, encompassing the three predominant-
ly Kazakh districts of the former ETR and, like the ETR, having its 
capital at Ining. The chairperson was a Kazakh, and there were 
Uighur and Kazakh vice-chairpersons, but there was also significant 
(and presumably more powerful) representation from regular units of 
the PLA and from the Sinkiang Production and Construction Corps. 
The latter, with its motto "on the one shoulder a rifle, on the other a 
hoe," was intended to garrison the area while helping local people to 
develop their economy. The possibility of American and other 
imperialist intervention always existed, and there were surely ways 
in which the local economy could be improved. But it was also 
possible for the Soviet leaders to view the Production and Construc-
tion Corps as guarding the border against the USSR. And the local 
people, noting the large number of persons in the corps and their 
preoccupation with agricultural, as opposed to animal husbandry, 
could see the crops as yet another Han Chinese plan to usurp their 
lands, turn the nomads into sedentary agriculturalists and assimilate 
them. The corps also bore an uncomfortable resemblance to the 
military agricultural colonies of imperial China, whose policies 
toward minorities were regularly and vehemently denounced by Mao 
Tse-tung. In 1956, there began a large-scale transfer of Han Chinese 
into Sinkiang, with many of them being absorbed either into the 
corps or onto newly created state farms. 
Curiously, and very much at variance with the practice else-
where in China, the IIi Kazakh's creation in 1954 and Sinkiang's 
reconstitution as the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region (SUAR) 
during the following year, occurred although elections in fourteen 
counties of IIi chou could not be held until 1956. Normally, such 
elections would precede the founding of the administrative areas. 
32. Whiting and Sheng, Sinkiang, p. 168. 
33. There is no evidence that the decision to use Cyrillic was actually im-
plemented on a significant scale, though the break with the USSR and China's 
development of its own Latin-based pin-yin system as a standard orthography for all 
the PRC's linguistic groups occurred too soon after the above mentioned decision to 
draw any meaningful conclusion from this. 
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In 1956, moreover, the CCP began a major investigation of its 
policies toward minority nationalities; this was carried on at the 
same time as persons throughout China were encouraged to voice 
their opinions of socialism in a campaign to "let a hundred flowers 
bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." The results, as they 
became known in 1957, were profoundly disquieting to CCP leaders. 
As they pertained to the Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other minorities of 
Sinkiang, the campaign revealed lurking preferences for the Soviet 
Union over China, often strongly voiced preferences for an indepen-
dent Kazakh, Uighur, or Turkic state, and the conviction that were 
ETR leader Akhmedjan still alive, he would be most dissatisfied with 
what had become of the autonomy he thought he had been promised. 
There were also charges that the Han Chinese were exploiting the 
minorities, and demands that they leave Sinkiang en masse. 
Salfudin, who had been made governor of the SUAR in 1955, 
attempted to refute these charges in the expected ways. According to 
him, Sinkiang had "always" been part of China, the Han Chinese 
were sacrificing themselves to build a better Sinkiang, and there was 
sufficient wealth in the province for all. Those who thought otherwise 
were either counterrevolutionaries or had been duped by 
counterrevolutionaries.34 As might be anticipated, many of the 
hundred flowers were found to be poisonous weeds; some Uighurs and 
Kazakhs who had voiced their opinions were removed from the 
socialist Garden of Eden and sent for "reform through labor." These 
included, among others, the talented young poet Kazhykumar 
Shabdanov; Jahoda, the head of the IIi Kazakh Autonomous Chou; 
the vice-director of the chou's Propaganda Department; and the 
president of its People's Court.35 Significantly, Zunin Taipov, a 
Uighur and former leader of the ETR army had been absorbed into 
the Chinese military, was removed as well. 
Public mention of the pro-Soviet predilections of those purged 
was necessarily muted, in order to avoid creating a confrontation 
with the Soviet Union. The anti-Soviet component of the anti-rightist 
campaign is sworn to by later refugees into the Soviet Union and can 
34. Salfudin's speech to the party committee of the SUAR, December 16, 1957, as 
reported by Peking Radio, December 25, 1957. 
35. Li Hui-yu, "The IIi Autonomous Chou Has Very Extensive Power; Why Do the 
Local Nationalists Say It Has No Powers?" in 1-lijih-pao [IIi Daily[, August 30, 1958; 
quoted in George Moseley, A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Auton-
omous Chou (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 
1966), p. 68. 
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be read into the Chinese criticisms of local nationalism in Sinkiang. 
While pro-Uighur, pro-Kazakh, and pan-Turkic sentiments are not 
the same as pro-Soviet sentiments, the role of the Soviet Union in 
supporting such separatist movements must be kept in mind. Thus 
every nostalgic recollection of Akhmedjan, Osman Bator, or the ETR 
inevitably reminded the Chinese leadership of Soviet machinations in 
Sinkiang. Also very much on the minds of Chinese leaders was the 
example of Mongolia, where the USSR had successfully encouraged 
"local nationalists" to set up a state allegedly "independent" of China 
when, in fact, it was almost completely dependent on Soviet aid and 
trade. Hence local nationalism in Sinkiang, while not the same as 
pro-Sovietism, is perceived by the Chinese leadership as largely 
overlapping with it. 
SINKIANG MINORITIES AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE, 
1958-1976 
In 1958 China began the Great Leap Forward (GLF), which 
sharply departed from the social, economic, and ideological policies 
the PRC had pursued during the previous nine years. There were 
many reasons behind the launching of the GLF, and why it was 
begun at this particular time. Among the more important were the 
growing conviction among an influential segment of the Chinese 
leadership that continued adherence to the Soviet model would be 
detrimental to China's development, and the feeling that the Soviet 
Union had abandoned its commitment to true Marxism. Communes 
encompassing tens of thousands of persons were created, the use of 
material incentives in production was drastically curtailed, and there 
was large-scale confiscation of private property. The relative toler-
ance accorded to minority nationalities' languages, customs, and 
life-styles under the influence of the Soviet model was also ended. 
The minorities of Sinkiang were expected, among other things, to 
contribute their animals to the communes, learn Han Chinese, adopt 
Han cultural forms, and give up various "decadent" customs includ-
ing polgamy. Communes were not generally established in Uighur 
and Kazakh areas until several months after they had been set up in 
much of the rest of China, and by that time their major deficiencies 
had become known. Although there is some evidence that these 
communes were created in a somewhat modified form, their effects 
were as dysfunctional as in other areas of China. Production fell 
sharply, and there was widespread hunger and dissatisfaction with 
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the economic and social policies of the GLF. There were rumors of 
small-scale uprisings in Sinkiang in 1958 and 1959.36 • 
The Soviet leadership was contemptuous of the Chinese policies 
and annoyed at the repudiation of the USSR's model which the GLF 
represented. Khrushchev was publicly critical of the communes; the 
Soviet press treated China's ensuing economic difficuliies with smug 
"concern." In 1960, all Soviet technicians still remaining in China 
were abruptly withdrawn. The strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship 
became increasingly evident to outside observers. A combination of 
intense minority dissatisfaction with Chinese rule in Sinkiang and 
growing hostility between Soviet and Chinese leaderships provided 
the backdrop for conflict in border areas. 
The first public manifestation of this internationalization (or, 
perhaps more accurately, reinternationalization) of the Sinkiang 
border land question occurred during the spring of 1962, though its 
direct antecedents can be traced back to 1958. The culturally 
repressive social policies introduced during the GLF and the critical 
economic situation which followed this movement strained Sinkiang's 
minority groups' tenuous allegiance to Han China. The belief that 
Han residents received preferential treatment in the allocation of 
food and other rationed commodities exacerbated these strains. 
On the southeast coast of China, authorities were allowing those 
citizens who wished to leave for Hong Kong to do so. Those who left 
presumably included a high percentage of the malcontents; their 
departure thus reduced the task of enforcing social order. In addition, 
whatever their political beliefs, the emigration of these persons would 
certainly ease pressure on China's scarce food resources. Apparently, 
the authorities in Sinkiang were initially similarly disposed toward 
allowing Uighurs and Kazakhs to leave for the Soviet Union. 
Subsequently, however, they began to worry over the large size of the 
migrant population, the fact that they were taking their herds with 
them, and the uses to which the now openly hostile Soviet Union 
could put the refugees. Chinese officials also discovered that Soviet 
consular authorities had been issuing thousands of false Soviet 
passports to those who wished to have them. 37 
The exodus was ordered halted, to the annoyance of many 
would-be emigrants. There seems to have been a demonstration of 
36. Moseley, A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier, pp. 107-10. 
37. "China Said To Send Troops to Sinkiang," NYT, April 16, 1964, quoting a 
White Russian refugee interviewed in Hong Kong (p. 6). See also Moseley, A 
Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier, p. 108. 
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some size in front of CCP headquarters in the Ili Kazakh Auton-
omous Chou, during which the demonstrators were fired upon. 
Several dozen Uighurs and Kazakhs were killed. News of the 
massacre spread quickly, resulting in rioting and disorder in other 
parts of Sinkiang. The Chinese suspected the Soviet Union of having 
fomented the incident, which indeed resembled the incidents preced-
ing the formation of the ETR two decades before. The Russians, on 
the other hand, used the incident to "prove" the repressive, racist 
nature of Chinese policy toward non-Han peoples. 
The Chinese have said virtually nothing publicly about these 
events. More than two and half years after the incident, Chou En-lai 
reported to the Third National People's Congress: 
In 1962, under the instigation and direct direction of external 
forces, a group of the most reactionary protagonists of local 
nationalism staged a traitorous counterrevolutionary rebellion 
in Ining, Sinkiarig, and incited and organized the flight to foreign 
territory of a large number of people near the frontier. 38 
The Soviets claimed to present an eyewitness account, which was 
somewhat more graphic. According to their report, "bursts of 
machine-gun fire from the windows lashed the crowd . . . shooting 
people in the back." There were "several dozen bodies of men, women, 
old men and children," which served, the Soviets insisted, "as 
testimony to the bankruptcy of the nationalities policy pursued by 
the Chinese leaders, as a reproach to their unclean conscience."39 
However different their emphases, the official Chinese and 
Soviet accounts agree on the essence of the story. The incident 
touched off an ongoing public confrontation between China and the 
Soviet Union which has been carried out through overt military 
means, clandestine infiltration, and propaganda channels. This 
confrontation has had important repercussions for the political, 
economic, and cultural lives of the minority peoples of both sides of 
the border. 
38. Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government," speech to the First 
Session of the Third National People's Congress, December 30, 1964; trans. in United 
States Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of the China Mainland Press, 
(hereinafter SCMP), No. 3370, p. 12. 
39. Zunin Taipov, "Eyewitness Account: On the other Side of the Barricade," 
Kazakhstanskaya pravda (hereinafter KPl, September 29, 1963, in CDSP, XV, No. 38, 
p. 16. See also A. Mirov, "Sinkiang Tragedy," Literaturnaya gazeta, May 7, 1969, in 
CDSP, XXI, No. 19, pp. 5-6. 
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Militarily, both sides complain of border incursions by planes, 
troops, and ostensibly private citizens.40 Only once has fighting on 
any significant scale been reported from the Sinkiang-Kazakhstan 
area; in August 1969, there were clashes involving several hundred 
Chinese and Soviet troops, with casualties on both sides. The Chinese 
accused the Soviet Union of sending helicopters, tanks, armored 
vehicles, and several hundred troops two kilometers into the Chinese 
side of the border, where they were repelled. The Chinese Foreign 
Ministry charged that larger numbers of troops and vehicles were 
being assembled to provoke even larger conflicts in the future!' The 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied that the Chinese author-
ities had been "deliberately exacerbating" the border situation for 
several months, and had purposely provoked both this and a previous 
clash in the Ussuri River area. The fact that the Chinese soldiers 
were equipped with movie cameras was held indicative of the planned 
nature of the Chinese attacks, and captured documents were released 
purportedly to prove Chinese guilt in the Ussuri clashes!2 In 1976, 
however, an analyst of the United States Central Intelligence Agency 
maintained that while the Chinese did indeed provoke the Amur-
Ussuri confrontation, the one in Sinkiang-Kazakhstan was perpe-
trated by the Soviets. 43 
A smaller-scale confrontation on the Sinkiang border occurred in 
March 1974, when a Soviet helicopter landed inside Chinese territory 
at Altai and was seized by the Chinese. According to the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry, the vehicle had been sent to pick up a seriously ill 
serviceman who urgently needed hospitalization. It had lost its 
bearings and made a forced landing in China, when its fuel supply 
ran out.44 In response, the Chinese Foreign Ministry accused the 
USSR of cooking up "a bunch of lies to cover the crime," noting that 
the helicopter carried neither medical personnel nor medical equip-
ment, while possessing arms, ammunition, and reconnaissance 
equipment. Documents on board indicated that the crew was on a 
40. See, for example, protest of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
USSR, in NCNA, September 17, 1968; and the Soviet Union's reply, "Provocative 
Fabrication of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs," Izvestia, November 2, 1968, in 
CDSP, XX, No. 43, p. 42. 
41. PR, XII, No. 33 <August 15, 1969), p. 3. 
42. S. Borzenko et al., "On Stony Hill," Pravda, August 16, 1969, in CDSP, XXI, 
No. 33, p. 4. 
43. Roger Glenn Brown, "Chinese Politics and American Foreign Policy," Foreign 
Policy, No. 23 <Summer 1976), pp. 3·23. 
44. Pravda, March 21, 1974, p. 9; CDSP, XXVI, No. 12, p. 4. 
28 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
"special mission;" moreover, this intrusion was not an isolated 
incident.45 
Mass rallies were held throughout Sinkiang, in which the 
participants accused the Soviet Union of carrying out provocations, 
planning a large-scale invasion and wishing to add to the 560,000 
square kilometers they had already "stolen" from Sinkiang (a 
reference to the treaty of 1881).46 Despite the Soviet Union's threat of 
"serious consequences," the helicopter and its crew were not returned 
until more than two and a half years later. As the PRC explained, 
"investigation has established the veracity of the Soviet crew's 
contention that they crossed into Chinese territory unintentionally."47 
In both Soviet and Chinese accounts of the 1969 and 1974 
incidents, indigenous ethnic names are conspicuously lacking among 
the personnel mentioned. The two governments clearly believed that 
border defense in this area was too important to be left to the natives. 
The Chinese belatedly noted that "people of all nationalities" had 
helped in apprehending the Soviet helicopter crew and paraded one of 
them at National Day rallies in Peking several months later, where he 
declared that "the militia and people of various nationalities .... are 
not to be bullied. "48 
Although the physical presence of the minority peoples is 
scarcely noticeable in the post-1962 confrontations, propaganda 
channels for both parties of the dispute have sought to fill in the gaps 
with lengthy discussions of the feelings of Kazakhs and Uighurs on 
each side of the border. The 1962 incident touched off a major media 
"war," with both China and the Soviet Union increasing their 
minority language broadcasting to areas where trans-border recep-
tion was possible. The Soviets were aided in this by the reemergence 
in the USSR ofleading Kazkhs and Uighurs who had been imprisoned 
or purged by the Chinese government, mostly during the anti-rightist 
campaign. Just how they made their escape has never been clarified, 
but it is plain that they are of great value to the Soviet Union as 
propagandists. 
Uighur, Kazakh, and Kirghiz programs beamed from Tashkent, 
Alma Ata, and Frunze were instituted in 1964 and expanded in 1967. 
45. NCNA <Peking), March 23, 1974; SCMP, No. 3585, p. 66. 
46. See, for example, Urumchi Radio CSinkiangl. March 28, 1974, in United States 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China, <hereinafter FBIS-CHil, No. 62, 1974, 
pp.A1-A3. 
47. TASS, December 27, 1976; CDSP, XXVII, No. 52, p. 14. 
48. Peking Radio, October 1, 1974, in FBIS-CHI, No. 192, 1974, p. D6; October 17, 
1974, in FBIS-CHI, No. 201, 1974, p. A4. 
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Special correspondents from TASS and Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 
among others, joined the refugee newscasters, who claimed to have 
seen both sides of the border. Most of the programs seem to present 
an accurate description of the situation in Sinkiang, presumably in 
order to establish the credibility of the broadcasts. Other themes, 
however, include the material advantages of life for Kazakhs, 
Uighurs, and others in the USSR, the availability of higher level of 
labor-saving technology, and the greater cultural freedom and 
diversity allowed there. The broadcasts frequently hark back to the 
IIi revolt of 1944, the founding of the ETR, the historical independ-
ence of the Turkic Muslim peoples and their praiseworthy struggle to 
maintain this independence, the 1962 incident, and other items with 
similarly subversive content. Sympathy is expressed for those who 
are being persecuted by the Chinese authorities for having relatives 
in the Soviet Union or who are suspected of pro-autonomy or 
pro-Soviet feelings. 49 
In many Soviet propaganda releases, there is a clear implication 
that the minorities' sympathetic kin, backed by the Soviet govern-
ment, are ready to welcome their Chinese relatives to the Soviet 
Union. A Western journalist who visited Alma Ata in 1976 noted 
the publication there of a thrice-weekly paper called Yeni Khayat, or 
New Life, for the refugees. It employed Arabic script, according to its 
editor, because the Soviet authorities discovered that the refugees 
had difficulty adjusting to the Cyrillic-based script used by other 
Turkic-Muslim language newspapers published in the USSR. Yet, the 
Soviets probably had other reasons for not using the Latin-based 
alphabet which the Chinese introduced in 1960 after their break with 
the USSR. 
Yeni Khayat's editor claimed that more than 100,000 persons had 
crossed the border. They had been provided with food, clothing, and 
medical attention and eventually settled on collective farms; most 
have apparently continued as sheep herders.50 To enhance the 
contrast between the picture of the cultural genocide of minorities in 
China and their happy life in the USSR, the Soviet Union has also 
49. Gretchen S. Brainerd, "Soviets Intensify Propaganda to Moslem Nationalities 
in China," Radio Liberty dispatch (Munich), February 14, 1972, pp. 1-4. For some 
examples of the Soviet reports, see Taipov, "Eyewitness Account," CDSP, XXI, No. 19, 
p.5; and 0. Matskevich, "Along the Border," KP, September 24, 1963, p. 3, in CDSP, 
XV, No. 38, pp. 17-18. 
50. Christopher S. Wren, "Kazakhstan Beckons Refugees from China," NYT, April 
24, 1976, p. 8. Chinese sources give a lower figure of 60,000. 
30 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES 
allocated funds to refurbish Islamic monuments, including Tamer-
lane's tomb,51 and has published multi-volume compendia on Uighur, 
Kazakh, and other nationality heritages. 
The Chinese Communists have countered by accusing the USSR 
of being a "big prison for nationalities," of forcing the nationalities to 
learn Russian (this last juxtaposed with a quotation from Lenin on 
linguistic diversity), and of exploiting its nationality repu"blics.52 As 
Chinese analysts noted, a 197 4 edition of the book, Problems of the 
CPSU Economic Policy and Reclamation of Virgin Lands in Kazakh-
stan, had quoted Leonid Brezhnev as saying: "We must spare no 
expenditure to carry out material encouragement, for such expendi-
ture will bring returns a hundredfold." But the 1976 reprint deleted 
these words. This showed, according to these analysts, the deliberate-
ly "exploitative nature of the Brezhnev government."53 
Just how seriously each party takes the propaganda efforts of the 
other is unclear, though neither has exerted much effort to jam its 
antagonist's broadcasts. In 1964, seemingly concerned with the Soviet 
propaganda, Salfudin publicly accused the USSR of using radio 
transmission to "spread lies and slander attacking the leadership of 
the CCP and to distort the history of Sinkiang in an effort to 
undermine the unity of the Chinese people ·of all nationalities."54 
In 1967, Ivan Spivanhov, deputy chief editor of Kazakhstanskaya 
pravda, reportedly stated that Chinese broadcasts "beam in hot and 
strong." Yet "few people take any notice. It is so rude and clumsy."55 
Nonetheless, the efforts to answer Chinese charges may, indeed, 
indicate a somewhat less nonchalant attitude. China's claim to much 
of Soviet Central Asia, as Pravda suggested, was based on the 
grounds that "many hundreds of years ago, Chinese troops came to 
these parts and the Chinese emperor once used to collect tribute from 
the local inhabitants." This was "childish," because "one could [also] 
say that . . . the boundary of the PRC passes only along the line of 
the Great Wall, less than 100 kilometers from Peking: the boundary 
of China did once pass there, the wall being evidence of this."56 
51. Hedrick Smith, "Tamerlane Stirs Soviet Controversy," NYT, June 2, 1974, p.2. 
52. "Soviet People's Struggle Against New Tsars," PR, XIX, No. 46 <November 12, 
1976), pp. 21-22; and "Analysis of Soviet Revisionists' Policy of 'National 
Rapprochement,'" PR, XVII, No. 29 (July 19, 1974), pp. 18-20. 
53. "Soviet Social Imperialism Pursues a Policy of National Oppression,'' PR, XIX, 
No. 22 (May 28, 1976), pp. 19-23. 
54. NCNA <Urumchil, April 28, 1964. 
55. Brainerd, "Soviets Intensify Propaganda," p.2. 
56. September 2, 1964, in CDSP, XVI, No. 34, pp. 4-5. 
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The USSR also reacted sharply to evidences of collaboration 
between the PRC and Ukrainian separatists, and refuted Chinese 
charges that Kazakhstan was being exploited.57 In 1972, moreover, 
Izvestia announced plans to publish a ten-volume dictionary of the 
Kazakh language and a multi-volume Kazakh Soviet encyclopedia.58 
There was renewed evidence of concern with civil defense in 
Kazakhstan, and Brezhnev personally made highly touted visits to 
the republic in 1970 and 1972.59 
Chinese media have attempted to refute Soviet charges of 
cultural repression with lengthy articles discussing the exact num-
bers of pamphlets, books, and texts printed in Uighur, Kazakh, 
Mongolian, Kirghiz, and Sibo. These publications, according to a 
Chinese newspaper, have "had considerable use in developing the 
languages and literatures of the various nationalities, enriching their 
culture and accelerating the progress of the socialist revolution and 
reconstruction in Sinkiang."60 A post-Cultural Revolution attempt to 
renew pressure on these minorities to use the Latin alphabet was 
made at the same time as many of China's non-Sinkiang minority 
groups were being urged to study Han Chinese;61 apparently it was 
considered sufficient to separate Chinese Uighurs and Kazakhs from 
their Soviet counterparts on the basis of script. 
The death of Mao's then heir-apparent, Lin Piao, coincided with a 
further liberalization of attitudes toward minorities. Uighurs and 
Kazakhs were reportedly adapting the new revolutionary operas 
57. M. Panchuk, "The Chinese Splitters and the Ukrainian Nationalists," 
Rabochaya ga.zeta, February 27, 1972; CDSP, XXIX, No. 8, pp. 13-14. For a 
representative sample of Chinese propaganda in favor of the Ukrainian nationalists, 
see NCNA (Peking), October 15, 1974; FBIS-CHI, No. 201, 1974, p. Al. For an example 
of Soviet refutation of Chinese charges of USSR exploitation of Kazakhstan, see E. 
Bagramov, "The Drawing Together of Nationalities Is a Law of Communist Construc-
tion," Pravda, June 22, 1972; CDSP, XXIV, No. 25, pp. 10-11. 
58. Izvestia, November 23, 1972, p. 5, in CDSP, XXIV, No. 47, p. 23; and May 12, 
1972, in CDSP, XXIV, No. 19, p. 26. The effect of showing the Soviet Union's 
encouragement of nationality cultures may have been somewhat diluted by the 
newspaper's observation that the encyclopedia's first entry was that of Abas, "the great 
Kazakh poet and educator, whose ardent dream was to educate his people and bring 
them closer to Russian culture." 
59. V. Titov, "Our Common Duty," Pravda, August 14, 1972; CDSP, XXI, No. 33, 
pp. 6-7. For accounts of Brezhnev's visits, see CDSP, XXII, No. 35, pp. 1-8; and XXIV, 
No. 35, pp. 6·7. 
60. Kuang-ming jih-pao [Bright Daily], October 23, 1963. 
61. Contrast Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily], August 22, 1971, with Urumchi 
Radio, December 10, 1970. 
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introduced under the aegis of Mao's wife to their own languages and 
art forms, and were receiving more consumer goods manufactured to 
the specifications of their customs and traditions.62 A protege of Lin 
Piao, who had become first party secretary of the SU AR after the 
Cultural Revolution, was removed from office and replaced by 
Salfudin, thus placing a minority group member in charge of the 
SUAR for the first time since 1949. Other Uighurs and Kazakhs were 
given prestigious, although not necessarily influential, positions in 
government and party, and a campaign was initiated to recruit more of 
them into leadership positions at lower levels ofsociety.63 
Chinese propagandists insisted that the 1962 incident had been 
instigated by the Soviet Union; it constituted one more sad proof that 
the USSR was following in the footsteps of its czarist predecessors. 
They flatly rejected Russia's explanation of the nineteenth-century 
territorial. cessions. As they argued, the lands obtained thereunder 
should have been returned, presumably with their inhabitants as 
well. A news report supposedly emanating from NCNA, which 
circulated in the capitals of several African states, implied that the 
peoples of Soviet Central Asia desired to "enter into a close union 
with China."64 
Thus, while the Soviets have been less overtly fearful of the 
effect of Chinese propaganda than the Chinese have seemed of Soviet 
propaganda, both parties have attempted to answer each other's 
charges, and have accompanied these refutations by actions signifi-
cantly liberalizing policies toward minorities. 
Nonetheless, neither side remains certain of the loyalties of its 
minorities. Within a few years of one another, two books were 
published in the Soviet Union to disprove "falsifiers of history who 
claimed that Soviet rule was established artificially and against the 
wishes of the population of Central Asia and Kazakhstan."65 A few 
62. Urumchi Radio, October 9, 1974. 
63. NCNA (Urumchil, May 17, 1972; SCMP. No. 5143, pp. 22-23. 
64. TASS, April21, 1969; CDSP, XXI, No. 34, p. 17. TASS's evident anger at this, 
and Russian fears of the potentially subversive effects of such statements, make it 
unlikely that the NCNA report was a Soviet fabrication. Nonetheless, information 
available to the author indicates that the report may well have been fabricated by 
United States' intelligence sources. 
65. Khamid Inoyatov, Central Asia and Kazakhstan Before and After the October 
Revolution (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966); and I. I. Mint, The Triumph of Soviet 
Rule in Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Tashkent: USSR Academy of Sciences' Branch 
Publishing House, 1967). The latter was reviewed in Pravda, No. 22, 1967, p. 3, in 
CDSP, XIX, No. 47, p. 22. Cf. L. M. Drobizheva, "On the Social Homogeneity of the 
Republics and the Development of National Relations in the USSR," Istoria SSR, No. 1 
(January 1967!, in CDSP, XIX, No. 18, pp. 28-29. 
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years later, several Kirghiz scholars were severely criticized for 
various "errors," including their assertion that even if a nationality's 
demands for separation and political self-determination should 
conflict with the interests of the nation, no one had the right to 
intervene forcibly in the nation's internal life and "correct" its errors. 
In China, the media have reacted with almost frenetic joy at each 
new archaeological find in Sinkiang which links that province with 
China proper. For example, a rally was held in 1975, with banners 
and headlines proclaiming that "T'ang [Dynasty] Relics Prove 
Sinkiang Historically Part of China." Rally leaders dutifully reiter-
ated the most recent twist in the party line, and explained that these 
latest discoveries would give the lie to nationalistically minded 
internal splittists and to the Soviet revisionist new czars who wished 
to separate Sinkiang from the ancestral land.66 
The group accompanying James Schlesinger to China in 1976 
testified to their Chinese hosts' extreme nervousness while guiding 
the American guests through Sinkiang. In a newspaper account 
admittedly modified for diplomatic reasons, Robert L. Bartley 
reported on the crowds in Ining, less than fifty miles from the Soviet 
border: 
As our caravan goes from stop to stop, the crowds on the streets 
grow, until at last the local citizens virtually climb into the cars. 
The crowds are nearly all Kazakh and Uighur, though the town 
is supposed to be half Chinese. They break into almost joyous 
applause at every wave. Our hosts from Peking grow testier than 
at any other point in the trip.67 
In 1976, a West German magazine published the story of the 
arrest of two recent refugees from China to the Soviet Union: one a 
Kazakh and the other a Kirghiz. After being apprehended, both were 
placed in a Soviet prison where a fellow prisoner, an ethnic Russian 
hostile to the Soviet government and familiar with the cruelties of 
the Gulag Archipelago, was amazed to learn that the two refugees 
were happy with their new lot. He quoted one as saying, "I have a 
bunk, a light bulb in the cell, we get food every day, even fish. What 
66. Urumchi Radio, March 16, 1975; FBIS-CHI, No. 54, 1975, p. E5. 
67. Bartley, "In China, Trust What You Feel," Wall Street Journal, October 1, 
1976, p. 10. 
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else do I need?"68 Members of the Schlesinger party confided that 
their Chinese hosts seemed taken aback by the relatively low 
standards of living in Sinkiang, speculating that the Chinese guides 
were shocked by the discrepancy between reality and what their own 
propaganda had led them to believe.69 
CONCLUSION 
It has been noted that the principal factors in the internationa-
lization of the Turkic Muslim question were the hostilities between 
the two host countries and the deteriorating economic conditions in 
China during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The many references in 
Chinese media to the existence of local nationalism over the entire 
decade of the 1950s make it clear that Kazakh and Uighur 
dissatisfaction with Chinese Communist rule existed prior to the 
catalyzing incident of May 1962. Nonetheless, owing to the appear-
ance of Sino-Soviet friendship, the public manifestation of their 
dissatisfaction was muted. 
The exact nature of Kazakh and Uighur demands on the Chinese 
government has never been made clear. There are references to 
separatism, implying an independent Sinkiang; some prefer to join 
together with other Turkic Muslims (some of whom would undoubted-
ly come from Soviet Kazakhstan) in a larger separate state, while 
others demand greater autonomy of Sinkiang within the Chinese 
state. There are, moreover, demands for the Han Chinese to leave 
Sinkiang; others simply ask that they relinguish their commanding 
positions in the province's economic and administrative infrastruc-
ture. 
Whether or not Soviet intrigues were behind the May 1962 
incident, as the Chinese charge, the Soviets hastened to make use of 
Kazakh and Uighur dissatisfaction thereafter. The USSR, champion-
ing the cause of China's Turkic Muslim peoples, sought to contrast 
the economic hardship and cultural repression on the Chinese side of 
the border with the allegedly improved situation on the Soviet side. 
The Soviet Kazakhs and other Central Asian minorities seem to have 
profited as a result. In an effort to provide suitable anti-Chinese 
propoaganda, the Soviets granted them various cultural and material 
benefits. Chinese Kazakhs and Uighurs have benefited as well, since 
the PRC has perceived it as necessary to refute Soviet charges. 
68. A. Uchitel, "Escape to an Adjacent Cell," Possev, No. 2 (February 1976), in 
Freedom at Issue, September-October 1976, p. 10. 
69. Information available to the author. 
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Compilations have been made of folk-songs, and resources have been 
transferred to Sinkiang via a preferential revenue redistribution plan 
which returns more money to the province than is collected there. 
This has allowed the construction of mining and other industries and 
aided in raising living standards. There has also been an increase in 
the number of Uighurs and Kazakhs in leadership positions in the 
SUAR. 
While Chinese and Soviet Kazakhs and Uighurs have gained 
leverage over their respective governments as a result of the 
Sino-Soviet situation, there are limits as to how far either govern-
ment can be manipulated. Past experience has shown that over-
zealous catering to minority cultures generally reinforces the con-
tinued perception of ethnic separatism and prevents the drawing 
together of the minority peoples which the two countries desire. The 
granting of more autonomy may also lead to subsequent demands for 
separatism. Moreover, the more liberal policies of China and the 
USSR are doubtless looked upon with justifiable skepticism by 
minorities on both sides of the border. In some instances, the 
liberality of a pronouncement may be tempered by other words 
spoken in a different context; in other instances, the policies are 
known to be subject to rapid reversal. 
With the higher degree of ideological orthodoxy demanded and 
lower living standards prevailing on the Chinese side, the Soviet 
Union would probably enjoy an advantage in any contest between the 
two states for the loyalties of the Central Asian peoples. Still, for 
reasons discussed earlier, the USSR cannot be fully certain of the 
loyalties of its own minorities. Furthermore, the PRC has recently 
endeavored to raise living standards in Sinkiang, to coopt more 
Uighurs and Kazakhs into the province's elite, and to relax some of 
the more culturally repressive aspects of the past. It is therefore 
unlikely that the Soviet Union will decide to employ the incitement 
of China's Kazakhs and Uighurs in any large-scale way. Anti-
Chinese propaganda and infiltration directed toward Sinkiang will 
probably continue on a small scale, in an attempt to impress the 
Chinese with the potentially damaging effects of a larger-scale effort. 
Since the Soviet Union does not intend to support Chinese Kazakh 
separatism or autonomy in any meaningful way, and because of the 
ever larger Han Chinese presence in Sinkiang, the Turkic Muslims in 
Central Asia who desire a separate state will not likely see their wish 
fulfilled. 
The most feasible scenario for the creation of such a separate 
state would entail a major destabiliaztion of the present equilibrium 
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on the border, such as a Sino-Soviet war. Given the unlikely 
eventuality of a war between the two states and the resurfacing of 
autonomy demands, there is a high probability that the Soviet Union 
would win and, as part of the settlement, might detach Sinkiang from 
China and establish it as an autonomous state, albeit one dependent 
on the USSR for its continued existence. At first glance, the effort 
might not seem worth the potential gains, in view of the Soviet 
Union's not wholly successful record of relations with its own Central 
Asian minorities. On the other hand, the example of the MPR may 
indicate that the venture is indeed worthwhile. The MPR is, and 
Sinkiang could be, a buffer state between the Soviet Union and 
China. The MPR is rich in minerals and has been usefully integrated 
into the Soviet economy; Sinkiang could be as well. Moreover, though 
Mongolians would probably, under other circumstances, wish a 
higher degree of international maneuverability, their actions indicate 
their strong preference for an independence circumscribed by the 
Soviet Union to the risk of inclusion within the Chinese state. Thus, 
there are very real prospects for gain for the Soviet Union in such a 
situation. 
Chinese foreign policymakers have demonstrated themselves to 
be highly skilled and fully cognizant of the realities of, and 
limitations on, Chinese power. The existence of the MPR is a constant 
reminder of what may happen in Sinkiang. It is therefore probable 
that they will do their utmost to prevent an escalation of Sino-Soviet 
violence. The influx of Han Chinese to Sinkiang will likely continue 
insofar as the local economy can absorb the immigrants. Sinkiang's 
minorities will be carefully treated in such a way as to diffuse 
resentment. While granting them some privileges, the PRC will not 
court the minorities to such a degree that further demands for 
separatism will be encouraged. 
The best laid plans of government policymakers have gone astray 
before, and it is not beyond the realm of posibility that this may 
happen again. History is replete with wars which began accidentally, 
and a Sino-Soviet armed struggle is but one of several possible 
scenarios which may rekindle hopes for separatism in Sinkiang 
and/or Soviet Central Asia. It is conceivable, for example, that such a 
minority group uprising may occur independent of any impetus from 
Peking or Moscow. Here the social mobilization phenomenon may be 
of crucial importance. In destroying the traditionally loose-knit 
kinship groups of Central Asian peoples and in giving them a 
common written language, making them literate, and drawing them 
into factories and mass organizations, the Chinese and Soviet 
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governments may inadvertently be creating the preconditions for 
large-scale well-organized resistance to their respective rule, rather 
than the small-scale and loosely organized hostilities they have 
successfully coped with so far. 
It is difficult to determine how much genuine feeling Chinese 
Kazakhs and Uighurs have for their kinfolk across the border, and 
vice versa. The constant propaganda of both sides, particularly that of 
the Soviet Union, suggests that they are indeed one people. This 
would surely reinforce such feeling as do exist, and may even create 
them where they do not exist. This may spark desires for irredentism 
which operate independently of official Chinese or Soviet wishes. 
At present, however, these possibilities remain remote and the 
outlook seems to portend a continuation of low-level resistance which 
may occasionally be exacerbated by local economic shortages or a 
misguided or misinterpreted order from Peking or Moscow. There 
seems little probability of either escalating or solving the Turkic 
Muslim problem. 
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Chapter Two 
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S APPROACH TO THE 
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES 
Robert G. Sutter* 
THE ORIGINS OF CHINA'S APPROACH TO THE 
SUPERPOWERS1 
The rapprochement of the United States (US) with the People's 
Republic of China (PRC), achieved during President Richard M. 
Nixon's February 1972 visit to China, marked the most important 
breakthrough in modern Chinese foreign policy. Peking's 
normalization of relations with Washington was especially useful in 
fostering China's vital interests in the Asian balance of power. In the 
late 1960s, the PRC leadership became increasingly aware of China's 
vulnerable strategic position. That vulnerability stemmed in part 
from disruptions of China's military preparedness during the 
Cultural Revolution, and it was increased by significantly larger 
Soviet military power deployed along the Chinese frontier. But at its 
heart lay Peking's strident opposition to both superpowers. 
The August 1968 Soviet incursion into Czechoslovakia and 
Moscow's concurrent formulation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine 
of limited sovereignty demonstrated to the Chinese that the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) might be prepared to use 
overwhelming military superiority to pressure, and even to invade, 
the PRC. At the same time, Peking voiced growing concern over 
alleged Soviet efforts to gain influence in countries along China's 
periphery in order to "contain" the PRC. The Sino-Soviet border 
clashes of 1969 increased Peking's concern over the Soviet "threat." 
In response, Chinese officials, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung 
and Chou En-lai, began a major effort in 1969 to broaden Peking's 
leverage against the USSR by ending China's international isolation. 
In this pursuit they used conventional diplomacy and played down 
the ideological shrillness characteristic of Chinese foreign policy 
during the Cultural Revolution. 
Because of Moscow's massive power, Peking realized that 
improving diplomatic relations with most foreign countries would not 
* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not 
represent the views of any US government agency. 
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be significantly helpful to China's pressing need to offset the USSR. 
In Asia, only the US, the other superpower, seemed to have sufficient 
strength to serve as an effective deterrent to Soviet pressure. Moscow 
had previously shown uneasiness over signs of possible reconciliation 
between China and the US. Thus, the Chinese leaders were well 
aware that they held an important option. They could move closer to 
the US in order to readjust Sino-Soviet relations and form a new 
balance of power in Asia favorable to the PRC. 
While the Chinese faced increasingly strong Soviet pressure in 
1969, the newly installed Nixon administration was beginning policy 
initiatives designed to pull back American military forces from Asia 
and reduce US commitments along the periphery of China. It was 
soon apparent that the so-called Nixon Doctrine of gradual troop 
withdrawal was perceived favorably by Peking, at least after the 
brief US incursion into Cambodia. The Chinese leaders treated the 
American pullback as solid evidence of the Nixon administration's 
avowed interest in improving relations with China. They also viewed 
it as a major opportunity for the PRC to free itself from the 
burdensome task of maintaining an extensive defense network along 
China's southern and eastern borders against possible US-backed 
armed incursions. Moreover, Peking hoped to spread its own 
influence to neighboring Asian areas as the US gradually reduced its 
military presence in those regions. 
Thanks to these considerations, the PRC agreed to invite 
President Nixon to China and to begin the process of normalization of 
Sino-American relations. Though the joint communique signed by 
Nixon and Chou En-lai in Shanghai in February 1972 acknowledged 
major differences between the two nations over ideology, Taiwan, and 
several foreign policy issues, the document showed that the two 
leaders had reached an important agreement on the principles which 
would govern the future international order in Asia. While agreeing 
that they would not seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, both 
sides promised to oppose efforts by any other nation to establish 
hegemony there. 
This accord served China's interests well. For the previous two 
decades, Peking had existed within a generally hostile Asian 
environment and had periodically faced threats to its national 
security. The Sino-American rapprochement offered the PRC an 
opportunity to adopt a more relaxed stance on its eastern and 
southern flanks. It also provided major support for China against 
Soviet pressure. US support for the antihegemony clause in the 
Shanghai Communique represented for China an important strategic 
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guarantee. It put Washington on record as opposing any effort by 
Moscow to dominate China. 
The Sino-US relationship remained the centerpiece of PRC 
strategy in the Asia-Pacific region following the promulgation of the 
Shanghai Communique. In accord with Peking's interests, 
Washington continued to implement the Nixon Doctrine, gradually 
withdrawing from Southeast Asia, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. At the 
same time, the US repeatedly insisted that its withdraw} should not 
be interpreted as a sign of weakness, since Washington remained 
firmly opposed to any other power's attempts to gain a dominant 
position in Asia. The Nixon administration kept sufficient force on 
hand to back up its stance, thereby reassuring Peking that the US 
would honor the Shanghai Communique's provisions against 
"hegemony" in East Asia. 
A milestone in the development of Peking's new relationship 
with the US and the USSR was reached at the Tenth Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in August 1973. In his August 24 
report to the congress, Chou En-lai showed increased confidence over 
China's strategic position, portraying the Soviet Union as principally 
threatening the West in Europe rather than threatening China. He 
offered a lengthy rationale for China's rapprochement with the US 
and its continued opposition to the USSR. He implied that Peking 
was, in 1973, secure in international affairs; the PRC would focus its 
attention and resources on dealing with internal questions.2 
Chou's report pressed the familiar line of forming "the broadest 
united front" against the "hegemonism of the two superpowers," but 
1. For useful overviews of recent Chinese foreign policy, see Harold C. Hinton, 
China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949 (new 
and enlarged edition; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972>; and A. Doak 
Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1977). See also Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch: Toward Sino-American 
Reconciliation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978>; Robert G. Sutter, 
Chinese Foreign Policy after the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977 <Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1978>; and Robert G. Sutter, "China's Strategy in Asia Following the US Defeat 
in Indochina" (paper presented at the Seventh Sino-American Conference on Mainland 
China, Taipei, June 1978). Background information on China's foreign policy is 
available in US Foreign Broadcast Information Service <hereinafter cited as FBISl, 
Trends in Communist Media, a weekly publication analyzing the media comments of 
China and other Communist countries. This is particularly useful in documenting the 
changes in Chinese foreign policy during this time. 
2. For an analysis of Chou's report, see FBIS, Trends in Communist Media, 
September 6, 1973. The report appears in The Tenth National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China <Documents) <Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1973), pp. 
1-37. 
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it did so in a way that clearly sanctioned the move toward Sino-US 
detente as a means to counterbalance Soviet influence. Chou 
sharpened the formula of great-power rivalry that had served as the 
major premise of Peking's differentiated approach to the superpowers 
in recent years. While noting that the superpowers "contend as well 
as collude" with each other, he maintained that "their collusion 
serves the purpose of more intensified contention. Contention is 
absolute and protracted, whereas collusion is relative and 
temporary." In the context of superpower contention, Chou cited 
Europe as "strategically the key point" in their rivalry. According to 
his analysis, the West always sought to divert the Soviet "peril" 
toward China, and the Soviets for their part were, in 1973, feinting to 
the East while thrusting toward the West. 
Chou's report pulled few punches in its attack on the Soviets, 
likening Brezhnev to Hitler and all but writing off any hope for an 
improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. Chou recited a familiar litany 
of charges, accusing the Kremlin of enforcing a Fascist dictatorship 
at home and practicing "social imperialism" across the globe. He 
reiterated Peking's position that the dispute over "matters of 
principle" should not hinder normalization of state relations on the 
basis of peaceful coexistence, and he urged that the border question 
should be settled peacefully through negotiations "free from any 
threat." This formulation, however, merely reflected Peking's consis-
tent demand for a mutual troop withdrawal from the disputed regions 
along the frontier. Indeed, it seems likely that he was making these 
points only for the record, for he raised in his report a sarcastic 
rhetorical question: "Must China give away all the territory north of 
the Great Wall to the Soviet revisionists" in order to demonstrate a 
willingness to improve Sino-Soviet relations? 
Chou made a passing reference to Soviet troops stationed along 
the Chinese border. His most direct portrayal of a threat to China's 
security appeared in the course of an appeal for vigilance against 
"any war of aggression that imperialism may launch and particularly 
against surprise attack on our country by Soviet revisionist soci~l 
imperialism." This warning against surprise attack was a new 
element in Chinese rhetoric, and it also appeared in the congress 
communique. Taken as a whole, however, the discussion of foreign 
affairs in the congress did not evoke a sense of imminent threat. In 
reference to Mao Tse-tung's May 20, 1970 statement on the danger of 
a new world war, Chou was confident that it was possible to "prevent 
such a war." 
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In contrast to its attack on Moscow, Chou's report contained a 
positive assessment of the Sino-US rapprochement. When he was 
listing Peking's successes in foreign affairs, Chou observed that 
"Sino-US relations have been improved to some extent." He justified 
Peking's move to improve Sino-US relations while denigrating 
Soviet-US detente. He distinguished "necessary compromises be-
tween revolutionary countries and imperialist countries" from "collu-
sion and compromise" between Moscow and Washington. He cited a 
Leninist scripture for the observation that "there are compromises 
and compromises," and he drove his point home by invoking Lenin's 
conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, contrasting it with "the 
doings of Khrushchev and Brezhnev," who were "betrayers of Lenin." 
In another justification of the Sino-American detente, Chou 
claimed that the US had "openly admitted that it is increasingly on 
the decline," and he argued that the Nixon administration "could not 
but pull out of Vietnam." This portrayal of receding US power 
contrasted with Chou's description of the "evil and foul things" 
perpetrated by the expansionist Soviet Union. 
COMPLICATIONS IN CHINA'S FOREIGN APPROACH, 
1974-1976 
By the end of 1973, it was clear that Peking's more pragmatic 
approach toward foreign affairs in general, and toward the two 
superpowers in particular, had greatly enhanced China's 
international position. In the course of little more than four years 
since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Peking had marked four 
major achievements: First, the PRC had managed, in some measure 
through Sino-Soviet border talks, to stay the Soviet threat against 
China. Moreover, it had used its active international diplomacy to 
block suspected Soviet efforts to keep China isolated in Asia and 
elsewhere. Second, Peking had gained entry into the United Nations, 
normalized diplomatic relations with such major capitalist powers as 
West Germany, Japan, and Great Dritain, and reestablished its 
traditionally favorable position among the independent 
Communist-ruled states of North Vietnam, North Korea, and 
Rumania. The Chinese had also begun what promised to be a fruitful 
reconciliation with the US. Third, the PRC had put aside its past 
ideological bias against increasing trade with capitalist states and 
had started to open more of its markets to the advanced technology 
and resources available in the West, hoping thereby to build China's 
strength with equipment purchased abroad. Fourth, Peking was 
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pursuing programs of cultural exchange with an increasingly large 
number of foreign countries, thereby significantly enhancing China's 
appeal internationally. 
The new program in foreign affairs was not without its critics 
within the Chinese leadership, however. Chou En-lai's efforts were 
particularly vulnerable to charges from "leftist" ideological spokes-
men in the Chinese hierarchy, who attacked the "expediency" of 
Chou's pragmatic initiatives and bemoaned the loss of Maoist 
"principle" in the conduct of Chinese foreign affairs. These spokes-
men were particularly critical of Chou's foreign policy during massive 
political campaigns in China in 1974 and again in 1976, producing 
serious disruptions in the development of Chinese foreign affairs. 
Furthermore, the success of the new program was largely 
dependent on the superpower relationship in Asia and elsewhere. 
Whenever the superpower balance changed substantially (or at least 
was thought to have changed substantially), Peking felt compelled to 
make corresponding shifts in its own foreign approach in order to 
adjust to the new situation. In particular, the PRC was relying 
heavily on the US and its Asian allies to maintain in the region a 
balance of influence that would preclude gains by the USSR. As a 
result, the Chinese were seriously concerned about increasing US 
"weakness" following American setbacks in Asia during 1975, and it 
responded with significant alterations in China's foreign approach. 
Impact of the Anti-Confucius Campaign, 19743 
The development of strong leadership conflicts in China during 
1974 interfered with the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. The 
conflicts were apparently prompted by Chou En-lai's declining 
health. Since Mao was not expected to live much longer, party leaders 
in Peking began to jockey for positions of power. "Moderate" leaders, 
guided by the ailing Chou and his protege, Vice Premier Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing, relied on their control of much of the state and party 
bureaucracies. Their opponents were headed by a group of "leftist" 
Politburo members known later as the "Gang of Four" (Wang 
Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, Chiang Ch'ing, and Yao Wen-yuan). 
They had no firm base of power. Although they were influential in 
propaganda, educational, and cultural organizations, their basic 
support seemed to rest on Mao's personal sanction of their activities. 
3. For a more detailed analysis of China's foreign policy during this time, see 
Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy, pp. 33-38. 
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The leftists strove to build up their own prestige within the 
leadership while tearing down the prestige of the moderates. In 1974, 
they exploited the massive political campaign to criticize Confucius 
and Lin Piao as a means to attack the moderates' management of 
Chinese affairs. Through their use of propaganda during the 
campaign, the leftists sniped at moderate policies on education, 
rehabilitation of veteran cadres who had been criticized during the 
Cultural Revolution, and China's domestic economic development. 
The leftist-inspired anti-Confucius campaign also had a signifi-
cant impact on the conduct of foreign affairs. First, it led to an 
outpouring of harsh criticism of foreign music, films, and other 
cultural works. This helped to curb what had been an active Chinese 
interest in developing cultural exchange with foreign countries. 
Second, the campaign criticized Chinese trade with capitalist coun-
tries. The propaganda claimed that such trade would render China 
dependent on "imperialism," a line which dampened Peking's interest 
in increasing trade with the West. Third, the campaign intensified 
Sino-Soviet hostility. Not only did the Peking media expand. harsh 
polemics against the USSR, but the Chinese, for the first time since 
the Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969, published the arrests of 
alleged Soviet "spies" in the PRC.4 Fourth, Chinese relations with the 
US fell prey to the anti-Confucius campaign. Peking became less 
interested in cultural exchange and trade with Washington, and 
Chinese media criticism of the US increased sharply. At the same 
time, the PRC adopted an unusually strong, militant stance on the 
sensitive Taiwan issue, warning that China was prepared to launch a 
military strike across the Taiwan Strait. 
Chou En-lai and the moderate leaders managed to weather the 
impact of the leftist challenge during the anti-Confucius campaign. 
In his report to the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) on 
January 13, 1975, Chou reaffirmed Peking's commitment to a 
pragmatic approach to foreign affairs. Nonetheless, the PRC lead-
ership disputes over power in China remained unresolved. For 
4. For example, the PRC publicized the arrest in January 1974 of Soviet 
diplomats in Peking and the arrest in March of the same year of a Soviet helicopter 
crew which had landed in Sinkiang near the Sino-Soviet border. The diplomats were 
promptly expelled from China, leading to a quick end of the incident. Nevertheless, 
Peking decided to detain the Soviet helicopter and its crew, and this resulted in a sharp 
exchange of Sino-Soviet protests, marking a downturn in the already poor relationship 
between the two nations. For a detailed discussion of the Sinkiang incident, see 
Chapter Two of this book, "The Role ofEthnicity in the Sino-Soviet Dispute," pp. 27-28. 
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example, prior to the convention of the NPC, Chou's protege, Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing, received a boost in his career when he was designated 
vice chairman of the party in the CCP plenum of January 8-10, 1975. 
Yet, soon afterward, leftist standard bearer, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, was 
appointed vice premier at the NPC and began to take a more active 
role in the management of Chinese foreign policy. 
Concern over US "Weakness," 19755 
During the next year, Chinese foreign policy was dominated by 
Peking's concern over what it perceived to be a major shift in the 
international balance of power, especially in East Asia. Although 
Chinese leftist leaders continued to snipe at the implementation .of 
moderate policies, their influence on PRC foreign policy was not 
strong. Strategic concerns stemming particularly from the rapid 
collapse of the US position in Indochina in the spring of 1975 
prompted increased Chinese efforts in pragmatic, conventional di-
plomacy designed to stabilize the East Asian balance of power and to 
prevent further Soviet expansion. The Chinese response represented 
graphic evidence of how far China had come to rely on the US to 
maintain an active posture in Asian and world affairs that would 
preclude a major expansion of Soviet influence. 
The fall of US-backed governments in Cambodia and South 
Vietnam in 1975 upset the steady development of an East Asian 
balance of power favorable to Chinese interests. From Peking's 
perspective, the stability of the newly emerging diplomatic equilib-
rium had met with a significant setback. While the PRC had expected 
Washington to withdraw eventually from Indochina, the precipitous 
US decline held serious implications for China's interests. Washing-
ton suffered a serious defeat at a time when US leadership and 
resolve abroad, especially in East Asia, had already been called into 
question as a result of the Watergate scandal and the 1974-1975 
economic recession. 
Against this backdrop, the US defeats in Indochina cast doubt on 
a key premise in Peking's plan to foster a new East Asian order 
favorable to Chinese interests. Was the US strong enough and, more 
important, was it resolute enough to continue to serve as the main 
strategic block against Soviet encroachment and advances in East 
Asia? According to the PRC's judgment, the US had indeed been 
weakened by the Indochina developments, and its strength and 
5. For further information on this issue, see Sutter, "China's Strategy in Asia." 
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resolve in East Asia had been similarly affected. To the Chinese, the 
US had become less influential in Asia; its utility as a bulwark 
against future Soviet expansion was therefore compromised. 
To respond to its perception of an altered East Asian situation, 
Peking was determined to continue to adhere to the Sino-US plan for 
a new East Asian order as articulated in the Shanghai Communique. 
But, whereas the PRC had previously relied mainly on US strength 
to sustain the favorable balance, it began to take on a greater 
responsibility for shoring up East Asian positions against Soviet 
expansion. For example, Peking moved adroitly to solidify its 
relations with, and to cement anti-Soviet feelings in, the Philippines 
and Thailand, the two non-Communist states in East Asia most 
affected by the collapse of the US position in Indochina. Peking's 
establishment of diplomatic relations with these states - with a joint 
communique in each instance testifying to their opposition to 
international "hegemony" - was intended to reassure Manila and 
Bangkok of their security and stability in the wake of the US defeat. 
By doing so, the PRC hoped to prevent the two states from moving 
into a one-sided relationship with the USSR, in their hasty search for 
big power support in the new Southeast Asian situation. 
In Peking's opinion, the US had been "beaten black and blue" in 
Indochina, and the Asian people, especially those in Southeast Asia, 
were increasingly successful in their efforts to drive the "wolf' - the 
US - from the "front gate." Nonetheless, the Chinese made plain 
that they were opposed to any unilateral US withdrawal from 
international involvement after this setback. They wanted the US to 
remain heavily involved abroad, and strategically vigilant against 
the USSR in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. They argued that 
the US defeats in Indochina had actually presented Washington with 
an "opportunity" to pull back from "secondary" areas where it had 
overextended itself, in order to serve more effectively as a strategic 
bulwark against Soviet expansion in more "vital" areas abroad. In 
this vein, the PRC reduced its criticism of US military presence and 
political influence in Asia, while giving unusually favorable play to 
US statements of resolve to retain strong ties with Japan and 
selected non-Communist Asian states, and to maintain a strong naval 
presence in the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. 
Peking viewed the USSR as a more immediate and serious threat 
to China's aspirations in East and Southeast Asia than it had in the 
early 1970s. Accordingly, the PRC adopted a more active policy 
against the USSR, aimed at blocking Moscow's attempts to advance 
along China's flanks as the US withdrew. It also launched a major 
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propaganda campaign to warn other Asian states of the danger posed 
by the ravenous "tiger" (the USSR), which lurked at the rear door as 
the Asian people pushed the "wolf" through the front gate. Peking, 
too, charged that Moscow's plan for a collective security system in 
Asia was actually a thinly veiled effort to achieve political "hegemon-
y;" it was the antithesis of the "antihegemony front" fostered by 
China and its friends. Because of their high profile against the USSR, 
the Chinese viewed with increased suspicion those Asian states 
which maintained cordial relations with Moscow, notably Communist 
Vietnam. 
By late 1975, Peking began to see the situation in East Asia in a 
more optimistic light. Although US power and influence in the region 
had weakened, Washington continued to be interested in sustaining 
an East Asian balance of power that would preclude Soviet expan-
sion. This was underlined by President Gerald R. Ford's announce-
ment of the Pacific Doctrine in late 1975. It was based on continuing 
strong US air and naval power in the region, on close US relations 
with Japan and other traditional allies, and on developing ties with 
the PRC. Significantly, it did not envision any major role for the 
USSR to play in the area. 
Meanwhile, Peking had achieved considerable success in 
broadening its influence among non-Communist Southeast Asian 
states. Its warning against the danger of Soviet expansion was 
winning new adherents in Southeast Asia. At the end of 1975, the 
only areas in East and Southeast Asia where the USSR maintained 
considerable influence were Vietnam and Laos. 
The PRC, however, still could not afford to be overly optimistic 
about the broad international trend of East-West relations. While 
feeling more secure in East Asia, the Chinese were alarmed in late 
1975 by what they considered to be a less resolute Western posture 
vis-a-vis the USSR. They viewed the summit meeting in Helsinki 
earlier in August as evidence of a growing trend in the US and other 
Western nations to "appease" Moscow in order to direct the Soviet 
menace "eastward," away from Europe. Peking warned against 
"appeasement" of Soviet "expansionism" under the cover of detente. 
It emphasized the danger of a "new world war" which, it charged, 
would be started by the Soviet Union. 
Chinese criticism of Western "appeasement" intensified when US 
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger was dismissed by President 
Ford. On November 7, 1975, for example, the New China News 
Agency (NCNA) departed from its past circumspect treatment of the 
US administration, and replayed in one dispatch some critical 
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comments made by foreign leaders on Schlesinger's dismissal. 
Nevertheless, it carefully refrained from attributing any of the 
criticisms to the agency itself. The PRC clearly regarded the incident 
as illustrative of the Ford administration's determination to speed up 
detente with the USSR, a decision which the Chinese believed was 
detrimental to US national security.6 
On the same day when the NCNA reported Schlesinger's 
dismissal, its dispatch carried two "international reference material" 
articles, explaining to the Chinese people the significance of the 1938 
Munich agreement and the 1940 Dunkirk evacuation. The articles 
focused on the disastrous results of the Munich "policy of appease-
ment" adopted by the British and French leaders to connive "with the 
aggressive acts" of the Fascists in order to "divert" the "spearhead of 
aggression toward the East." The implications of the Peking media 
were obvious. According to the Chinese, the Ford administration's 
dismissal of Schlesinger was an attempt to ease US-Soviet tensions, 
and it was comparable to Neville Chamberlain's earlier efforts to 
appease Hitler at Munich. 
POST-MAO DEVELOPMENTS 
In 1976, Chinese foreign policies were dominated by the impact 
of major internal leadership changes. Premier Chou En-lai, NPC 
Chairman Chu Teh, and CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung died in 
January, June, and September, respectively. Moreover, Teng Hsiao-
p'ing was removed from his posts in April, and the four leftist 
Politburo members (known since then as the "Gang of Four") were 
arrested in October. Hua Kuo-feng was named to the positions of 
acting premier in February, premier in April, and CCP chairman In 
October. Yeh Chien-ying and Li Hsien-nien, Politburo members who 
had dropped from public view along with Teng Hsiao-p'ing after 
Chou's death in January, received unusual prominence in Chinese 
media following the purge of the "Gang of Four" in October. 
Apparently in reaction to these major leadership shifts, Chinese 
spokesmen cautioned repeatedly throughout the year that the basic 
orientation of PRC foreign policy would not change. And, in fact, it 
did not change, although there were signs that leaders in Peking 
disagreed among themselves on how foreign policy should be carried 
out. Leftist leaders headed by the "Gang of Four" tried to reverse 
several aspects of Chinese policy previously carried out by such 
6. For an analysis of the dispatch, see FBIS, Trends in Communist Media, 
November 12, 1975. 
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moderate leaders as Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. These leftist 
leaders were particularly prominent during the massive domestic 
campaign against Teng in mid-1976, and they used their influence in 
propaganda circles to push their radical policies. They criticized 
Teng's advocacy of increased foreign trade, especially with the West; 
they adopted a harder line than the moderates on the Taiwan issue; 
and they were more critical of Washington. 
Following the removal of the "Gang of Four," Chinese officials 
were preoccupied with conventional diplomatic, economic, and milit-
ary efforts to protect China's security interests in world affairs, 
especially against the perceived threats from the Soviet Union. The 
PRC tried to foster an "antihegemony united front" with other 
developing Third World countries, as well as the US and other 
developed Western nations whose interests were seen as directly 
threatened by Soviet "hegemonism." 
In its bilateral relations with the USSR, Peking worked to 
maintain a state of controlled hostility in order to avoid direct 
military confrontation with the vastly superior Soviet forces along 
the contested Sino-Soviet border. The PRC rebuffed Moscow's public 
gestures to revive the stalled border talks, and Sino-Soviet polemics 
continued to underline a solid impasse. 
In its broader foreign policy, Peking viewed the Sino-Soviet 
rivalry for influence in world affairs as a zero-sum game, in which a 
gain for Moscow was equivalent to a loss for China. Thus, the PRC 
befriended not only those states which had adopted a pro-Peking 
orientation, but also those nations which did not cooperate closely 
with the USSR. Moreover, the Chinese leaders supported the 
continued presence in East and Southeast Asia of strong US naval 
and air forces as an effective deterrent to the spread of Soviet 
military power along China's periphery. They warned that a precipitous 
American withdrawal could create a power vacuum which would likely 
befilledbythe USSR. 7 
The PRC put aside its previous fears of Japanese militarism, and 
strongly urged Japan to strengthen its ties with the US, as well as to 
7. For background information on this policy and comments by Chinese officials, 
see A New Realism: Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China, July 3-13, 
1978, a report submitted by the Subcommitte on Asian and Pacific Affairs to the 
Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives !Washington, 
D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1978l; and China and Asia: An Analysis of 
China's Recent Policy Toward Neighboring States, a report submitted by the 
Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US 
House of Representatives <Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979l. 
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expand its defense capabilities in order to guard against the "threat 
from the north." At the same time, Peking supported the Indonesian 
government's close ties with the US and applauded Jakarta's cool 
response to various Soviet blandishments, although Indonesia had 
often been suspicious of the PRC's intentions. 
The Chinese, too, were increasingly supportive of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); they wanted the organization 
to become an effective instrument to block Soviet expansionism in 
Southeast Asia. In contrast, they opposed Hanoi's call for greater 
Southeast Asian cooperation, because they considered Hanoi a Soviet 
surrogate, and the Vietnamese proposal a thinly disguised effort to 
spread Soviet influence in the region. In South Asia, Peking had 
likewise been suspicious of India's proposals for regional cooperation 
in the early 1970s, when New Delhi was, in Peking's opinion, 
assisting Soviet expansion. Yet as India demonstrated greater 
independence vis-a-vis the USSR later in the decade, the Chinese 
responded more positively to New Delhi's calls for regional coopera-
tion. 
Indeed, concern over Sino-Soviet rivalry was not the sole factor 
governing China's foreign behavior. For example, domestic politics, 
Maoist ideology, Peking's territorial claims, as well as its support for 
overseas Chinese, for Communism in Korea, and for insurgencies in 
Southeast Asia, all served to complicate the PRC's policy from time to 
time. Most important for Washington, the Chinese demanded the 
withdrawal of American troops from South Korea even though they 
supported continued US military presence in Asia in order to offset 
the USSR. At the same time, although Peking wanted to develop 
friendly relations with Japan and the non-Communist governments 
in Southeast Asia, its leaders did not stop to quarrel with these 
governments about conflicting territorial claims; neither did they 
refrain from supporting insurgent movements which were directed 
against some of these administrations. Nonetheless, these many 
considerations largely remained in the background as the PRC 
devoted primary attention to fostering an Asian balance of influence 
favorable to China and unfavorable to the USSR. 
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NORMALIZATION WITH THE usa 
The Chinese preoccupation with the Sino-Soviet rivalry clearly 
benefited the US. While China had previously been the major 
opponent to American involvement in world affairs, especially in 
Asia, Peking became one of the most vocal supporters of a strong US 
military, political, and economic presence. From the PRC's perspec-
tive, American interests in Asian and world affairs coincided with 
Chinese interests, insofar as they served to preclude the growth of 
Soviet influence, particularly along China's frontiers. Significantly, 
this support from the PRC did not cost the US much in terms of 
material outlays and political prestige. In fact, it allowed Washington 
to reduce its costly military presence in Asia without dramatically 
upsetting the balance of power there. Peking's positive appraisal of 
the US also reduced the possibility of a major Sino-American conflict 
in Asia; it became less likely that the Chinese would disrupt the 
political order and economic stability of the non-Communist Asian 
states for fear that turmoil would open opportunities for Soviet 
expansionism. 
Meanwhile, Peking encouraged Washington to adopt policies 
with respect to Europe, the Middle East, and US-Soviet arms control, 
which would compel Moscow to maintain a high level of military 
vigilance along its western frontier and thereby reduce its pressure 
on China. From time to time, the PRC warned the US against trying 
to use cooperation with the USSR in arms control, or in Europe and 
the Middle East, as a means to divert the "threat" of Soviet 
expansionism eastward, toward China. 
The normalization of US-PRC diplomatic relations, announced on 
December 15, 1978, was seen by Peking as strengthening its position 
in Asia against both the long-standing "threat" from the USSR and 
the recently intensified pressures from Soviet-aligned Vietnam. As in 
the Sino-Japanese Treaty of August 1978, Peking again emphasized 
its stance on "antihegemonism" in the US-PRC communique. On 
later occasions, its leaders likewise expressed strong anti-Soviet and 
anti-Vietnamese sentiments. 
In the wake of Sino-American normalization, Chinese media 
soft-pedaled past complaints about progress in US-Soviet detente. 
8. Information for this section is taken in part from Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress, "US-China Relations," Issue Brief 76053 !periodically 
updated); and "US-China-Soviet Relations," Issue Brief 79115 (periodically updated). 
See also Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy (eds), The Chinese Connection and 
Normalization (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland 1980). 
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Presumably reassured about Washington's intentions with regard to 
the US-USSR-PRC triangular relationship, Chinese commentators 
did not view the possible conclusion of the SALT II agreement as 
evidence of US "appeasement." Instead, they argued that the SALT 
accord would not make any substantial difference in the Soviet-
American arms race. This new approach suggested that Peking was 
less worried toward the end of 1978 about the US lowering its 
military guard against Moscow, and thereby allowing the USSR to 
put greater military pressure on China. 
Over the next year, the PRC made rapid progress in its economic 
relations with the US as the two governments agreed on their 
disputed financial claims, and concluded a major trade accord 
granting most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Chinese imports to 
the US. Washington also pledged to provide China with two billion 
dollars in Export-Import Bank loans on a case-by-case basis over a 
five-year period. Moreover, the US began a major effort to extend to 
the PRC reimbursable technical assistance, and promised to provide 
government investment guarantees to American businesses in-
terested in trading in China. 
Similarly, bilateral strategic cooperation between the two na-
tions also increased. A month before the announcement of normaliza-
tion of their relations, the US disclosed that it had dropped its past 
policy of blocking West European arms sales to China. Washington 
had also eased its control over the export to Peking of certain types of 
technology which might be useful for civilian and military purposes. 
None of the above-mentioned economic and strategic benefits was 
promised to the USSR. To many American observers, the Carter 
administration's heretofore avowed policy of "even-handedness" in 
dealing with Peking and Moscow was, by late 1979, being replaced by 
a clear American "tilt" in favor of China. 
Peking appreciated, and was indeed reassured by, this growing 
shift in US policy. During the Chinese incursion into Vietnam in 
early 1979, however, the PRC officials had shown some signs of 
disappointment with the less than enthusiastic American position on 
China's action. Their dissatisfaction with the US coincided with, and 
was probably related to, a Chinese initiative in early April to start 
talks to improve relations with the USSR. Indeed, by proposing to 
negotiate with the USSR without preconditions, Peking made its 
most serious diplomatic overture to Moscow in a decade. 
Nevertheless, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 
destroyed the atmosphere for the talks and drove the PRC and the US 
into an even closer strategic relationship vis-a-vis the USSR. Peking 
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reacted strongly to the Soviet move. Its officials charged that the 
invasion had posed a direct threat to China's security, marking the 
most serious escalation of Soviet "expansionism" in more than ten 
years. The PRC hoped that the US would adopt a more active 
approach to the Middle East-South Asian region in order to 
counteract the Soviet "threat." It signaled, to some observers, an even 
keener interests in pursuing closer strategic cooperation with 
Washington than i"n the past, an interest reflected during the PRC's 
discussions with US Defense Secretary Harold Brown in Peking in 
January 1980. Thanks to the development in Afghanistan, the 
Chinese became more suspicious of Soviet motives in international 
affairs, and this resulted in the suspension on January 20, 1980 of the 
Sino-Soviet talks which had begun a year earlier. 
The Soviet action in Afghanistan and the resulting furor in the 
US undercut the arguments of those American policymakers who had 
favored an even-handed approach toward Moscow and Peking. 
China's strongly anti-Soviet reaction also weakened the contentions 
of many Americans who had feared that the PRC could not be trusted 
to maintain an anti-Soviet posture in coordination with Washington. 
With the apparent demise of the former even-handed strategy, a 
new American approach to China and the Soviet Union emerged 
during Secretary Brown's visit to the PRC in January 1980. Although 
the full details of the visit are not yet readily available, several of its 
announced results clearly suggested that the US would side with 
China to resist Soviet expansion in Asia. According to various press 
accounts, the US agreed to sell a ground station to China, enabling 
the PRC to receive data of possible military use from American 
satellites. Washington also expressed its willingness to sell to Peking 
an array of non-lethal military equipment, which could be expanded 
in the future. Moreover, the two nations coordinated their strategies 
to support Pakistan and other unspecified efforts (perhaps including 
anti-Soviet Afghan forces) to thwart Soviet expansion in southwest 
Asia. Finally, the US informed China that it would welcome Chinese 
military help against Vietnam in whatever form Peking might 
choose, if Vietnam should cross from Cambodian territory into 
Thailand. 
PROSPECTS 
While the PRC will likely continue its current policy toward the 
US and the USSR in the near future, longer term prospects remain 
unclear. For example, Moscow's fears of Sino-American "collusion" 
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can build to such a point that the USSR may decide to attack China, 
the weakest link in the US-PRC encirclement effort, in the hope of 
discrediting Peking's anti-Soviet posture and of disrupting its 
relationship with Washington. 
Furthermore, Peking's current emphasis on economic develop-
ment and foreign trade can lead to serious disagreement with some 
Asian countries and perhaps even with the developed nations of the 
West. For instance, as the PRC increases its export of textiles, 
electronics, and other consumer goods in order to pay for the recent 
large increases in foreign imports, it may come into conflict with 
other developing countries in Asia which are also increasing their 
export of similar goods in order to pay their growing import bills. 
This problem can become particularly acute if Japan and the major 
developed nations of the West should decide to protect their 
indigenous manufacturers of consumer products by limiting the 
influx of such goods from overseas. 
The unity of the Chinese leadership remains uncertain, and this 
constitutes an unpredictable element in China's foreign policy. A 
major political purge, similar to those which occurred during the 
Cultural Revolution of 1966-1969, after the mysterious demise of Lin 
Piao in 1971, and following Mao Tse-tung's death in 1976, can bring 
about a significant reorientation in Peking's approach to foreign 
affairs. Chinese leaders who are less favorable toward the US and 
more flexible toward the USSR may gain power, and they may either 
treat the superpowers more even-handedly or seek a guarded 
rapprochement with Moscow. A reconciliation of Sino-Soviet relations 
will probably not serve American interests. It can enhance Soviet 
influence in Asia, and it may prompt the USSR to divert a large part 
of its armed forces along the Chinese border to Europe and the 
Middle East, thereby increasing pressure on the US and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
The policies of the USSR and the US will also have an important 
bearing on the future Chinese policy. The Brezhnev leadership has, 
in recent years, apparently resigned itself to a continuing state of 
controlled hostility in its relations with China, and has seemingly 
concluded that it is impossible to reach significant compromise with 
Peking over the border problem and other issues. After the death of 
Brezhnev, however, Moscow may initiate policies which are more 
forthcoming toward China, and it may also begin to reduce its forces 
along the Chinese frontier. Since the PRC has long regarded the 
withdrawal of Soviet troops as the necessary first step for a 
settlement of the border dispute, its leaders may view such a move as 
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a sign of Soviet goodwill. This can provide a basis for talks leading to 
a Sino-Soviet reconciliation. 
On the other hand, the Soviet leaders of the post-Brezhnev era 
may increase their pressure on China. They may, for example, 
encourage the Vietnamese to resist the PRC with force or attempt to 
improve relations with the Nationalist government on Taiwan. Such 
developments, if coupled with an expansion of Soviet naval and air 
power along China's eastern and southern frontiers, may cause 
Peking to react by attacking Vietnam and/or Taiwan. In accord with 
its recently concluded "friendship" treaty with Vietnam, Moscow may 
then respond with military pressure along the PRC's northern border. 
This can lead to a major Sino-Soviet conflict. 
The Soviet leaders may also use their military forces along the 
northern border to occupy one of the more weakly defended frontier 
regions, such as sections of Sinkiang. Such a move may start a 
protracted war with the PRC, thus seriously discrediting the hard 
line anti-Soviet policy currently followed by China. It may thereby 
compel Peking to adopt a more accommodating stance. Any Sino-
Soviet armed conflict will certainly alarm neighboring states; reduce 
economic development and stability in Asia, and confront the US 
with the difficult task of deciding whether it should support China 
against Soviet "hegemony" in Asia. 
Similarly, any substantial shift in US foreign policy can lead to 
important changes in China's behavior. For instance, Washington 
may decide to continue to withdraw militarily from East Asia, to pull 
back from bases in Korea and the Philippines, and to reduce the size 
of both the US fleet in the western Pacific and the American forces in 
Japan. Such actions will almost certainly change China's evaluation 
of the US as a strategic counterweight to the USSR, especially if 
Moscow should continue its steady military buildup in Asia. In 
response, the Chinese may feel compelled to realign their policy 
toward a reconciliation with the USSR, or they may rapidly increase 
their air and naval power in order to "fill the vacuum" as the US 
pulls back, a development which will probably alarm Japan, South 
Korea, and other non-Communist states. 
American usefulness to China may also be called into question if 
Washington should again adopt policies with respect to Europe, the 
Middle East, or US-Soviet arms control which would allow Moscow to 
relax its military vigilance along the western front, while substan-
tially increasing pressure on China. The PRC may then either resist 
such pressure with force or seek reconciliation with the USSR. 
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In sum, Peking will probably be encouragd to continue the 
conventional policy it has generally pursued toward neighboring 
countries over the past decade, and this policy will likely be highly 
compatible with American interests in foreign affairs in the near 
future, while unfavorable to the USSR. Changes in Peking's policy 
will probably be caused either by changes in the PRC leadership 
(stemming from the passing of Teng Hsiao-p'ing, a major setback in 
China's ambitious economic programs, or some other domestic 
difficulties), or by substantial shifts in the policies of the powerful 
nations in the region, especially the US and the USSR. The various 
scenarios explored above suggest that American interests may well 
suffer if the PRC significantly alters its current foreign approach. 
They also indicate that Sino-US bilateral relations may not serve as 
an important source of leverage for Washington to prevent a major 
change in China's foreign policy, a change which will likely be 
damaging to the US position in East Asia. 
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Chapter Three 
TAIWAN: A CRUCIAL QUESTION IN UNITED STATES-
CHINA RELATIONS 
Robert L. Worden 
The words "crucial question" were used by the Chinese in 
describing their position on Taiwan in the Shanghai Communique 
signed by Premier Chou En-lai and President Richard M. Nixon on 
February 28, 1972. According to this important document, the 
Taiwan issue "is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of 
relations" between the People's Republic of China CPRC) and the 
United States (US). 1 
In announcing the impending January 1, 1979 establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the US, the PRC stated on December 15, 
1979: 
The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the 
normalization of relations between China and the United States. 
It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit 
of the Shanghai Communique and through their joint efforts.2 
Thus, after nearly three decades of dispute, the Taiwan question in 
US-China relations was finally settled. This chapter will discuss the 
history of the dispute primarily from the PRC's viewpoint. It will 
analyze the efforts of the two nations to resolve the issue, and then 
raise questions as to whether normalization did, in fact, solve the 
long-standing Taiwan problem. 
THE TAIWAN ISSUE IN RETROSPECT, 1950-1971 
Sovereignty over Taiwan (previously known as Formosa) has 
been a critical concern of various Chinese governments since at least 
the seventeenth century. After facing Dutch, French, and British 
threats, China lost the island to Japan under the Treaty of 
1. "Joint Communique," Peking Review <Beijing Review since January 1979) 
(hereinafter PRJ, No. 9 (March 3, 1972), pp. 4-5; emphasis added by author. 
2. "Statement of the Chinese Government," PR, No. 51 <December 22, 1978), pp. 
8-9; emphasis added by author. 
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Shimonoseki of 1895. Taiwan was restored to China after Japan's 
defeat in 1945. 
The policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) toward the 
island had gone through several changes. In 1928, its leaders 
accepted Taiwan's future political autonomy, while in 1943 they 
allegedly supported an independence movement in the island.3 Both 
the Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945 
called for the restoration of Taiwan to the Chinese after Japan's 
defeat in World War II. In the post-1943 years and, in particular, 
after the Liberation of 1949, the CCP policy shifted toward the 
reintegration of the island with mainland China. 
The role of the US in Taiwan began at least as early as the Cairo 
and Potsdam accords. Its involvement intensified after 1945 as 
Washington sided with Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese civil war. 
Nonetheless, when the Nationalists retreated to Taiwan after the 
founding of the PRC in October 1949, President Harry Truman 
decided against further involvement in China's domestic affairs. He 
declared, in January 1950, that the US would not provide military 
aid or advice to the Chinese forces on Taiwan; his administration 
would not, moreover, seek to establish military bases on the island 
"at this time." A corollary statement was issued several days later by 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson who delineated the first line of 
defense of the US in the West Pacific, a line which was drawn to the 
east of (and therefore excluding) Taiwan.4 
Meanwhile, the defeated Nationalist forces consolidated their 
control over the island and announced that they were ready to 
recapture the mainland. The victorious Communist government, on 
the other hand, became committed to the goal of liberating Taiwan. 
3. Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Chinese Communist Party 
and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943," Pacific Affairs (Vancouver), LII, No. 3 (Fall 
1979), pp. 447, 464. 
4. "United States Policy Toward Formosa, Statement by President Truman, 
January 5, 1950," in Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz, Remaking China 
Policy: US-China Relations and Governmental Decisionmaking (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), Document 3, pp. 93-94. See also Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson's statement of January 12, 1950, partially quoted in Immanuel C. Y. 
Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (2nd edition; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1975), p. 929. William M. Bueler claims that the US, even after the outbreak of the 
Korean War, considered its relations with the PRC to be more important than the 
interests of both the Nationalist government on Taiwan and the native Taiwanese. 
See Bueler, US China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan <Boulder: Colorado Associated 
University Press, 1971), p. 20. 
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The Korean War (1950-1953) precipitated new conditions for US 
involvement in the Chinese civil war and, in effect, insured the 
long-range maintenance of a Nationalist status quo on Taiwan. For 
the next twenty-nine years, the US upheld a defensive arrangement 
with Taipei that was anathema to Peking. Washington's recognition 
of Taiwan as the sole government of China, as well as the stationing 
of American military forces in and near the island, provided powerful 
constraints on any solution to US-PRC problems. 
Peking considered Washington's presence in Taiwan as an 
aggressive violation of China's territorial integrity and an interfer-
ence in its internal affairs. The US commitment to the Nationalist 
government, coupled with the war in Korea, prompted the PRC to 
reassess its plans for Taiwan's liberation. At the same time, political 
debates in the US over the "loss" of China led Washington to 
continue its generous support of Chiang Kai-shek. 
The PRC increased its pressure against the Nationalist-held 
coastal islands after the Korean armistice in 1953. As tension 
mounted, Washington and Taipei moved to insure the security of 
Taiwan and the Penghu Islands by concluding the Mutual Defense 
Treaty on December 2, 1954.5 Ostensibly, the treaty affirmed both 
nations' desire for peace in the West Pacific. In practice, it aimed at 
preventing the PRC from using military forces against any Chinese 
territories, except the coastal islands, held by the Nationalists. It 
increased American involvement in Taiwan to a significant extent. 
This dramatic development could not have been anticipated in 1949 
when the Taiwan-related chain of events began. 
Despite the enmity between Peking and Washington over the 
Taiwan question, the two nations did attempt to resolve their 
problems. At the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Chou En-lai 
insisted that the PRC did not want a war with the US, and he 
expressed his willingness to discuss with Washington for the purpose 
of relaxing tensions in the Asia-Pacific region and, especially, the 
Taiwan area.6 Similarly, in his report to the Second Session of the 
First National People's Congress (NPC) on July 20, 1955, Chou 
emphasized that the Chinese people "were ready to seek the 
liberation of Taiwan by peaceful means," maintaining that "there 
was no lack of precedents for peaceful liberation." He noted, however, 
5. For the full text of the treaty, see Moorsteen and Abramowitz, Remaking 
China Policy, Document 5, pp. 96-99. 
6. "Premier Chou En-lai's Statement on the Situation in the Taiwan Area, April 
23, 1955," Moorsteen and Abramowitz, Remaking China Policy, Document 7, p. 103. 
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that the possibility of"peacefulliberation" depended on Washington's 
noninterference in China's internal affairs. 7 
Indeed, prior to Chou's statements, the two nations had already 
started to make serious efforts to defuse the hostile situation. 
Beginning in 1954, bilateral talks were held in Geneva at the 
consular and ambassadorial levels. They served to keep the two 
governments in official contact while establishing their long-term 
negotiating positions. The US tried to ask the PRC to promise not to 
use force against the Nationalists, whereas Peking demanded the 
withdrawal of American troops from the Taiwan area. After 1956, the 
talks were shifted to Warsaw where PRC representatives maintained 
a firm line. According to Peking, Taiwan was a part of China, and the 
US military presence on the island was undesirable; it contributed to 
tension in the Asia-Pacific region. Although the PRC did signal a 
certain "willingness to adopt a flexible position over fundamental 
Chinese national interests, including the recovery of Taiwan," cold 
war politics on both sides prevented any conclusive results from the 
talks.8 
The Indochina War in the 1960s and 1970s, as had the Korean 
War before it, created additional tension which further delayed the 
resolution of the Taiwan question. China's concern over encirclement 
by its enemies became more apparent in the 1960s with alleged 
threats not only from the US, but also from India and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The formerly bipolar world had, by 
the late 1960s, become sufficiently complex as to make both 
Washington and Peking appreciate better the need for some form of 
reconciliation. But the Taiwan issue remained, as always, a crucial 
question for the two nations. 
China's preoccupation with its domestic turmoil during the 
activist phases of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1969) was greatly 
altered by the increasing Soviet threat. Moscow's invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 prompted Peking to start a new diplomatic 
initiative. Ambassadorial relations were gradually resumed with 
socialist countries, while overtures were made to neutral and 
nonaligned nations. A new balance was sought between "politics of 
7. Ibid., Document 8, p. 104. 
8. Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), p. 47. For a detailed analysis of the talks, see pp. 
47-62. For the texts of proposals and counterproposals, see Moorsteen and Abramowitz, 
Remaking China Policy, Document 9, pp. 105-109. 
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Maoist insurrection and conventional diplomacy," as the PRC 
adopted an increasingly pragmatic approach to foreign affairs.9 
In November 1968, Peking proposed to resume the US-China 
Warsaw talks which had been suspended since the previous January. 
The PRC's continued insistence on a Taiwan settlement, however, 
made it politically difficult for the new Nixon administration to move 
propitiously toward Peking.10 It was therefore not until January 1970 
that the Warsaw talks were finally resumed. 
The extension of the Vietnam War into Cambodia, as well as the 
US maneuverings in the United Nations (UN) on behalf of the 
Republic of China (ROC), provided continued hindrances to any 
accord. Despite the "ping-pong" diplomacy, the relaxation of China 
trade barriers, and Nixon's surprise announcement that he would 
visit the PRC, the US maintained what Peking perceived as a 
"two-China" policy. The UN vote in October 1971, which resulted in 
the admission of the PRC into the organization, relieved a significant 
pressure point in US-China relations. Although Washington had 
opposed Taiwan's expulsion to the last hour, the seating of Peking 
was a necessary step toward any kind of US-PRC rapprochement. 
SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE RELATIONS, 1972-197811 
It took a long period (from February 28, 1972, when the 
Shanghai Communique was promulgated, to December 15, 1978, 
when the establishment of diplomatic relations was announced) for 
Washington and Peking to find a mutually satisfactory formula for 
normalization. While most countries breaking relations with Taipei 
and establishing relations with Peking had to resolve the problem 
from their own perspective, none, including Japan, had the same 
connection with Taiwan as had the US.12 During this era pf 
"Shanghai Communique relations," there were many global and 
bilateral developments which, eventually leading to normalization, 
9. Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 
1966-1971 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 7, 14. 
10. For an analysis of the PRC overtures to the early Nixon administration, see 
Sutter, China-Watch, pp. 63-82. 
11. This section is based partially on a paper, "A perspective on US-China 
Relations since the Shanghai Communique," presented at the annual meeting of the 
Association for Asian Studies on March 31, ~978, and on a revision of that paper later 
published in Asian Profile <Hong Kong), VII, No. 1 <February 1979l, pp. 1-16. 
12. See US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Recognizing the People's Republic of China: The Experiences of Japan, Australia, 
France, and West Germany (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979>. 
62 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES 
confirmed the unique nature of US-China ties. The Shanghai 
Communique was an important document because it allowed the two 
sides to defer, somewhat ambiguously, the Taiwan issue while 
pursuing their strategic relations. This was a compromise not 
attainable in the seventeen years of Geneva and Warsaw talks. 13 
President Nixon's visit to china and the promulgation of the 
Shanghai Communique were significant first steps toward the 
evolution of a new US-PRC relationship. Many American officials 
and observers of the Chinese scene argued that friendly relations 
between the two nations could be developed and maintained without 
achieving normalization. Indeed, public opinion polls in the US in 
1972-1978 favored a "two-China" policy, improving relations with 
Peking without "abandoning" Taipei. The leadership on both sides of 
the Pacific, however, persistently pressed forward on the issue of 
normalization. 
The years of 1972-1973, representing the early stage of the era of 
"Shanghai Communique relations," were marked by such events as 
the Nixon and Kissinger visits to China, the end of US military 
involvement in Vietnam, the beginning of the withdrawal of 
American forces from Taiwan, and the establishment of liaison offices 
in Peking and Washington. These years witnessed real progress in 
the normalization process and were characterized by an initial 
enthusiasm in both nations. Many American delegations and indi-
viduals visited China, while reciprocal visits to the US by PRC 
officials were restrained owing to the presence of ROC representa-
tives in Washington and other American cities. 
Chinese leadership and media hailed the new friendly contacts 
although differences in principle continued to exist between the two 
nations. 14 The deferment of the Taiwan question was emphasized in 
November 1972 when Chou En-lai conceded that Taiwan was not the 
foremost issue in US-China relations; he named Indochina as the 
"key area" of differenceY Thus, after Washington signed the 
13. For the complete text, see "Joint Communique," PR, No. 9 <March 3, 1972), pp. 
4-5. 
14. See, for example, "Strive for New Victories," the National Day joint editorial 
in Jen-min jih-pao (hereinafter JMJP), Hung-ch'i [Red Flag], and Chief-fang chun pao 
[Liberation Army Daily], October 1, 1972, as translated in PR, No. 40 (October 6, 
1972), p. 9; and Ch'iao Kuan-hua's October 1972 speech to the UN General Assembly, 
English text in PR, No. 41 (October 13, 1972), p. 4. 
15. Interview with Australian journalists, Vienna Domestic Service, November 7, 
1972, as quoted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, People's 
Republic of China (hereinafter FBIS-Cffi), November 10, 1972, p. All. 
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"Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" on 
January 27, 1973, further progress was made in normalizing US-PRC 
relations. Peking commended the peace in Vietnam for having "a 
positive influence on reducing tension in Asia and the world."16 
Shortly afterward, the process of normalization accelerated and an 
agreement was reached to establish liaison offices in Peking and 
Washington. Significantly, Taiwan was not mentioned in this 
agreement. 17 
In 1973, China commemorated the February 28 Taiwan Uprising 
of 1947. At a meeting in the Taiwan Hall of Peking's Great Hall of 
the People, speakers stressed that it was the "common desire and 
sacred duty" of the Chinese people, "including Taiwan compatriots," 
to liberate the island and unify China. For example, Liao Ch'eng-
chih, an official responsible for Taiwan affairs in· the PRC, claimed 
that "the domestic and international situations are now . . . very 
favorable to the ... struggle to liberate Taiwan." He cited the 
Shanghai Communique and the talks between leaders of the US and 
China as some of the "important victories" in foreign affairs, which 
improved the situation for Taiwan's liberation. Fu Tso-yi, NPC vice 
chairman and former Nationalist military leader, charged that "by 
erroneously relying on the US, my former colleagues in Taiwan have 
delayed the unification of the motherland for more than twenty 
years." He also quoted the Shanghai Communique, arguing that 
Washington had indeed "recognized" Taiwan as a part of China's 
territory. According toFu, Henry A. Kissinger had indicated during 
his February 1973 visit that the US favored "the peaceful resolution 
of the disagreements between the mainland and Taiwan." Fu 
interpreted this as a sign that Washington would no longer defend 
Taiwan. As he argued, since the US had committed itself to peace in 
the Asia-Pacific region, it would be "impossible" for Washington to 
damage its process of normalizing relations with the PRC by 
maintaining its existing ties with Taiwan for an extensive period of 
time. Fu believed that the US valued its peaceful coexistence with 
China more than its relations with the Nationalists. In an ac-
knowledgment of Taipei's "Soviet card," Fu warned that the US would 
not "allow Taiwan to 'cooperate' with anyone else to disrupt peace in 
16. "Welcome the Signing of the Agreement on Vietnam," JMJP editorial, 
January 28, 1973, English text in PR, No. 5 <February 2, 1973), pp. 6-7. 
17. "Communique, February 22, 1973," PR, No.8 (February 23, 1973), p. 4. 
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the Asia and Pacific region." He offered to meet either formally or 
secretly with the Nationalist authorities for reunification talks!8 
In the speeches made later by Chou En-lai at the Tenth CCP 
Congress in August 1973 and by Ch'iao Kuan-hua at the UN General 
Assembly in October, they did not mention the Taiwan issue, 
although Chou did imply that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) 
was ready to liberate the island. Nonetheless, Vice Premier Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing told a visiting Japanese delegation in October that the 
settlement of the Taiwan question was a prerequisite for the 
normalization of US-PRC relations. 19 This was his first public 
statement on the subject, and he gradually emerged as China's 
principal actor in the Washington-Peking negotiations. 
In November 1973, Kissinger made a hi.gh-key visit to Peking 
which belied the intensity of the debate among Chinese leaders over 
Taiwan and US policies. The November communique, unlike the one 
signed during Kissinger's February visit, made specific reference to 
Taiwan. As Washington reaffirmed, "all Chinese on either side of the 
Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan 
is a part of China;" the US also reiterated its intention not to 
challenge this position. The Chinese again insisted that relations 
with Washington could only be normalized in accordance with "the 
principle of one China."20 
The year 1974 was a difficult one in US-PRC relations. 
Disagreements in Peking over Taiwan and US policies came to the 
fore. The annual commemoration of the February 28 Uprising 
displayed a more militant tone than in 1973. Fu Tso-yi, for instance, 
called for the liberation of Taiwan "at an early date," emphasizing 
that the "choice of means" (by peaceful methods or by force) was 
China's internal affair. He warned the Nationalist military personnel 
that the Taiwan Strait was "no longer an obstacle" to the liberation 
process.21 
In April, Chiang Ch'ing's "Chu Lan" writing group issued a 
scathing criticism of the "bourgeois" music that the Philadelphia 
Orchestra had played in Peking eight months earlier. In the same 
18. "'February 28' Uprising in Taiwan Province Marked," PR, No. 10 <March 9, 
1973), pp. 10-11, 21. 
19. Quoted in FBIS-CHI, October 16, 1973, p. A.15. 
20. "Secretary of State Kissinger in Peking," PR, No. 46 <No¥ember 16, 1973J, pp. 
6-7; and "Communique," PR, No. 46, p. 10. 
21. "Peking Meeting Commemorates 27th Anniversary of February 28 Uprising in 
Taiwan Province," PR, No. 10 (March 8, 1974J, pp. 18-20. 
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month, Teng Hsiao-p'ing appeared at the UN Special Session on Raw 
Materials and Development. He announced Peking's new foreign 
policy on the "three worlds," with explicit attacks on the two 
superpowers. 22 
Other setbacks in the normalization process included Chou 
En-lai's hospitalization with a terminal illness and Richard Nixon's 
resignation from the US presidency. To provide additional ammuni-
tion to those in Peking who were opposed to the US-China initiative, 
Washington appointed a new ambassador to Taipei. It also allowed 
two new ROC consulates to open in the US, thus bringing to a total of 
five such openings since the promulgation of the Shanghai Com-
munique 
In October 1974, Teng attracted attention on the Taiwan issue 
during a reception for overseas Chinese, including some overseas 
Taiwanese. He stated that the US recognition of the island as an 
inseparable part of PRC territory had been a prerequisite for the 
signing of the Shanghai Communique and the exchange of liaison 
offices. He expressed his hope for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan 
question, but he insisted that such a settlement was not feasible 
while Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Ching-kuo, remained in power; a 
"non-peaceful" method should not, therefore, be excluded from 
consideration. He called for further "development of patriotic forces" 
in Taiwan, since they could play an important role in the island's 
liberation. He compared the Tiaoyu (Senkaku) Islands issue in 
Japan-China relations with the Taiwan issue in US-PRC rapproche-
ment. In 1972, Peking had put aside the differences on the Tiaoyu 
Islands when diplomatic relations were established with Tokyo.23 
Teng's implication on the subject of Taiwan was subtle but apparent. 
A late 1974 visit to China by Senate Democratic leader Mike 
Mansfield shed new light on the state of US-PRC relations. After 
meeting with Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Ch'iao Kuan-hua, 
he returned to Washington to write a glowing tribute to Mao 
Tse-tung's China. Nevertheless, he also noted that US-China rela-
tions had reached a "plateau," with the Taiwan issue blocking further 
progress toward normalization. According to Mansfield, in order for 
the US to follow the "Japanese formula" in its relations with the PRC 
22. "Chairman of Delegation of People's Republic of China Teng Hsiao-p'ing's 
Speech at Special Session of UN General Assembly," Supplement to PR, No. 15 !April 
12, 1974). 
23. Ch'i-shih nien-t'ai [The Seventies) <Hong Kong), December 1974, pp. 15-17, as 
translated in FBIS-CHI, December 10, 1974, p. El-7. 
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and Taiwan, Washington would have to fulfill Peking's "three 
preconditions" by terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty with 
Taiwan, withdrawing all US troops from the island, and severing· 
diplomatic relations with the ROC.24 
In this report to the Fourth NPC in January 1975, Chou noted 
the continuation of "fundamental differences" between China and the 
US, and he emphasized the need to carry out "in earnest" the 
principles of the Shanghai Communique. In his brief comments on 
Taiwan, he reiterated the PRC's determination to liberate the island, 
and he maintained that Peking was militarily ready for this 
endeavor.25 
When the commemorative meeting of the February 28 Uprising 
was held in 1975, Fu Tso-yi had died. Liao Ch'eng-chih became the 
keynote speaker, and he hailed the "revolutionary spirit" of the 
Taiwanese people.26 For the first time, a significant number of 
military leaders were present in the meeting. Among the notable 
examples were Yeh Chien-ying, Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, and Yang 
Ch'eng-wu. 
There were relatively minor problems in the US-China-ROC 
relations. Peking was angered, for example, when the Department of 
State cancelled the scheduled Chinese Performing Arts Troupe tour 
of the US. Washington had objected to the inclusion of the song, 
"People of Taiwan, Our Own Brothers," in the program, yet China 
argued that the US position was unwarranted and in contravention of 
the spirit of the Shanghai Communique. As the PRC pointed out, 
both nations had agreed that the Taiwan question was an internal 
24. For the "three preconditions," see Mike Mansfield, China: A Quarter Century 
After the Founding of the People's Republic (Washington, D.C.: US Government 
Printing Office, 1975), p. 23. These "preconditions" can be dated back at least to 1955 
when they were stated in the following form: withdrawal of all US troops and bases 
from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait and; the establishment of a relationship based on 
the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In Peking's viewpoint, US respect for the 
principles of territorial integrity and noninterference in internal affairs implied that 
Washington recognized Taiwan as a part of the PRC, thus precluding any possible US 
diplomatic or defense ties with Taipei. See Seymour Topping's interview with Chou 
En·lai, June 21, 1971, in Topping, Journey Between Two Chinas <New York: Harper & 
25. Chou En-lai, "Report on the Work of the Government," in Documents of the 
First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress <Peking: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1975), p. 58. 
26. "28th Anniversary of February 28 Uprising of People in Taiwan Province 
Commemorated," PR, No. 10 (March 7, 19751, pp. 14-17. 
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affair in which no foreign country had the right to interfere. 
Washington was accused of "retreating'' from its commitment to the 
Shanghai Communique, as well as violating its principles.27 
The year 1975 drew to a close with a spectacular show of 
American visitors to Peking. A "World Affairs" delegation was 
headed by Cyrus Vance, chairman of the Board of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, who would later become secretary of state in the Carter 
administration. He met with Teng Hsiao-p'ing on October 11, 1975, 
and they debated about China's US policy. The delegation also raised 
the issue of the song about Taiwan. Teng expressed the hope that 
American behavior in the incident did not reflect a "retreat" from the 
normalization process. 28 
Before the year's end, Henry Kissinger made two visits to China, 
the latter one with President Gerald Ford. The Chinese were 
obviously unhappy with Ford's reluctance to act on the Taiwan issue 
before the 1976 election. Ford had found it politically difficult to 
break with the Nationalists in the same year as the collapse of 
US-supported regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. As a result, 
no communique was issued at the end of the negotiations, and no 
significant progress was made.29 
China's displeasure with the Ford administration was empha-
sized in a well-publicized reception by Mao Tse-tung of Julie Nixon 
Eisenhower on New Year's Eve. To demonstrate his appreciation for 
Richard Nixon's initiative toward normalizing relations with the 
PRC, Mao invited the former president to visit China again. This 
action had considerable effect on American politics in an election 
year. At one point, Ford feared that this might cost him his victory in 
an early primary race. 
In general, 1976 constituted a vacuum in US-China relations. 
The deaths of Chou En-lai in January, Chu Teh in July, and Mao 
Tse-tung in September were accompanied by the second dismissal of 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing in April, the ascendancy of Hua Kuo-Feng in the 
same month, and the political demise of the so-called "Gang of Four" 
in October. These tumultuous events provided too many uncertainties 
for any progress to be made in the faltering normalization process. 
27. "US Unreasonably Cancels Chinese Performing Arts Troupe's Tour," PR, No. 
15 (April 11, 1975), pp. 10, 21. The song about Taiwan was not part of its repertoire 
when the PRC troupe toured the US in 1978. 
28. John H. Knowles, China Diary (New York: Rockefeller Foundation, 1976), pp. 
78-79. 
29. Sutter, China-Watch, p. 112. 
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Visits to China by ex-President Nixon and ex-Secretary of Defense 
James Schlesinger were played up for their pro-Shanghai Communi-
que and anti-Soviet symbolisms. 
The Taiwan factor in this chaotic year was high-lighted on at 
least two occasions. At the commemorative meeting of the February 
28 Uprising, Liao Ch'eng-chih stressed the "contradictions" among 
the Taiwan authorities and the general "state of unrest" in the 
island. Although Peking claimed to continue its liberation policy, the 
meeting clearly emphasized, instead, the importance of the Taiwan 
people to liberate themselves. Moreover, despite the presence of such 
PLA leaders as Ch'en Hsi-lien and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien, military 
participation in this meeting was much more subdued than in 1975.30 
In an alleged August 24 speech to graduates of the Institute of 
Diplomacy in Peking, Keng Piao, director of the CCP International 
Liaison Department, contradicted earlier PRC statements on US-
Taiwan policy. He reportedly insisted that the US had not yet 
accepted the principle of "one China" as a major premise for 
normalization. Although he believed that Taiwan was still the 
"greatest obstacle" to US-PRC relations, he conceded, in an allusion 
to the Soviet threat, that it was not the most important issue of 
mutual concern. 31 
The year 1977 saw a resurgence of normalization activity. 
Peking's Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained that post-Mao China's 
openings to the US were "important strategic policy decisions," and it 
cited the Shanghai Communique as the basis for all future relations. 
It argued, however, that Washington was still "forcibly occupying 
Taiwan," thereby creating a continually abnormal situation.32 On a 
later occasion, a Foreign Ministry spokesman expressed the hope that 
the new Carter administration would respect the Shanghai Com-
munique and fulfill the "three preconditions" for normalization.33 
30. "29th Anniversary of February 28 Uprising of People in Taiwan Province 
Commemorated," PR, No. 10 (March 5, 1976), pp. 12-13. 
31. "Keng Piao's Talks on 'A Turning Point in China-US Diplomatic Relations' 
(Excerpts)," Chinese Law & Government, X, No. 1 (Spring 1977). The original source 
was identified as Fei-ch'ing yueh-pao [Bandit Affairs Monthly) <Taipei), XIX, No. 7 
(January 1977), pp. 105-106. 
32. "Premier Chou Creatively Carried Out Chairman Mao's Revolutionary Line in 
Foreign Affairs," PR, No. 5 (January 28, 1977), pp. 11-12. 
33. See the interview which Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Chan had with 
the managing editor of Mainichi shimbun on Febuary 5, 1977, as reported by Agence 
France-Presse, Hong Kong, February 6, 1977; quoted in FBIS-CHI, February 7, 1977, 
p. All. 
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The thirtieth anniversary of the February 28 Uprising brought 
forth a number of anti-US criticisms. Liao Ch'eng-chih, for instance, 
condemned the formulas of "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," 
"one China, two governments," and the "independence on Taiwan." 
The 1976 theme of self-liberation continued; many expressed the 
attitude of "let bygones be bygones" toward those Taiwan residents 
"wishing to take the patriotic road."34 
According to interviews with key Chinese leaders before the 
arrival in Peking of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the PRC insisted 
that Taiwan was a "remaining question" in US-China relations. Vice 
Premier Chi Teng-k'uei dismissed Washington's desire for a "peaceful 
solution" as an interference in China's internal affairs, and Vice 
Minister of Foreign affairs Yu Chan charged that Taiwan was a 
stumbling block to normalization.35 The pressure on Washington 
increased in July 1977, when Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien told former 
US Chief of Naval Operations Elmo Zumwalt that the "three 
preconditions" could not be dispensed with in the US-PRC negotia-
tions for normalization.36 This was the first time that the Chinese 
press attributed to a specific PRC leader the demand for the 
fulfillment of the "three preconditions," and it was indicative of 
Peking's determination to exert its will. Li later argued that the US 
had already accepted in the Shanghai Communique the "one China" 
concept; in spite of this, however, Taiwan continued to be the "focus 
of our differences."37 
Shortly before Vance's visit to China in late August, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Huang Hua expressed his dissatisfaction with 
34. "Peking Marks 30th Anniversary of 'February 28' Uprising by People of 
Taiwan Province," PR, No. 10 (March 4, 1977), pp. 4-6. Another article in the same 
issue expressed similar sentiments on the subject of self-liberation. See "Preparing for 
the Liberation of Taiwan," pp. 7-8. 
35. See Chi Teng-k'uei's interview on May 15, 1977, with a Yomiuri delegation, as 
reported in Ta-kung pao [L'impartial] <Hong Kong), May 17, 1977, p. 1; quoted in 
FBIS-CHI, May 18, 1977, p. Nl. Chi also demanded, in a meeting with a delegation of 
the US Committee on Scholarly Communications with the PRC in mid-June, that the 
US carry out the "three preconditions." See Fox Butterfield, "China Rebuffs US Aid to 
Widen Scholarly and Scientific Visits," New York Times, June 29, 1977, p. A6. For Yu 
Chan's interview with Swedish military commentator Stig Lofgren in early June, see 
Svenska Dagbladet (Stockholm), August 12, 1977, as translated in FBIS-CHI, August 
25, 1977, p. A2. 
36. "Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on Sino-American Relations," PR, No. 29 (July 
15, 1977), p. 3. 
37. Svenska Dagbladet, August 14, 1977, as translated in FBIS-CHI, August 18, 
1977, p. E1-5. The interview took place on July 25 with Gnistan editor Stefan 
Lindgren. 
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Washington's normalization efforts, and he stated that he did not 
expect any meaningful progress toward that end in the next one or 
two years. He suggested that the major problem between the two 
nations was not the Taiwan issue, but rather the US attitude toward 
the USSR.38 Nevertheless, in his report to the Eleventh CCP 
Congress, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng stressed the importance of the 
"three preconditions," and he expressed the PRC's determination to 
liberate Taiwan. He argued that this was an internal affair in which 
China would not tolerate any US interference. 39 
The Vance visit reaffirmed the status of the "Shanghai Com-
munique relations." Washington's optimism, however, was dispelled 
in early September when Teng Hsiao-p'ing, who had been reinstated 
in July, told Associated Press and Japanese Diet delegations that the 
visit had actually been a retrogression. According to him, Gerald 
Ford had promised to break diplomatic relations with Taipei if he 
would be reelected. Moreover, Teng revealed that he had earlier 
rejected Washington's proposal to establish a US liaison office in 
Taipei, while sending a full diplomatic mission to Peking. He 
condemned this suggestion as an attempt to play "two cards," with 
the PRC against Taiwan.40 Yet, he was clearly willing to compromise. 
As he had told Vance in their talks, although Taiwan was an internal 
issue, the PRC would consider the special conditions on the island 
and try to solve the problem with the US. 
Peking's displeasure with President Carter's seeming weakness 
vis-a-vis the USSR continued to be tied to the normalization issue. In 
October, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Yu Chan told the editors of 
Wall Street Journal and Asian Wall Street Journal that the Soviet 
threat was more important to China than the Taiwan question, 
although he insisted that the PRC would not compromise its basic 
stand on the island.41 In the same month, Teng asked all countries, 
including the US, to unit against Moscow.42 Shortly afterward, a 
38. See report of Huang Hua's speech to Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials in 
late July, Agence France-Presse, Hong Kong, October 17, 1977, as quoted in FBIS-CHI, 
October 18, 1977, p. Al. 
39. Hua Kuo-feng, "Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, August 12, 1977," PR, No. 35 <August 26, 1977), p. 42. 
40. Louis Boccardi, "Teng Says Vance Trip Set Back Normal Ties," New York 
Times, September 7, 1977, pp. A1, A2. 
41. Warren H. Phillips, "Peking's Posture," Asian Wall Street Journal <Hong 
Kong), October 20, 1977, pp. 1, 6. 
42. Interview by Claude Roussel, chairman and managing director of Agence 
France-Presse, October 20, 1977, as quoted in FBIS-CHI, October 21, 1977, pp. A1-4. 
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lengthy Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily] (JMJP) article likewise 
called for the creation of a broad united front. It quoted Mao 
Tse-tung's 1970 statement that he had placed "great hopes" on the 
American people. Interestingly, the article compared the US "inva-
sion and occupation" of Taiwan with the Soviet occupation of China's 
northeastern and northwestern borderland; both threatened the 
PRC's territorial integrity and national security.•a 
The year 1978 started with several positive moves toward 
normalization. Senators Edward Kennedy and Henry Jackson, both 
in favor of the process, visited China in January and February, 
respectively. They met with Teng, Huang Hua, and other Chinese 
leaders. 
At the Fifth NPC, which began in February, Premier Hua 
Kuo-feng emphasized his government's resolute opposition to the 
concept of "two Chinas." He declared that the PRC had placed its 
hopes on the people of Taiwan who struggled against Chiang 
Ching-kuo. He remained firm, however, on China's right to use force 
to support Taiwan's liberation. The new PRC constitution echoed the 
general policies on national reunification. 44 
Peking used the annual commemoration of the February 28 
Uprising as a forum to delineate further what the CCP leaders 
perceived as the instability of the Nationalist authorities and to hail 
the "glorious revolutionary tradition" of the compatriots on the 
island. The PRC encouraged military and administrative personnel 
in Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy, and Matsu to "take the patriotic road," 
while urging the US to accept the "three preconditions" and to give 
up any "two China" illusions.45 
In May, President Carter's anti-Soviet national security adviser, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, visited China. Both governments agreed on the 
strategic aspects of the US-China relationship, but neither brought 
up the Taiwan issue in subsequent public statements. The way was 
apparently cleared for final normalization talks. Privately, Brzezins-
ki told Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-p'ing that Leonard Woodcock, 
43. "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is a Major 
Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," PR, No. 45 <November 4, 1977!, pp. 10-41. 
44. Hua Kuo-feng, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern Powerful Socialist 
Country! Report on the Work of the Government, February 26, 1978," PR, No. 10 
(March 10, 1978), p. 35; and "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, March 
5, 1978," PR, No. 11 (March 17, 1978), p. 6. 
45. "CPPCC [Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference] Meeting Marks 
31st Anniversary of Taiwan Uprising,' New China News Agency (hereinafter NCNA), 
Peking, February 28, 1978, as quoted in FBIS-CHI, March 1, 1978, pp. 09-15. 
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who headed the US liaison Office, was prepared to begin "serious 
negotiations" on the process of normalization. He also assured that 
the Carter administration would not object to the antihegemony 
clause in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which was about to be 
concluded by the PRC and Japan.46 
NORMALIZATION AND THE FUTURE 
The final normalization talks were highly secretive, with their 
share of reversals. The determination of Jimmy Carter and Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing to accomplish the task with a specific deadline in mind 
kept the momentum going. The Chinese insisted on their "three 
preconditions," while the US offered three "preconditions" of its own: 
(1) continuation of commercial and cultural ties with Taiwan; (2) a 
statement on the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question; and (3) 
the right to sell arms to the Nationalists after the completion of the 
normalization process. 
In late October, according to Teng, normalization negotiations 
were in progress, and the Taiwan issue remained the "only 
hindrance."47 The Chinese urged that Washington should not allow 
its desire to maintain good relations with Moscow to be an 
impediment to US-China relations. 
On December 15, 1978, China and the US simultaneously 
announced their decision to normalize relations on January 1, 1979. 
In a joint communique, the two nations reaffirmed the principles of 
the Shanghai Communique, including the antihegemony clause, and 
they stressed that normalization not only served the interests of the 
Chinese and American peoples, but was also conducive to the cause of 
peace in Asia and the world. 
The Taiwan question was addressed in two separate parts of the 
communique. Washington noted its recognition of the PRC as the sole 
legal government of China, and stated that "within this context, the 
people of the US will maintain cultural, commercial, and other 
unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." Washington also 
acknowledged "the Chinese position that there is but one China and 
Taiwan is part of China."48 
46. "Dr. Brzezinski in Peking," PR, No. 21 !May 26, 1978), pp.4-6; and Martin 
Tolchin, "How China and the US Toppled Barrier to Normalized Relations," New York 
Times, December 18, 1978, pp. Al, Al2. 
47. "Vice Premier Teng at Tokyo Press Conference: New Upsurge in Friendly 
Relations Between China and Japan," PR, No. 44 !November 3, 1978l, pp. 14-15. 
48. "Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between PRC and USA," PR, No. 51 
<December 22, 1978), p. 8. 
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The communique did not explicitly address any of the Chinese 
"preconditions," although they were implicitly conceded in the US 
recognition of the PRC and its acknowledgment of Chinese sovereign-
ty claims over Taiwan. The document also accepted the US "precondi-
tion" of continuing cultural, commercial, and other "unofficial 
relations" with Taiwan. Despite a unilateral declaration in President 
Carter's announcement, many American critics regarded the want of 
a clause in the joint communique on the peaceful resolution of the 
Taiwan issue as a major mistake on the part of Washington. 
The two governments attempted to clarify the nature of their 
new relationship. Carter announced that the US would continue to 
have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, and 
he maintained that normalization would not jeopardize the wellbeing 
of the island. Simultaneously, the Department of State declared that 
the US would terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan a 
year later in accordance with Article 10 and would withdraw its 
remaining military personnel in four months. Washington would 
henceforth have no "official government representation" in Taiwan; 
neither would it have "diplomatic relations with" the Nationalist 
government. The US would, however, adjust its laws and regulations 
in order to maintain its commercial, cultural, and other non-
governmental relationships with the people of the island.49 Moreover, 
despite Peking's opposition to US arms sales to Taiwan, Washington 
announced its decision to continue to supply "carefully chosen 
defensive military equipment" to Taiwan after the termination of the 
defense treaty on December 31, 1979.50 
On the other hand, the PRC noted in an official statement that 
the "crucial issue" of Taiwan had been resolved between China and 
the US. "As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of 
the motherland and unifying the country," Peking insisted, "it is 
entirely China's internal affair." Apparently, Washington had been 
able to persuade the PRC to drop the term "liberation" from its 
rhetoric in favor of a less aggressive phrase.51 
In an unprecedented press conference, Hua Kuo-feng provided 
further clues to Peking's Taiwan policy in the post-normalization era. 
He reiterated the PRC stand that Taiwan was a part of Chinese 
territory, stressed the theme of reunification, and acknowledged that 
49. "Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China," Department 
of State News Release, December 15, 1978. 
50. "US Arms Sales to Taiwan," GIST: Department of State, January 1979. 
51. "Statement of Chinese Government," PR, No. 51 (December 22, 1978), pp. 8-9. 
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the US would only be allowed under the new diplomatic arrangement 
to have unofficial relations with the people of the island. Hua also 
revealed that the two nations had disagreed over the US decision to 
continue arms sales to Taiwan after normalization; according to 
Peking, such sales would "not conform to the principles of normaliza-
tion, would be detrimental to the peaceful liberation of Taiwan, and 
would exercise an unfavorable influence on the peace and stability of 
the Asia-Pacific region." Hua maintained that the PRC "absolutely 
would not agree" to the sales. 52 
During the first year or so after normalization, both the US and 
the PRC were determined to have their own way on the Taiwan 
question, even though the issue had been declared "resolved" in their 
public statements. Chinese leaders announced that the return of 
Taiwan was "now on the agenda," and they hoped that the task would 
be accomplished "at an early date."53 This was a somewhat surprising 
statement, since the island's reunification with the mainland had 
been a general policy of the PRC since 1949. The NPC maintained 
that Peking would "take present realities" into account during the 
process of political reunification. The PRC would, for example, 
respect the status quo in Taiwan, achieve reunification without loss 
to the people of the island, establish transportation and postal 
services between Taiwan and the mainland at an early date, and 
develop trade relations. The NPC also applauded the Nationalist 
authorities for their "firm stand" on the concept of "one China," as 
well as for their opposition to an independent Taiwan.54 As a gesture 
toward the US and as an affirmation of the belief that normalization 
had lessened tensions in the area, the defense minister of the PRC 
ordered the termination of the shelling of the offshore islands.55 In 
52. "Chairman Hua Gives Press Conference," PR, No. 51 <December 22, 1978), pp. 
9-11. For the full texts of Carter's announcement and the US government statement, 
see pp. 11-12. 
53. "An Unusual New Year's Day: Three Salient Points," PR, No. 1 (January 5, 
1979), p. 4, quoting a speech by Teng as chairman of the CPPCC; and "NPC Standing 
Committee: Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," pp. 16-17. 
54. "NPC Standing Committee," pp. 16-17; and NCNA (Peking), February 28, 
1979, in FBIS-CHI, March 1, 1979, p. Cl. 
55. "Shelling of Jinmen [Quemoy] and Other Islands Stopped," PR, No.1 (January 
5, 1979), p. 4. See also Ralph N. Clough, "The Taiwan Issue in Sino-American 
Relations," in William J. Barnds (ed.), China and America: The Search for a New 
Relationship (New York: New York University Press, 1977), with regard to the need 
for the PRC to induce and pressure the US, Japan, and Taiwan in order to bring 
Taiwan back under mainland control. According to Clough, such inducements and 
pressures were necessary because Peking was afraid of both an independent Taiwan 
and Soviet support of the Nationalists on the island (p. 157). 
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domestic politics in Peking, the Revolutionary Committee of the 
Kuomintang and the Taiwan Self-Government League gained new 
prominence in 1979 and 1980. 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing's visit to the US in January and February 1979 
marked the real beginning of the normalization period, with both 
governments emphasizing their mutual concern for global affairs. In 
the Teng-Carter joint communique of February 1, the two leaders 
noted their areas of "common interest" and "differing perspectives" in 
the international situation, and they made no mention of Taiwan.56 
Nonetheless, in an interview with four American television network 
commentators, Teng stated that his government would "try our very 
best by peaceful means" to bring about a reunification of Taiwan with 
the mainland. While recognizing the US determination to resist any 
PRC use of force against Taiwan, Teng insisted that non-peaceful 
actions would result only if the Nationalist authorities should refuse 
to negotiate with Peking for a peaceful reunification.57 He rejected 
any suggestion that China should renounce its right to use force. He 
must have reiterated these points in his private talks with US 
officials, although there was no reference to Taiwan in the joint 
communique · 
In March 1979, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations 
Act, which formalized the US stand, as enunciated by the Depart-
ment of State in mid-December 1978, that Taiwan's future should be 
determined by peaceful means. This new act further declared that a 
threat to the island would be considered a threat to the peace and 
security of the Western Pacific; it would also be of "grave concern" to 
the US. In an appropriate application of the "Japanese formula," the 
act, too, provided for the establishment of the American Institute in 
Taiwan, which would henceforth be responsible for the "non-
government" affairs of the American people on the island. Taipei 
created the Coordination Council for North American Affairs to serve 
similar purposes for its people in the US. 
The PRC regarded the act as interference in its internal affairs, 
and it was particularly piqued by the provision that Washington 
56. "Joint Sino-US Press Communique," NCNA !Peking), February 1, 1979, as 
reported in FBIS-CHI, February 2, 1979, pp. A3-4. As Ralph Clough argues, even after 
normalization, there would be "little room to expect that this act would lead to the 
early peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question." See Clough, "Taiwan Issue," p. 150; 
and his book, Island China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978>, pp. 
202ft'. 
57. "In Washington: Interview with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping [Teng Hsiao-
p'ing] by US TV Commentators," PR, No. 7 (February 16, 1979), pp. 19-20. 
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would continue to sell defensive arms to Taiwan despite the 
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty.58 Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Huang Hua informed US Ambassador Leonard Woodcock that 
Carter's support of the Congress on this issue would cause "great 
harm" to the new relationship between Peking and Washington. The 
Chinese media likewise charged that the act was "tantamount to 
saying the US will continue to regard Taiwan as a 'country' and the 
Taiwan authorities as a 'government.' "59 
Chinese criticism of the act, however, diminished after the initial 
flurry. Peking's attention was somewhat diverted by two Taiwan-
related court cases in the US. The first involved a suit filed to allow 
Taiwan's athletes to participate in the US 1980 Olympic Games, 
using the ROC flag and anthem. In Peking's opinion, a decision in 
Taipei's favor would result in a "serious political problem," but, as it 
turned out, the athletes were barred from the games. The second 
case, which went as far as the US Supreme Court, involved President 
Carter's authority to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with 
Taiwan. In spite of reversals in lower courts, the Supreme Court 
ruled in mid-December 1979 that the President had the authority to 
terminate the treaty on December 31, 1979. 
Vice President Walter Mondale's visit to China in August 1979 
evoked expressions of satisfaction with the progress in US-PRC 
relations. Teng Hsiao-p'ing continued to be disturbed by Washing-
ton's Taiwan policies and demanded that the US act in strict 
accordance with the principles of the bilateral agreement on estab-
lishing diplomatic relations. In an apparent return to the pre-
normalization line, Li Hsien-nien later told an American interviewer 
that complete agreement on the Taiwan question had not yet been 
reached.60 
When Peking announced its long-range goals for the 1980s as the 
new decade began, they included the following three major points: (1) 
opposition to the Soviet Union; (2) modernization in China; and (3) 
reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. Although there is 
58. For the text of the Taiwan Relations Act, see Hungdah Chiu (ed.), China and 
the Taiwan Issue (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), Document 35, pp. 266-75. Vice 
Minister of National Defense Su Yu called the act a "breach of trust" on the part of the 
US; see his interview with Japanese defense instructors, March 13, 1980, as quoted in 
FBIS-CHI, March 14, 1980, p. D2. 
59. NCNA (Peki,l)g), March 23, 1979, in FBIS-CHI, March 26, 1979, pp. K1-2. 
60. Interview with New York Times managing editor, Seymour Topping, cited by 
NCNA (Peking), September 27, 1979, in FBIS-CHI, October 5, 1979, p. B5. 
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sufficient support in Mao Tse-tung's teachings to postpone the 
solution of the Taiwan problem for some years, there are limits to 
Peking's flexibility on the issue.61 
As more conciliatory policies gained influence in the PRC, the 
annual commemoration of the February 28 Uprising was not held in 
1980. Peking was perhaps afraid that such an uprising in the future 
might lead to an independent Taiwan, thereby creating problems for 
political reunification. Though seldom publicly expressed, the CCP 
leaders have also entertained the concern of possible Soviet involve-
ment in the island. Such situations will likely drive Peking to act 
cautiously to protect its short-term interests. The PRC will tolerate 
the continued US presence in Taiwan, as long as it does not 
contribute to either independence or Soviet involvement, and as long 
as the Washington-Peking strategic relationship will remain benefic-
a! to China. 
Peking has vital interests in the stability of Taiwan's economy 
because of its future potential benefit to China after some form of 
reunification has taken place. The US influence on the island's 
stability and its resolve to take a firm stand against the Soviet 
Union's strategic maneuverings are both sensitive factors in Peking's 
policy toward Washington. The latter is the more critical issue in 
post-normalization US-China relations. Should the US resolve 
against Soviet threats weaken, the Washington-Peking entente will 
be affected, and the PRC will probably readjust its timetable for 
action on Taiwan reunification. Conversely, should the US remain an 
influential force both globally and in the Asia-Pacific region, 
Taiwan's status quo will likely be maintained in the near future. 
Hence, the "crucial question" of Taiwan remains to be settled, and it 
will continue to affect the relations between Washington and Peking 
in the coming years. 
61. Hungdah Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," in 
Chiu (ed.), China and the Taiwan Issue, pp. 192-93. For discussions of post-
normalization US-Taiwan relations and Taiwan's international status after normaliza-
tion, see ibid., pp. 186-88; and Chiu's articles, "Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing 
the People's Republic of China," in Journal of International Law, II, No. 2 !spring 
1979), pp. 404-16; and "The Outlook for Taiwan," Asian Affairs, VII, No. 3 
(January-February 1980), pp. 137-48; as well as William R. Kinter and John F. Copper, 
A Matter of Two Chinas: The China-Taiwan Issue in US Foreign Policy !Philadelphia: 
Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1979). 
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Chapter Four 
UNIFICATION AND MODERNIZATION: TWO DIMENSIONS 
OF CHINA'S NEW TAIWAN POLICY 
Byron S. J. Weng 
In a speech to the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) on January 1, 1979, Teng 
Hsiao-p'ing claimed that the New Year's Day of 1979 was unique, 
since it was marked by the following three salient points: (1) the 
focusing of the nation's work on the "Four Modernizations;" (2) the 
normalization of relations between China and the United States (US) 
and; (3) the presence on the agenda of the return of Taiwan to the 
motherland and the reunification of the country. 1 On the same day, 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NCP) 
issued a "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," launching a new "soft 
offensive." It called for an end to military confrontation on the 
Taiwan Strait, the establishment of links in transportation and 
postal services, the development of economic ties and trade relations, 
and the initiation of academic, cultural, technological, and sports 
exchanges.2 Thereafter, in a series of overtures, Peking moderated its 
conditions for reunification negotiations with Taipei. Apparently, 
Taiwan could maintain its status quo if it would only abandon its 
official name, lower its flag, and recognize Peking as the national 
capital. 
Taipei's official response was negative. Premier Sun Yun-suan 
maintained that the Republic of China (ROC) would never engage in 
1. See "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation, January-March 1979," China 
Quarterly (hereinafter CQ), No. 78 (June 1979), pp. 400-403; Beijing Review (known as 
Peking Review until December 1978) (hereinafter PR), XXII, No. 1 (January 5, 1979), 
p. 4. 
2. This message appeared in Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily] (hereinafter 
JMJP), on New Year's Day under the leading headline on the front page. For the 
English text, see PR, XXII, No. 1, pp. 16-17. 
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a negotiation to surrender. Instead, he challenged the Peking 
government to give up Communism.3 
On the New Year's Day of 1980, Teng Hsiao-p'ing spoke again to 
the same CPPCC group, this time on China's three major tasks for 
the 1980s. His speech was expanded and repeated on January 16 to a 
gathering of more than 10,000 cadres of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) at the Great Hall in Peking. He identified the tasks as 
opposing hegemonism and maintaining world peace in international 
affairs; working for Taiwan's return to the mainland and realizing 
national unification; and accelerating the construction of the "Four 
Modernizations."4 
Peking's new conciliatory Taiwan policy raises a number of 
questions that cannot be easily answered. Teng's three tasks for the 
1980s are essentially the same as the three silent points of 1979, 
except that antihegemonism has replaced normalization of relations 
with the US as the focal point in international affairs. In both cases, 
modernization is China's principal concern. In January 1979, a press 
editorial likewise described this concern as "the central task" of the 
CCP.5 As Teng affirmed in 1980, the core of Peking's three major 
tasks was modernization; this was the key to solving China's 
domestic and international problems. 
According to Teng, "a scholar of Chinese descent" expressed to 
him strong reservations about emulating Taiwan in Peking's drive 
toward modernization, because the island's economy "is actually 
under American control." Yet, the task of national reunification 
seems closely related to that of modernization. As Teng conceded, 
"unification with Taiwan cannot be accomplished unless our political 
and economic systems, as well as our economic development, are 
superior to Taiwan's to a certain extent." Nonetheless, economic 
development on the island is so far ahead of the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) that it is doubtful whether Peking can catch up with 
Taipei by the end of the twentieth century. Teng himself dared only 
hope that China's per capita GNP would by then have increased to 
US $1,000, a figure already exceeded by Taiwan in 1977 (Table 1). 
3. Central Daily News (International Edition), November 7, 1979, p. 1. 
4. The full text appears in Cheng-ming [To Compete in Expression) (Hong Kong), 
No. 29 (March 1980), pp. 11-23. 
5. "Historical Shift: All-Out Effort for Modernization," PR, XXII, No. 1, pp. 7-8. 
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How can national reunification be accomplished in the 1980s under 
these circumstances? Is Teng serious about this political objective?6 
Indeed, do the Peking leaders have an accurate and up-to-date 
understanding of Taiwan and its people? Is the advice of Teng's 
"scholar of Chinese descent" regarding Taiwan a wise one? Should 
the PRC dismiss Taiwan's modernization experience so cavalierly 
without examining the facts? This chapter attempts to answer some 
of these questions, while explaining the meaning of Peking's new 
Taiwan policy and exploring the island's potential conrtributions to 
China's modernization efforts. 
THE PRC'S NEW TAIWAN POLICY 
The new Taiwan policy launched on the New Year's Day of 1979 
had apparently been planned and approved at the Third Plenum of 
the Eleventh Central Committee and related working meetings of the 
CCP leadership during December 1978. Indeed, during the latter half 
of the month, Hua Kuo-feng, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ambassador Fu Hao 
in Tokyo, and other officials had clearly indicated that a new policy 
on Taiwan was evolving.7 
The tone of this new policy is conciliatory, and the terms for 
reunification seem, at first glance, to be almost too generous. PRC 
officials now speak of "the return of Taiwan to the motherland," and 
the term used in the 1978 constitution, "liberation" of the island, has 
been dropped. The government in Taipei is, at present, referred to as 
"the Taiwan authorities," instead of the "Chiang gang" or "Chiang 
clique." 
More important, instead of calling for the overthrow of the 
Taiwan government as it had done before 1976, the PRC now offers to 
6. Lu K'eng is a noted Hong Kong journalist with high-level connections in both 
Peking and Taipei. In 1979, he learned from some senior PRC officials that Peking did 
not really expect the unficiation with Taiwan to materialize for decades. For 
complicated reasons, the CCP leaders felt it necessary to maintain the present stance. 
Lu's information was included in a speech at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 
March 1980. 
7. Reports of an impending new Taiwan policy appeared in Hong Kong 
newspapers as early as October 1978 (see South China Morning Post, October 5, 1978, 
p. 6), and filled the front pages in the latter half of December. For a discussion of this 
subject, see Li Chih-yuan, "Chung-Mei chien-chiao yu ta-lu, T'ai-wan ho Hsiang-kang" 
[The Establishment of Sino-American Diplomatic Relations and Mainland China, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong], in Kuan-ch'a chia [Observers Monthly] <Hong Kong), No. 15 
(January 1979), pp. 15-19. 
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discuss with Taipei, appealing to common national interests and to 
the people's desire for reunion with their long separated families. It 
promises to make arrangements to assure that the higher standard of 
living in Taiwan will not be lowered; that the present social and 
economic system will remain intact; that the security forces will be 
retained and disarmament will not be required. After the transitional 
period, Taiwan can still enjoy an autonomous status. Meanwhile, 
Peking proposes to establish closer contacts with Taiwan.8 On 
January 7, 1979, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications held 
discussions about setting up postal links with Taiwan. On January 11 
and 25, a Ministry of Foreign Trade spokesman stated that direct 
trade with Taipei could be expanded in various ways. China could 
supply special local products such as wine, tea, porcelain, and herbal 
medicines, while Taiwan could offer industrial and agricultural 
products such as television sets, tape-recorders, sugar, bananas, and 
the like. Taiwan could even resell goods manufactured with raw 
materials imported from the mainland. The residents on the island 
were invited to the Canton Fair, and customs duties on goods moving 
to and from Taiwan were removed or reduced. Peking also proposed 
that the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait be allowed to visit 
each other. 
Furthermore, the PRC released a group of former Kuomintang 
(KMT) officials and sent them to Taiwan. It publicized a new policy 
by which landlords, rich peasants, and other bad elements who had 
been reeducated would be reclassified as normal members of com-
munes. It noted that Chiang Kai-shek's niece and other ex-KMT 
personnel in Chikou, Chekiang, had been freed from the landlord 
designation. Much has also been made of the rehabilitation of the 
national bourgeoisie and intellectuals, as well as other moves toward 
social democracy. 
For the first time, Communist propaganda does not depict life on 
Taiwan as "suffering in misery;" instead, Peking concedes that 
Taiwan is prosperous, a worthy example from which the PRC can 
learn. China's technical journals and literary magazines have 
reprinted articles published in Taiwan or by Taiwan authors. Scenes 
of Taiwanese tourist attractions have appeared on China's television 
8. Li Fu-hua, "Chung-kung yu Mei-kuo chien-chiao hou tui wo t'ung-chan 
yin-mou te fen-hsi" [An Analysis of the Chinese Communist United Front Conspiracy 
Toward Us After the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the United States], in 
Chung-kuo tsa-chih [China Magazine] (Taipei) (hereinafter CKTCl, March 1979, pp. 
70-75. 
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broadcasts and on special stamp sets. Symbolic shelling of the 
offshore islands has also stopped and troops adjacent to the Taiwan 
Strait were transferred to other parts of China. 
The tactics of this new offensive are wide-ranging and flexible. 
On January 9, 1979, Teng Hsiao-p'ing claimed that he had already 
sent several reunification proposals to the Taiwan authorities. Mass 
organizations, such as labor unions and women's associations, invited 
the Taiwanese to participate in their activities, while democratic 
parties, especially the KMT Revolutionary Committee and the 
Taiwan Democratic League, were resuscitated and made to work on 
the Taiwan question. Former KMT officials and relatives of present 
leaders in Taiwan wrote open letters to their compatriots, and many 
government units issued specific proposals for cooperation with their 
counterparts in Taiwan. The press, too, made certain that Taiwan-
related features, such as national sports events, were not slighted in 
news reporting. Peking also appealed to compatriots in Hong Kong 
and Macao, as well as the overseas Chinese, to work for the cause of 
national unification. 
According to press reports, Peking has been considering various 
reunification options. There is the Hong Kong-Macao formula, under 
which the PRC and the ROC will maintain mutually profitable 
relations, while allowing non-Peking rule in Taiwan for an indefinite 
length of time. The Tibet model will give Taiwan an autonomous 
status over a long transitional period.9 There may even be some kind 
of federalist relationship between Peking and Taipei. 10 In short, the 
PRC is ready to make concessions, if Taipei only recognizes Peking as 
the national capital. 
Teng Hsiao-p'ing and his associates have, however, refrained 
from painting themselves into a corner. They insisted that Peking 
would not forswear the use of military forces to achieve reunification, 
since such renunciation might discourage Taiwan from participating 
9. A Taipei radio reported in early 1979 that US Senator Sam Nunn had related 
promises by Vice Premier Teng whereby Taiwan might, in future, have a status 
similar to that of Hong Kong and Macao. See CQ, No. 78, p. 408. For suggestions 
regarding the Tibet model, see the Associated Press dispatch by John Roderick, in 
South China Morning Post, January 2, 1979. 
10. Peking has not stated that it favors a federal system, although leftist 
magazines in Hong Kong have discussed this possibility. See Hai-hsia-jen (pseud.l, 
"Chieh-chueh T'ai-wan wen-t'i: Hsi-ts'ang shih? Lien-pang shih?" [Resolving the 
!taiwan Problem: Tibet Formula? Federation Formula?], in Ching pao [Mirror Monthly] 
(Hong Kong), No. 18 (January 1979), pp. 12-13; and Huang Hsing-chih, "Chung-kuo 
ho-p'ing t'ung-i ts'ao-an" [A Draft Proposal for the Peaceful Unification of China!, in 
Kuang-chueh ching [Wide Angle Mirror] (Hong Kong), No. 77 (February 1979), pp. 
41-53. 
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in serious talks. Besides, as Teng told a visiting US Senate delegation 
on January 9, 1979, China might have to resort to force, should 
Taiwan refuse to hold discussion indefinitely, or should Soviet Russia 
attempt to meddle in the affairs of the island. Significantly, this 
important conversation with the Americans is conspicuously missing 
in both Beijing Review (known as Peking Review until January 
1979, hereinafter PR) and the special pamphlet, entitled Chung-kuo 
cheng-fu tui T'ai-wan te cheng-ts'e [The Policy of the Government of 
China Toward Taiwan], issued by a PRC outlet in Hong Kong. 11 
Peking is also unwilling to let Taiwan get away with the "one 
China, one Taiwan" or "one sovereignty, two government" approach 
to the question of representation in international organizations or 
conferences. On this issue, the PRC's concession is limited to allowing 
Taiwan to be present along with Peking if the name, flag, and 
anthem of the ROC are not used. 12 The concession is, however, 
significant since PRC officials have hitherto preferred to withdraw 
rather than sit in the same meeting hall with ROC representatives. 
Moreover, among the thirty provincial units in China, including 
Tibet and other autonomous regions, Taiwan alone can attend 
international gatherings on its own under the new tacit arrange-
ments. 
THE PRC'S MOTIVES 
What are Peking's motives in adopting this new strategy? The 
ROC charges that this is just another subtle and treacherous move in 
the continuing civil war, designed to capture Taiwan without 
sacrificing a solider. 13 Specifically, observers on the island have 
offered the following explanations: 
11. Chung-kuo cheng-fu tui T'ai-wan te cheng-ts'e [The Policy of the Government 
of China Toward Taiwan] (Hong Kong: San-lien shu-tien, 1979). 
12. Most notable is the case of the International Olympic Committee <IOCl. By a 
vote of sixty-two to seventeen, the IOC decided to restore the PRC's membership, while 
demanding Taipei to change its official name in the IOC to "Chinese Taipei Olympic 
Committee," and adopt a new anthem, flag, and emblem if it wished to continue to 
participate. 
13. Many articles on this subject have appeared in the KMT's CKTC; see especially 
the issue of February 1979. The thesis of "continuing civil war" is consistent with 
Taipei's earlier positions; see Hsiung Shu-chung, Chung-kung ts'e-lueh chi ch'i tso-fa 
chih yen-chih [A Study of Chinese Communist Strategy and Its Operation] !Taipei: 
Cheng-chung shu-chu, 1977), Chapter 5. Others have contented that this united front 
thesis does not explain the Chinese policy as adequately as the alliance model. See J. 
D. Armstrong, Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front 
Doctrine <Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978). 
84 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
First, the normalization of Sino-American relations has led to 
Taipei's growing diplomatic isolation, and Peking hopes to accelerate 
that process. Both Peking and Taipei seem to believe that if the ROC 
is no longer recognized by any government, it will have to consider 
seriously returning to "the embrace of motherland." A 1978 study by 
Taipei's Foreign Ministry predicted that when the US recognized the 
PRC, the ROC could only count on the support of Saudi Arabia out of 
the twenty-one governments with which the ROC still maintained 
diplomatic relations at that time!4 Similarly, Ch'en Yi-sung, a 
member of the Standing Committee of the NPC, told Kyodo News 
Service on December 16, 1978 that he expected the number of 
countries having diplomatic ties with Taiwan to dwindle from 
twenty-one to five or six in three months. 15 
Second, in Taipei's view, another thrust of the PRC's new 
offensive is directed specifically at Washington. The US-ROC mutual 
defense pact was nullified at the end of 1979, but the US is 
continuing to supply military hardware to Taiwan. Peking is trying 
to convince the Americans that their limited support of the ROC will 
no longer be necessary, as the Chinese are prepared to solve the 
Taiwan question by themselves. This explanation is plausible, 
judging from the politics of the Taiwan Relations Act adopted by the 
American Congress, as well as the PRC's protest over continued US 
sales of arms to Taiwan. 16 
Third, the New Year's Day message and all other gestures, as 
Taipei points out, are consistent with the united front "trickery" of 
the Communists, aimed at promoting dissension among adversaries 
and thus undermining their morale. 17 There are indeed sentiments 
and separatist tendencies in Taiwan which Peking can exploit to 
pressure the KMT authorities to look favorably toward the reunifica-
tion proposals. Older mainlanders, nostalgic for their homeland, can 
be lured into hoping for reunion with long-separated loved ones. 
Patriotic Chinese, too, may be attracted by the PRC's great power 
14. Frank Ching, "China: A Soft Line on Taiwan," Asian Wall Street Journal, 
December 18, 1978. 
15. South China Morning Post, December 18, 1978, p. 1. 
16. Hungdah Chiu (ed.), Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of 
China: Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Baltimore: School of Law, University of 
Maryland, 1978). 
17. See the January and March 1979 issues of CKTC. 
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status, something which Taiwan can never attain. 1" The prosperous 
new middle class, especially the young Taiwanese businessmen, can 
be led to believe that "maintaining the status quo," as promised by 
the PRC, will definitely be a better alternative to the threat of war. 
Fourth, with its united front strategy, Peking also attempts to 
"delude" the pro-Taiwan elements, especially the overseas Chinese 
and the American public. In the eyes of third parties, the reasonable 
conditions outlined by Teng Hsiao-p'ing and other PRC leaders may 
appear magnanimous, while Taipei's refusal to consider them may 
seem stubborn and unworthy of support. 
There is as yet little, if any, trust between the two parties, and 
trust is a prerequisite for meaningful negotiations. As ROC commen-
tators suggest, the "soft offensive" is but a call to surrender, for 
behind the offers of "peaceful unification" are plans to infiltrate, 
subvert, and eventually destroy the existing political and socioecono-
mic structures of Taiwan. To these commentators, Communists are 
Communists, and it is unrealistic to believe that they can be 
otherwise. 
Nonetheless, Taiwan's jaundiced perception of Peking cannot 
satisfactorily explain the motives of China's new policy toward the 
island. One must look beyond the united front thesis for more 
plausible explanations. For example, the PRC's current policy is 
doubtless shaped by its determination to pursue the "Four Mod-
ernizations." Compared to the pressing needs for a workable national 
development program and an effective birth control policy, political 
reunification is a low priority concern. Hasty moves against Taiwan 
at the present time may be counterproductive. While the PRC is 
anxious to obtain technology and capital from the industrialized 
nations, the latter, especially Japan and the US, are reluctant to 
relinquish their present lucrative economic ties with Taiwan. 19 
The PRC has probably come to realize that it is in China's 
interest to avoid jeopardizing the status quo in Taiwan. In order to 
promote modernization, Peking has put into practice in the last three 
years the "revisionist" line of Liu Shao-ch'i. Taiwan can assist China 
in the pursuit of the "Four Modernizations" if cooperation between 
18. Ray Cline, a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency, projected the 
perceived power weights for the PRC and the ROC in 1977 at 120 to 37 units, 
respectively. See Cline, World Power Assessment, 1977 (Colorado: Westview Press, 
1977), pp. 173 ff. 
19. See Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia Yeh (eds.l, Growth, Distribution, and Social 
Change: Essays on the Economy of the Republic of China <Baltimore: School of Law, 
University of Maryland, 1978l, Chapter 5. 
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the two sides develops. At that time, a booming economy in Taiwan 
may even help to stimulate China's own economic growth. It does not 
serve Peking's interests, therefore, to create confusion and panic in 
Taiwan through controlled air raids, blockade, or international trade 
squeeze.20 
Peking's Taiwan policy can also be construed as an offer of truce 
with Taipei in order to forestall Taiwan's use of the "Russian card," 
and to reduce internal unrest caused directly or indirectly by the 
ROC's clandestine operation in the mainland. 
The PRC's concern over Taiwan's "Russian card" is understand-
able. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had created by 
1978 a network of pro-Soviet states in South and Southeast Asia. 
Tensions at China's borders had been mounting, and Peking had 
found it necessary to wage a war to "punish" the Vietnamese. China 
would certainly feel threatened by the establishment of a Taiwan 
base for the Russian navy. A conciliatory truce offer could induce 
Taipei to abandon any thought of playing the "Russian card." 
Apparently, Taipei has not yet seriously contemplated the possibility 
of a USSR-ROC entente despite the Kremlin's overtures.21 Peking 
must have been relieved, since it was able to free some of its troops 
from the coastal areas adjacent to Taiwan for the anti-Vietnam 
campaign in 1979.22 
Internally, the PRC's pursuit of "Four Modernizations" must be 
supported by political stability and national unity. Taipei has been 
active in backing dissidents in the mainland through its propaganda 
machine and planted agents. As China becomes more open to the 
outside world, these agents are bound to have more opportunity to 
create trouble. A truce offer to Taipei would give Peking time to 
bring about internal stability. The new conciliatory policy toward 
Taiwan is therefore making a virtue out of necessity. 
20. To a lesser extent, the PRC wields similar power over Hong Kong and Macao. 
Walter Easey of Hong Kong Research Project, London, has written a provocative 
article on Hong Kong's future. A Chinese translation appears in Ch'i-shih nien-tai I 
The Seventies) (Hong Kong) (hereinafter CSNT), No. 119 <December 1, 1979), pp. 
67-71. 
21. John W. Garver, "Taiwan's Russian Option: Images and Realty," Asian 
Survey, XVIII, No. 7 (July 1978), pp. 751-66. 
22. For discussions on China's war with Vietnam, see "Chung-kuo yu Yueh-nan" 
[China and Vietnam), in Nan-pei chi [South and North Poles] (Hong Kong), No. 106 
(March 1979), pp. 6-14; and Kuo Ch'ien, "Chung-Yueh chih chan: Shuang-fang 
chuang-pei, chan-lueh chi chan-shu" [Sino-Vietnamese War: Equipments, Strategies, 
and Tactics of the Two Parties), in Ming-pao yueh-k'an (Ming-pao Monthly( tHong 
Kong) (hereinafter MPYKl, XIV, No. 4 (April 1979), pp. 19-26. 
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In sum, China wants to concentrate on its work on "Four 
Modernizations," and it needs political stability at home and peace 
abroad, as well as foreign capital and technology. It is genuinely 
concerned with the Taiwan question, but it may also have begun to 
appreciate Taiwan's potential contribution to the PRC's program of 
modernization. By late 1978, Peking must have realized the norma-
lization of relations with the US was necessary to ward off the 
Russian threat; this might also open the possibility of obtaining 
technology and capital from the West. Meanwhile, Taiwan (as well as 
Hong Kong, Macao, and the overseas Chinese) must be wooed into 
cooperating with, or at least acquiescing in, Peking's new ventures. 
These considerations, more than the united front tactics, are indeed 
the motivating factors governing Teng Hsiao-p'ing's three salient 
points, which included the new Taiwan policy. 
THE "FOUR MODERNIZATIONS" AND 
THE REUNIFICATION OF TAIWAN 
The program of "Four Modernizations" is politically attributable 
to the late Premier Chou En-lai and his associates, and those 
opposing it today may be castigated as supporters of the "Gang of 
Four." Mao Tse-tung is being attacked posthumously by his 
successors for his "red and expert" approach to China's development 
which has, according to his critics, made the present modernizing 
efforts doubly difficult. As noted by Jen-min jih-pao [People's Daily] 
(JMJP), "carrying out the Four Modernizations is the biggest politics" 
in Peking today.23 • 
Economically, the PRC can ill afford to postpone its work on 
"Four Modernizations." Its economy is beset with such serious 
problems as overpopulation and unemployment; imbalance among 
the economic sectors; bottlenecks in industry; low productivity in 
agriculture; an outmolded and inappropriate management system 
copied from Stalinist Russia; and serious shortages of qualified 
scientists, technicians, and managers.24 The people's standard of 
23. PR, XXII, No. 17 (April 27, 1979), pp. 10-13. 
24. See Hua Kuo-feng's report on the work of the government, presented to the 
Second Session of the Fifth NPC on June 18, 1979; and "Readjusting the National 
Economy: Why and How?" PR, XXII, No. 26 (June 29, 1979), pp. 13-23. See also Chien 
Yuan-heng, "Tui Chung-kung t'iao-cheng ching-chi kung-tso te yen-chiu" [An Analysis 
of Communist China's Task of Economic Adjustments], in Chung-kung yen-chiu 
[Studies on Chinese Communism] <Taipei), XIII, No.7 (July 15, 1979), pp. 63-78; and T. 
T. Hsueh, "Wei Chung-kung ching-chi cheng-ts'e k'an-ping yu ch'u-fang" [Diagnosis 
and Prescription for Communist China's Economic Policy," MPYK, XIV, No. 10 
<October 1979), pp. 49-57. 
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living cannot be improved without moving swiftly along the road to 
modernization.25 
The program of "Four Modernizations" is also likely to help the 
PRC's national security. Most observers agree that Peking does not, 
at present, have the military power to "liberate" Taiwan by force, let 
alone protecting its borders against the USSR and the pro-Moscow 
states in the south. 
Even in the ideological realm, the ruling CCP elites cannot fail 
to realize that the superiority of socialism over capitalism will not be 
proven by a Communist China frantically running in circles at a low 
level of development. Only through successful modernization can the 
PRC continue to uphold its belief that Communism will eventually 
triumph. 
The importance of "Four Modernizations" was underscored by 
Yeh Chien-ying's lengthy speech on the eve of the thirtieth 
anniverary of the founding of the PRC. "At the present," he claimed, 
"the Four Modernizations constitute the pivot of our political life. The 
security of the state, social stability, and a better material and 
cultural life for our people all hinge ultimately on the success of 
modernization, on the growth of production. Our work in every field· 
must revolve around and serve modernization." He urged everyone in 
China to "concentrate on this great cause of construction."26 
Compared to the work on "Four Modernizations," political 
reunification can hardly be considered equally important. Although 
both are national goals to be realized, yet at least for now, 
reunification with Taiwan has to be either laid aside or approached in 
the least costly way. Modernization, a rational desire for changes and 
improvement, requires immediate attention. The PRC would be 
gratified if, by adopting a new policy toward the island, the Taiwan 
question could be used to serve the program of "Four Modernizations" 
in some ways. 
Thus, the new Taiwan policy embraces the two dimensions of 
modernization and reunification. The emphasis on modernization has 
yielded a conciliatory policy toward the island, while the appreciation 
of Taiwan's potential usefulness has created a new element in the 
program of "Four Modernizations." 
25. James E. Nickum and David C. Schak, "Living Standards and Economic 
Developments in Shanghai and Taiwan," CQ, No. 77 (March 1979), pp. 25-49. 
26. The English version appears in PR, XXII, No. 40 (October 5, 1979), pp. 7-32. 
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THE PRC AND TAIWAN: SOME COMPARISONS 
The developmental processes of the PRC and Taiwan are so 
different that it is difficult to compare them in any detailed and 
comprehensive fashion (Table D. Nonetheless, they are both Chinese, 
sharing the same historical, cultural, and linguistic roots, and they 
are, by their own claims, two separate parts of a larger entity. It is 
therefore necessary, perhaps, to compare them in those specific areas 
targeted by the PRC in its program of "Four Modernizations."27 
In agriculture, Taiwan has been notably successful in its land 
reform program during the 1950s and, to a lesser extent, in its 
approach to rural construction in the 1970s. The land reform program 
transferred landownership to the tillers and transformed former 
landlords into new industrial capitalists. The rural construction 
programs, supported by a growing industrial sector, absorbed surplus 
labor, upgraded agricultural technology, and commercialized the 
rural economy. 
But Taiwan, as does the PRC, experiences problems of balance 
between agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of the economy. The 
ratio of agricultural product to gross domestic product has dropped 
from 38 percent in 1953 to 16.7 percent in 1972. The growth rate of 
agriculture has likewise declined from an average of 4.5 percent 
during 1953-1968 to a low of 2.1 percent in 1969-1972. Per capita 
income for agricultural households, though substantially increased in 
absolute terms, has dropped from 75 percent of that of nonagricultu-
ral households in 1954 to only 66 percent in 1972.28 This is not so bad 
as it seems however, at least as compared to the situation in the PRC. 
Since 1957, the PRC's population has increased by 50.6 percent 
while its cultivated land has dropped by 11 percent.29 Peasant income 
27. The KMT's CKTC published a special issue in October 1979, in which it 
compared the PRC with Taiwan in the areas of politics, economy (agriculture, industry, 
and trade), society, culture and education, and the military. The PRC was put in the 
worst light, while the ROC appeared remarkably successful and progressive. Some 
information in the issue is useful, however. 
28. Wang Yu-chao, "Chia-su nung-ts'un chien-she ch'eng-chiu chi yuan-ching" 
[Accelerate the Effects and Prospects of Rural Construction], CKTC, August 1979, pp. 
19-23; and Wu and Yeh, "Taiwan's External Economic Relations." 
29. Ch'en Ting-chung, "Chung-kung nung-yeh san-shih-nien lai te huo-hai" 
[Thirty Years of Scourge in Communist China's Agriculture], CKTC, October 1979, p. 
62; and Robert F. Dernberger and David Fasenfest, "China's Post-Mao Economic 
Future," in Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Chinese Economy Post-Mao, 
Volume I, Policy and Performance <Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1978), p. 6. 
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is so low that inclement weather can still precipitate famine in some 
areas. Many communes are debt-ridden and hard work alone is not 
likely to improve their poor conditions. At the national level, there 
are serious problems of coordination between the growth of agricultu-
ral production and that of population, as well as between agriculture 
and industry. Agriculture has become a bottleneck in economic 
development. 
The desire to improve agricultural production had led Mao 
Tse-tung and his supporters to initiate a nationwide movement to 
"Learn from Tachai." Defying nature and economic laws, this 
campaign brought little sustained benefit to the nation as a whole. 
Many communes squandered away valuable manpower and materials 
in their attempt to emulate Tachai's example of removing mountains 
and opening new fields. In a speech on "Four Modernizations" in July 
1978, Hu Ch'iao-mu, president of the Academy of Social Science, 
stressed that it was best to observe economic laws, instead of the laws 
of Mao. Hua Kuo-feng, too, admitted later that China's economy 
required restructuring because "in many areas and in varying 
degrees it violates objective economic laws."30 The Tachai model has 
since been abandoned. 
In industry, Taiwan experienced relatively rapid growth in the 
latter half of the 1960s during and after its fourth four-year economic 
plan. In 1963, industry overtook agriculture for the first time as the 
main sector of the economy. The ratio of industrial product to gross 
domestic product has increased from 17.9 percent in 1952 to 40.3 per 
cent in 1978.31 
Because of its limited resources and market, Taiwan has tried to 
coordinate its industrial development with an expansion in exports 
by means of such innovative ideas as the export processing zone. 
There has been no great leap, but the steady growth has been 
impressive and consequential. Throughout the last three decades, 
overall government plans have guided and helped private enter-
prises. Foreign aid and private investment have, by and large, been 
put to effective use. A structural change is taking place as Taiwan 
begins to develop heavy and more sophisticated industries on the 
30. The full text of Hu's speech appears serially in three issues of PR, XXI, Nos. 
45-47 (November 10-21, 1978). Hua's statement is derived from his report on the work 
of the government, presented to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC. 
31. Wei Yung-ning, ''T'ai-wan te kung-yeh ch'eng-chang chi ch'i chi-kou chuan-
pien" [Taiwan's Industrial Growth and Its Structural Change], CKTC, October 1979, p. 
72. 
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basis of its experiences in labor-intensive light industries. Some 
observers have even argued that the ten great construction projects 
completed during the 1970s have elevated Taiwan to the rank of an 
"industrialized nation." 
The picture in the PRC is comparatively bleak.32 The lack of 
material incentives and personal accountability for project mistakes 
and delays encourages wastefulness, undermines morale, and fosters 
apathy among the workers. Industrial production, controlled by 
central plans, is often based on unrealiable and unrealistic data. This 
is especially true in times of frenzied political campaigns when rigid 
ideological demands outweigh pragmatic decisions and stifle initia-
tives. Exaggerated claims of production increases are made; quantity, 
instead of quality, becomes the sole criterion. Consequently, valuable 
resources are wasted in the overproduction of low technology, low 
quality goods. 
In national defense, Taiwan relies on a smaller, but more 
professional and better equipped force than the PRC's. At present, 
observers generally agree on its ability to defend itself against a 
potential invasion from Peking. The ROC air force, in particular, has 
had an impressive performance record. The real test, however, is yet 
to come for Taiwan's defense capability, especially with the termina-
tion of the US-Taiwan defense pact at the end of 1979. In the final 
analysis, Taiwan's military forces cannot hope to match those of the 
PRC. In this, time is on Peking's side. 
Nonetheless, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in China has 
its problems, too. It suffered heavy casualties in the 1979 war against 
Vietnam, and it withdrew without accomplishing its goal. As 
commentators in Taiwan point out, the PLA's ills have been caused 
by Mao Tse-tung's anachronistic military thought. Moreover, the 
purges of P'eng Teh-huai and Huang K'o-ch'eng in 1959, as well as 
the Lin Piao affair in 1971, have substantially weakened the 
military's stature. Consequently, modernization of the armed forces 
has been retarded, while their capabilities have declined. 33 
32. See supra n. 24. 
33. Chu Liang, "Ts'ung Chung-kung chun-tui kan-pu ssu-hsiang lu-hsien te 
fen-ch'i k'an Chung-kung chun te hsien-tai-hua ch'ien-t'u" [ The Prospects of the 
Chinese Army's Modernization as Seen from Cleavages in the Thinking of the Army 
Cadres], in Chung-kung yen-chiu, XIII, No. 8 !August 15, 19791, pp. 75-81; and Ellis 
Joffe and Gerald Segal, "The Chinese Army and Professionalism," Problems of 
Communism, XXVII, No. 6 !November-December 19781, pp. 1-19. 
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'rhe problems of the socialist system and the disasters of the 
Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution have intensified 
China's weaknesses in science and technology. Vacillations between 
"ideo-logic" and "techno-logic" lines are not conducive to basic 
research and development in these two areas.34 Over the years, there 
have been some impressive achievements in medicine and in the 
development of nuclear weapons and orbiting satellites, yet China's 
recovery from the self-inflicted damages of the Cultural Revolution is 
likely to take a long time. 
For two decades, the PRC has been losing ground in training new 
scientists and technologists. According to the annual reports of Who 
Is Publishing in Science, there have been fewer authors in the last 
several years from the PRC than from Taiwan who publish articles in 
any Western language in some 5,000 scientific journals (Table II). 
One writer characterizes the PRC's "size of science" as "vanishingly 
small" in terms of published scientific literature.35 Who Is Publishing 
in Science lists 339,078 authors in 1977. While 327 of them were from 
the ROC, 137 were associated with the PRC. 
China's import of foreign technology increased around 1970, and 
it has since reached a high level. The PRC has been mostly importing 
complete sets of equipment; it would like to change gradually to 
importing mainly technology, "selectively purchasing key equipment 
and designing the engineering projects ourselves."36 Moreover, be-
cause of limited foreign exchange, China would have to pursue the 
goal of "Four Modernizations ... through self-reliance and hard 
work, not through purchases and borrowing."37 
TAIWAN'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PRC'S 
MODERNIZATION 
In spite of their differences, the PRC may, as suggested earlier in 
this chapter, find Taiwan's experience helpful to its work on "Four 
34. Hans Heymann, Jr., China's Approach to Technology Acquisition: Part Ill, 
Summary Observations (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1975), pp. v-vi, 4-9. 
35. Derek J. de Solla Price, "Measuring the Size of Science," in Who Is Publishing 
in Science (Philadelphia: Institute for Scientific Information, 1977), p. 20. 
36. "Importing Technology: Plans Readjusted, Policy Unchanged," PR, XXII, No. 
30 (July 27, 1979), p. 10. In his report to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, Hua 
Kuo-feng also emphasized the importance of technology. He spoke of building up "a 
number of model enterprises" that could pave the way for adopting modern 
management methods and advanced technology, especially in the major sectors of the 
national economy. This was to be achieved "by learning from foreign countries, 
importing technology, and exerting our own efforts in innovation and invetion." 
37. JMJP, May 8, 1979; translated in PR, XXII, No. 22 (June 1, 1979), pp. 11-13. 
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Modernizations." For Peking, a moderate policy toward the island is 
therefore desirable. The following are some of the roles which Taiwan 
can play in the PRC's modernization efforts: First, Taiwan can be a 
pilot project area for Peking. The island's economic success in the last 
two decades has, at least, some instructional value for the PRC. 
Second, Taiwan can be China's friendly competitor. As long as it 
remains civil, this competition may stimulate progress, and both 
sides will benefit. Third, Taiwan can assume the form of an 
opposition party to the CCP on the mainland, thereby offering the 
Chinese people a choice in governmental system and the way of life. 
These roles, however, suggest a much broader concept of 
modernization than the PRC leadership is, at present, willing to 
contemplate. According to an article authored by Chou Chen-hua, 
modernization is an historical and universal concept, instead of an 
unchanging, abstract notion. It has concrete contents and definite 
standards in relation to specific times and places. Chou views 
modernization as a technological revolutionary process of "equipping 
the national economy, defense and other units with the newest 
contemporary science and technology, reshaping . . . the entire 
domain of material production, and raising the societal economy and 
technology of a given country to the advanced level of its contempor-
ary world."38 
This narrow interpretation overlooks the social, cultural, and 
political aspects of modernization. It echoes the common Chinese 
interpretation as presented by Chou En-lai in 1964 and 1975, and by 
Hua Kuo-feng in February 1978.39 More thought, however, has been 
devoted to the matter since then. As Y eh Chien-ying announced in 
September 1979, China wanted to build an "advanced socialist 
democracy and a complete socialist legal system . . . and develop a 
rich and many-sided cultural life," beyond the four major aspects of 
modernization. Nonetheless, even this interpretation fails to consider 
the environmental and psychological consequences of modernization. 
In a speech on January 16, 1980, Teng Hsiao-p'ing identified the 
four conditions that would help to achieve the goals of the "Four 
38. Chou Chen-hua, "Hsien-tai-hua shih i-ko li-shih te shih-chieh-hsing te 
kai-nien" [Modernization Is an Historical, World-Wide Concept], Ching-chi yen-chiu 
[Studies on Economics], August 1979, pp. 19-22. 
39. Yin Chih-p'eng, "Chung-kuo te chiao-yu ke-rning yu ssu-ko hsien-tai-hua" 
[China's Educational Revolution and the Four Modernizations], in China Toward 
Modernization: Collected Essays for the Fifth China Week <Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
Federation of Students, 1977), p. 113; and Hua Kuo-feng's report on the work of the 
government, delivered to the First Session of the Fifth NPC on February 26, 1978, 
especially Part 3. 
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Modernizations." They were: (1) a firm and continual political line; 
(2) a political situation of stability and unity; (3) a struggling and 
enterprising spirit and; (4) a troop of able cadre, with professional 
knowledge and devoted to socialism. Many of the other conditions 
which have contributed to Taiwan's remarkable success cannot be 
duplicated in China, yet the island's experience in modernization is, 
indeed, worthy of Peking's attention. 
Specifically, the program of "Four Modernizations" needs a 
tremendous amount of capital. In 1976-1985, China plans to spend 
600-630 billion US dollars, of which no more than 400 billion can be 
accumulated through forced domestic savings.41l The rest must be 
raised from foreign loans and investments. As the PRC has already 
found out, this is not easy, since the capitalist lenders are demanding 
collaterals after advancing initially some easy credit. The 1979 Joint 
Venture scheme is likely to attract only a small amount of funds, 
pending enactment of auxiliary laws and regulations on property 
rights, taxes, and the like!' 
The ROC cannot offer China much capital, even though Taiwan's 
investment in the US and some Asian countries is considerable. 
Nonetheless, Taiwan's effort to introduce new technology and attract 
private investment from overseas by such means as the export 
processing zones is an experience which Peking cannot afford to 
ignore. 
The PRC also needs scientists, technicians, social scientists, 
managers, and highly skilled personnel. To train these experts, 
Peking must expand and improve its higher education. Yet, the 
Cultural Revolution has devastated the PRC's higher education 
system. Without such interruptions, China could have produced 1.5 
million more scientists and technicians in 1966-1976!2 
40. Estimates vary. These figures are given by Li Kuo-ting, former minister of 
economics in Taiwan, in "I T'ai-wan fa-chan ching-yen p'ing-ku ta-lu hsien-tai-hua" 
[Evaluating and Forecasting Modernization on the Mainland by Tawan's Developmen-
tal Experiences], Hai-wai hsueh-jen [Overseas Scholars] (Taipei), No. 84 (July 1979), p. 
5; and by Cheng Chu-yuan, "Chung-kung te ching-chi wen-t'i" [Communist China's 
Economic Problems], in Chung-kuo jen [The Chinese] (Hong Kong), I, No. 9 <October 
1979), p. 15. 
41. Ch'en Hsin, "Chung-wai ho-tzu-fa wen-t'i ch'u-t'an" [A Preliminary Analysis 
of the Laws on Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investments], CSNT, No. 115 
(August 1979), pp. 34-37. 
42. This is an estimate of the number of PRC students (about 150,000 per year) 
who could have received higher education in 1966-1976, had there been no Cultural 
Revolution. 
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By contrast, the ROC has produced an impressive number of 
well-trained and highly capable people in all fields through education 
at home and abroad (Table III). This is one of the major reasons for 
Taiwan's successes in economic development and overall moderniza-
tion. Indeed, the PRC has already begun to tap scientists and experts 
in various disciplines, who have received at least part of their 
education and training in Taiwan. Clearly, there is a serious 
educational problem in the PRC which Taiwan may help to remedy. 
Ironically, the fact that the island has not been "liberated" during 
these years may be a blessing in disguise for Peking. 
In China, scientific and technological training in the West 
continues to enjoy greater prestige than that in the USSR. The 
majority of the Chinese leaders in scientific and technical fields 
received their education in the West before 1949. In its exchange of 
students and scholars with the US after the purge of the "Gang of 
Four," China has admitted that the pre-1978 training of its 
university and college graduates was largely inadequate.43 They are 
not capable of engaging in postgraduate studies when sent abroad to 
the advanced Western nations. This difficulty is compounded by the 
problems of prohibitive costs and cultural shock, as well as the risk of 
defections. Peking has to decide whether to send more students to the 
West under the present circumstances. A report shows that there 
were only 2,230 PRC students abroad during the twenty-two months 
preceding November 1979.44 
Taiwan, on the other hand, has been sending students to foreign 
countries over the years (Table IV). For a time, there were complaints 
of the "brain drain" from the island. Recently, however, many foreign 
trained scholars, scientists, technicians, managers, and other highly 
skilled personnel have returned to fill key posts in Taiwan, and they 
have contributed significantly to its progress. There is probably a 
surplus of overseas Chinese experts in many fields who are currently 
unemployed or otherwise temporarily idle. It is sad that this should 
be so when their talents and skills are badly needed by the PRC. 
For linguistic, cultural, and nationalistic reasons, an expert from 
Taiwan can relate to the Chinese conditions more effectively than a 
non-Chinese. Should Peking be willing to minimize its ideological 
43. Chang Tu-sheng, "San-shih-nien lai Chung-kung chiao-yu te yu-hui tao-lu" 
[The Winding Road of Communist China's Education During the Last Thirty Years], 
MPYK, XIV, No. 10 October 1979), pp. 107-13. 
44. PR, XXII, No. 47 (November 23, 1979), p. 7. 
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differences with the non-Communist world, it could attract experts in 
Taiwan and the overseas Chinese in the West. This may cause some 
resentment among locally trained people in the PRC, but it is a price 
worth paying in the present situation. Indeed, Peking may want to 
send some of its students to Taiwan. In terms of China's immediate 
needs, Taiwan has much to offer. 
The PRC also has the "fifth modernization" problem.45 In the 
winter of 1978-1979, big character posters on the Democratic Wall in 
Peking called for a move toward democracy, with greater freedom 
and participation in public decision-making. Moreover, they favored 
the rule of law, with greater protection of human rights. To a limited 
extent, this sentiment is shared by many CCP leaders who were 
victimized by the abuses of the Cultural Revolution. But they are 
unwilling to allow this "fifth modernization" problem either to 
undermine their authority or to create social and political instability. 
How can the PRC mobilize its people to support the moderniza-
tion efforts without yielding to the demands for a more democratic 
political process? To maintain a proper balance, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and 
his associates have, on the one hand, encouraged production by 
offering material incentives, redress of past grievances, and greater 
freedom in decision-making at the production level, in the market, 
and even in the mass media. On the other hand, they insisted on the 
people's compliance with such regulations of conduct as the six 
prohibitive rules and the four basic principles.46 They also ordered the 
45. This is the key issue in the celebrated case of Wei Ching-sheng; see MPYK, 
XIV, No. 11 (November 1979); Chung-kuo jen, I, No. 11 (December 1979); and CSNT, 
No. 119 (December 1979). 
46. The six prohibitive rules, promulgated on March 29, 1979, by the Peking 
Revolutionary Committee, were as follows: (1) Citizens should obey the direction of the 
people's police when engaging in assembly or demonstration; (2) Assault upon party, 
government and military organs, and enterprise units was not permitted; neither was 
occupation of offices, obstruction of public business, or destruction of public facilities; 
(3) People were not allowed to incite strife, misguide the masses with rumors, do 
mischief, or libel and make false charges; (4) Citizens were prohibited from blocking 
vehicles or riding vehicles without ticket; (5) Except in specified areas, people were not 
permitted to post or print slogans, posters, big character posters, or small character 
posters; and (6) Slogans, posters, big character posters, and small character posters, as 
well as books, magazines, pictorials, photographs, and pictures that were opposed to 
socialism, dictatorship of the proletariat, CCP leadership, Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Tse-tung's thought were all prhobitied; so were those that leaked national secrets or 
violated the constitution and the laws. The four basic prinicples, announced in a JMJP 
editorial on April 5, 1979, reaffirmed the need to keep to the socialist road, to uphold 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, CCP leadership, and Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Tse-tung's thought. 
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incarceration of the boldest of the dissidents who dared not only to 
demand democracy but also to challenge Marxism-Leninism and the 
basis of Teng's power. During the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee, the CCP proposed to eliminate the following 
"Four Great Freedoms" from the 1978 PRC constitution: (1) speak out 
freely; (2) air views fully; (3) hold great debates; and (4) write big 
character posters!7 
By Western standards, Taiwan is not a shining example of 
democracy. For more than thirty years, the KMT's central leadership 
has ruled the island with firm hands. The Legislative and Control 
Yuans, as well as the National Assembly, are gerontological bodies 
claiming to represent not only the inhabitants of Taiwan, but also the 
nearly one billion people on the mainland.48 The island has been 
47. See the communique and resolutions of the Fifth Session of the Eleventh CCP 
Central Committee, in PR, XXIII, No. 10 (March 10, 1980), pp. 7-17; and Ch'i Hsin, 
"K'an Chung-kung ju-ho ch'iang-hua tsu-chih" [Let Us See How the Chinese 
Communists Strengthen Their Organization], CSNT, No. 123 (April 1980), pp. 55-60. 
48. (Editors' note) Of the 2961 National Assembly members elected in 1947, only 
1393 were still serving in 1971; of the 759 members of the Legislative Yuan, 434 
remained; and in the Control Yuan, where the average age of members was over 
sixty-five years, membership declined from 180 in 1949 to 69 in April 1971. Because it 
claims to be the only government of China, the Nationalist government was reluctant 
to hold a general election in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the ROC has had to recognize the 
phenomenon of political stagnation and the rising demands of its local residents to 
participate in the policymaking process. As a result, in 1972, 53 new members were 
elected to the National Assembly, 36 to the Legislative Yuan, and 7 to the Control 
Yuan. Their terms are three (Legislative Yuan) and six years (Control Yuan and 
National Assembly), respectively, according to the provisions of the constitution. See 
Yung Wei, "Political Development in the Republic of China," in Hungdah Chiu, ed., 
China and the Taiwan Question (New York, Praeger, 1973), p. 98. 
On June 11, 1980, the government announced further expansion of the number of 
new members for the above three bodies. In total 204 new members will be elected in 
Taiwan - 76 to the National Assembly, bringing the total to 1218, 96 to the 
Legislative Yuan, bringing the total to 412, and 32 to Control Yuan, bringing the total 
to 74. "Parliamentary Seats Added," Free China Weekly, Vol. XXI, No. 23 (June 15, 
1980), p. 1. 
Among the three bodies, the most important one is the Legislative Yuan. The 
election of 96 new members to this body will significantly revitalize that body. 
Moreover, many remaining members are too old or ill to be active. As a result, less 
than half of the remaining members regularly attend the meetings of the Yuan. So, in 
practical terms, after the recent increase of the membership, approximately half of the 
active members of the Legislative Yuan will be elected in Taiwan. See Hungdah Chiu, 
"The Future of Political Stability in Taiwan," in Taiwan: One Year After United States 
- China Normalization (A Senate Foreign Relations Committee - Congressional 
Research Service of Library of Congress Workshop, (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, June 1980), pp. 40-41. 
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under martial law since 1947, and the myth of "recovering the 
mainland" is still a national policy not open to discussion. The press 
is controlled, and magazines stepping beyond "acceptable" bounds are 
suspended. In 1980, eight leading dissidents were brought to trial in 
Taipei, and they were punished according to martial law.49 
Yet, it would be mistaken to argue that Taiwan is as undemocra-
tic as the PRC. To the common people on the island who acquiesce to 
his supreme power, Chiang Ching-kuo is benevolent. They support 
him because of his populist style, and also because of the success of 
his economic policies. Taiwan has survived international setbacks, 
and it has time and again reemerged stronger and more prosperous. 
The KMT government has relaxed its control, and it has even allowed 
local elections to take place, if only grudgingly. 
Perhaps the PRC can learn from Taiwan's experience in holding 
local elections. If one accepts the thesis that democratic tradition has 
never been a part of the Chinese political culture, what is taking 
place in Taiwan must then be considered a significant step toward 
the creation of a democratic process. Taiwan has indeed been 
experimenting with a limited democracy in the last decade, and there 
are promising signs pointing to greater popular participation in the 
governmental process. It may therefore serve the PRC's interest to 
allow Taiwan's experiment to continue instead of terminating it by 
premature unification. 
CONCLUSION 
In his fable of the "Foolish Old Man," Mao Tse-tung described 
imperialism and feudalism as the two mountains standing in the way 
of China's goal of achieving modernity and national greatness. The 
present rulers in the PRC name two more such obstables: (1) 
bureaucratic capitalism which they claim to have got rid of and; (2) 
economic and technological backwardness which they are now trying 
to eliminate through the program of "Four Modernizations."50 Yet, to 
accomplish the objectives of "Four Modernizations," the PRC must 
49. For non-KMT reports and analyses of the Kao-hsiung Incident, see the two 
issues of Ya-chou-jen [The Asians], published by dissidents in Taipei in Feburary and 
March 1980. On April 18, 1980, the eight defendants were found guilty and sentenced 
to life or long-term imprisonment. Peking condemned the KMT's "suppression of 
democratic movement." See Ta-kung pao [L'impartial] <Hong Kong), April 21, 1978, 
p.2. 
50. MJP, February 9, 1979; translated in PR, XXII, No. 8 (February 23, 1979), pp. 
5-6. 
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put aside Mao's revolutionary rhetoric, observe objective economic 
laws, devise realistic plans, import foreign technology, raise a huge 
amount of capital, train a large number of skilled personnel, and, 
above all, curb its population growth. 
Following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, 
Chinese leaders have displayed a more pragmatic and business-like 
attitude.51 There is a growing awareness of the worth of the 
individual and the need to enlist his genuine support in working 
toward national goals. To motivate the workers, the leaders have 
resorted to material incentives similar to the system championed in 
the early 1960s by Liu Shao-ch'i, who was officially· rehabilitated in 
February 1980. The general mood reflects a new realism and 
open-mindedness. 
In his report to the Second Session of the Fifth NPC, Hua 
Kuo-feng stressed the need for readjustment, restructuring, con-
solidation and improvement as the task for the PRC in 1979-1981. It 
is evident that China's modernization cannot be accelerated at will by 
Peking. The post-Mao leaders are realistic and courageous enough to 
recognize the shortcomings of their ideology and admit their past 
mistakes. They are now regrouping for their next move toward 
modernization, and Taiwan's possible role in that move is an 
important part of Peking's consideration. 
At a time when the PRC needs all the resources it can muster to 
push forward the program of "Four Modernizations," it would be 
foolish for the leaders to divert any of these resources to "liberate" 
Taiwan. The island poses no real threat to the PRC; it may, indeed, 
be helpful to China's modernization efforts. Moreover, the US and 
Japan are still keen on doing business with Taiwan, and it would not 
be to China's advantage to antagonize the Americans and the 
Japanese. 
Taiwan can play these positive roles in China's modernization 
only if it is free from Peking's direct political control. It would seem 
advisable, therefore, that China should leave Taiwan alone, except 
for certain mutually acceptable contacts. The KMT authorities have 
already rejected the idea of reunification with the mainland, even 
51. Ch'i Hsin, "Chung-kung wan-ch'eng liao chi chuan-wan: San-chung ch'uan-hui 
te t'ai-ch'ien no-hou" [Communist China Makes a Quick Turnabout: The Ins and Outs 
of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee], in CSNT, No. 109 <February 
1979), pp. 7-9; and "Chung-kuo ta-lu te chieh-chi chuang-k' uang ho chu-yao mao-tun" 
[The Class Situation and the Mlijor Contradictions in the Chinese Mainland], CSNT, 
No. 115 (August 1979), pp. 26-33. 
100 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
under the generous terms offered by the PRC. This must have been a 
factor in Peking's formulation of its new Taiwan policy in 1979, a 
policy which may well be calculated to permit the island to play 
certain roles as China proceeds toward modernization. Time will 
tell. 
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TABLE I 
PRC VERSUS ROC: 
A COMPARISON OF VITAL STATISTICS 
PRC ROC 
Area (thousand square kilometers) 9,597 36 
Population (millions in mid-1977) 885.6 16.8 
Literacy 25% 85% 
Life expectancy at birth (1977) 64 72 
GNP per capita (US dollars, 1977) 390 1,170 
Average annual growth rate, 1960-1977 5.1% 6.2% 
Gross domestic product: 
Average annual growth rate, 1960-1970 6.6% 9.2% 
1970-1977 5.8% 7.7% 
Working age (15-64) population, 1960 58% 52% 
1977 61% 63% 
Labor force in agriculture, 1960 75% 56% 
1977 53% 34% 
Labor force in industry, 1960 15% 11% 
1977 24% 27% 
Labor force in services, 1960 10% 33% 
1977 13% 39% 
Daily per capita calorie supply: 
1974 2,330 2,780 
As percentage of requirement 99% 119% 
Total manufactured exports: 
1976 (millions US dollars) 3,124 6,922 
Destination of manufactured exports, 1976 
To developed countries 32% 73% 
To developing countries 53% 24% 
To centrally planned economies 12% 0% 
To capital surplus oil exporters 3% 3% 
Per capita energy consumption: 
Kilograms of coal equivalent, 1960 683 583 
1976 706 1,797 
Physical quality of life index (PQLI)* 59 88 
Per capita military expenditures: 
1973 (US dollars) 19 53 
* The PQLI of the PRC and the ROC ratings are based on an average of each 
government's index ratings for life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy in the 
mid-1970s. 
Sources: World Development Report, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1979l; and 
The United States and World Development: Agenda 1977 (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1977!. 
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TABLE II 
NUMBERS OF PUBLISHING AUTHORS IN SCIENCES, 
IN THE PRC AND THE ROC, 1973-1977 
PRC ROC 
1977 137 327 
1976 102 292 
1975 107 275 
1974 136 269 
1973 47 226 
Source: Who Is Publishing in Science, Philadelphia: Institute for Scientific Informa-
tion, 1974-1978 Annuals. 
TABLE III 
HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLMENTS IN THE 
PRC AND THE ROC: 
SELECTED YEARS 
PRG ROC 
Total Population in Total Population in 
enrollments millions %* enrollments millions** 
1952-1953 191,000 590 0.037 10,037 8.29 
1956-1957 403,000 623 0.065 22,606 9.54 
1965-1966 695,000 722 0.097 85,346 12.81 
1973-1974 324,000 825 0.039 270,895 15.71 
1974-1975 440,000 839 0.053 282,618 16.00 
* estimated % of total population. 
% 
0.12 
0.23 
0.66 
1.72 
1.77 
** population figures in this column are averages of the two related years in each case. 
Sources: For the PRC, see Richard P. Suttmeyer, "Scientific Institutions," in Science 
and Technology in the People's Republic of China, Paris: OECD, 1976; and 
Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1976, United Nations. For the 
ROC, see Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Executive Yuan, ROC, Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1966, Taipei; China 
Yearbook, 1978, Taipei; and Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, ROC, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of 
China, 1976. 
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TABLE IV 
TAIWAN STUDENTS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, 1973-1977 
Other 
us Japan Canada Countries Total 
1973 1,650 74 30 212 1,966 
1974 1,992 74 43 177 2,285 
1975 1,824 112 139 226 2,301 
1976 3,173 156 111 201 3,641 
1977 3,369 156 44 219 3,788 
Source: China Yearbook, Taipei, 1974-1978. 
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